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i 
ABSTRACT 
In this research study, the researcher explores the democratisation process in the Middle East 
and North African region (MENA), with Libya as the case study. The study is based on the 
views of students and lecturers from universities in the three major regions of post-revolution 
Libya – Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha – and examines how the relationship between democracy 
and revolution is perceived. The causes of the Arab Spring revolution, as well as its economic, 
social and political implications are presented in the study, based on reviewed literature, and 
the perspectives drawn from the study sample. Finally, the researcher presents the challenges 
and barriers to the process of democratisation after the Arab Spring. 
 
In pursuit of these issues, the researcher explores the following main research questions: 
• How do students and lecturers describe the relationship that exists between the Arab 
Spring revolution and democracy? 
• What are the causes of the Arab Spring in Libya according to the opinions of students 
and lecturers? 
• What are the implications of the Arab Spring in MENA and in Libya? 
The study adopted a descriptive research approach, using quantitative and qualitative data. A 
major finding of the study revealed that there is a connection between the revolution and 
democracy, and that the barriers to the process of democratisation are inextricably linked to the 
political, economic and social implications of the Arab Spring, which has caused major security 
and stability repercussions in the country.  
The researcher argues that, based on the opinions of the study sample, the Arab Spring 
revolution was necessary to initiate the process of democracy, and the barriers to the process 
of democracy are linked to the imbalance of the political and economic structures of the 
country, including the cultural-tribal base of the Libyan society. In order to address the barriers 
to the democratisation process, the researcher argues for the development of a hybrid 
democracy that takes into consideration the broader political, historical and cultural 
sensitivities of the Libyan people, and the MENA region. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have previously 
possessed the ability to monopolise power domestically, which, in turn, resulted in the erosion 
of the state’s immunity against external penetration (Salih, 2013). Subsequently, sectarianism 
and ethnic enlistment, which, until recently, has been dormant under the ideological supremacy 
of Arab nationalism, has become apparent since the fall of Saddam Hussein, former Iraqi 
dictator, in 2003, and the ensuing uprisings of Syria in 2011 (Salih, 2013). The waves of 
uprisings have challenged the well-established supremacy of the governing regimes in the Arab 
states, and have paved the way for possible political transformation in the region (Salih, 2013). 
 
For decades, the people of the MENA region were subjugated to years of tyranny, dictatorships, 
and survived the aftermath of deeply entrenched colonial legacies (Kayrouz & Atala, 2015). 
More recently, a need for democratic transformation developed in the MENA region, which 
eventually found its voice in the eruption of the Arab Spring revolution (Aras & Falk, 2015). 
Since then, the region has been beleaguered by waves of popular protests, demonstrations and 
civil wars, as well as the deposition of leaders, which have incurred major implications for the 
region and the respective countries. Further destabilisation of an already delicate socio-political 
atmosphere in the MENA states, in addition to imbalances in the economic infrastructures, only 
exacerbated the implications of a revolution, even further (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013). 
 
Although some of the economic, social and political implications may be traced to colonialist 
legacies in the region, many of the problems faced by the people of MENA are the results of 
post-colonial governments and failing leadership (Ennaji, 2014). Many explanations have been 
provided as the causes of the Arab Spring revolution. However, Aras and Falk (2015) argue 
that there is a strong case for linking the causes of the Arab Spring, to discontent towards the 
ruling regimes. In contrast, Weyland (2012) asserts that the fall of the Soviet Union, and the 
so-called ‘third wave of democracy’, created the occurrences in the Arab world, some twenty 
years later. 
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For many people in the MENA, widespread unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, 
extensive corruption, the absence of democracy and equality, as well as foreign agendas and 
domestic circumstances are motivating factors that triggered the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen and Libya in 2011 (Hussain & Howard, 2012). Barriers that previously prevented a 
demand for democracy, especially those supported by foreign agendas, were now sufficiently 
obviated by the reaction of the populace of these countries (Zajac, 2014).  
 
The aftermath of the revolution has not only left Libya exposed to external infiltration, but 
internal instability, which has invariably affected its ability to institute political, economic and 
social reform, may pose barriers to the process of democratisation (Bogaert, 2013). Though the 
aim of the Arab Spring revolution in 2011 was a drive for social, political and economic change 
in the MENA region, the prospect of achieving a democracy still remains questionable, and 
people are losing faith (Malik & Awadallah, 2013). 
 
1.2 Rationale and significance of the study  
Though many researchers have provided arguments on the causes of the Arab Spring for the 
MENA region, the case of Libya has been under-studied (Bogaert, 2013). Unlike its other 
MENA counterparts, Libyans and others in the region, did not think that the Arab Spring would 
spill over into Libya, as the conditions in the country were at variance with those in the 
neighbouring ones (Hussain & Howard, 2012). Conditions, specific to Libya, were both internal 
and external to the state. Internally, the Gaddafi regime, in power for forty-two years, had solid 
control over the military and state, among others (Stepan & Linz, 2013). Further obstacles faced 
by the Libyan revolution, included the unchecked entry of non-politicised masses and arms into 
the country (Zajac, 2014). In addition, the Libyan revolution exposed the shortage of existing 
civil and military institutions within the Libyan society, as well as the failure of successive 
governments to achieve national reconciliation (Wilson, 2014).  
 
According to the researcher, the Libyan people are still experiencing a much harder transition 
from the revolution, to the initial stages of the democratisation process, and are still living in 
the aftermath of a revolution. The country faces economic, political and social challenges that 
have not yet been addressed by the interim governments (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013). These 
challenges and barriers cannot be addressed if they are not identified. Secondly, the challenges 
are linked to the political, economic, historical and cultural backgrounds of Libya. In order to 
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address these challenges, it is pertinent to examine the causes of the Arab Spring revolution in 
Libya, and the implications that occurred, as a result of it. Once these have been established, 
governments and policy-makers may use the information generated from this current study, to 
develop solutions relative to the challenges.  
 
Additionally, this current study focuses on the concepts of democracy and revolution, in order 
to understand how these concepts are understood by the sample of people surveyed. Based on 
the opinions of the sample, the researcher argues that Libya may be in need of the development 
of an alternate democracy that considers the social, political, historical and cultural 
backgrounds of the Libyan people. The development of a new alternate form of democracy 
may prove to be useful for countries, in which a conventional liberal ‘western’ democracy may 
not be workable.  
 
Though there have been many revolutions in the past, the motivating factors behind the Arab 
Spring revolution in Libya were to initiate economic and social reform, political reform, regime 
change and democracy. Therefore, a central argument presented in this current study is that 
whilst a relationship exists between a revolution and a democracy, and that the revolution/Arab 
Spring was necessary to bring about political change, it still requires important political reforms 
to accommodate local historical forms of political and cultural community. In terms of 
governments’ perceptions of protests, the interim government of Libya could learn from this 
current study that protesters are not necessarily against the political parties, but against the lack 
of socio-economic and political opportunities. Such a view might help mend the relationship 
between the state and its people, as well as pave the way for an easier transition to a democratic 
state. The researcher is of the opinion that the findings of this current study may lead to the 
government’s appreciation of the agency of communities. Additionally, the findings could 
assist the government to actively shape the state and society from the grassroots, based on the 
aspirations of the people it wishes to govern. The study may also provide valuable insight into 
the deep-seated tribal nature of the Libyan society, and that its cultural base may not necessarily 
have to be transformed to suit the state, instead a new form of democracy should be aligned to 
the tribal society. 
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1.3 Research questions 
 Main research question  
• What are the social, political and economic challenges to democratisation after 
the revolution in Libya? 
 Sub-questions: 
• What are the causes of the Arab Spring in Libya, according to the opinions of 
students and lecturers? 
• How do students and academics envisage the Libyan government achieving 
democracy? 
 
1.4 Arguments 
The researcher argues: 
• Argument 1: The revolution was necessary for political reform in Libya, in order to start 
the process of democratisation. 
• Argument 2: Economic and social reform is a major motivation of revolution and the 
lack of opportunities was not a result of revolution only. 
• Argument 3: ‘Tribalism’1 is not necessarily a barrier to the process of democratisation. 
• Argument 4: Libya needs the development of an alternate form of democracy that 
considers the social, political, historical and cultural background of the Libyan people. 
 
1.5 Aims of the study 
• To understand the political, economic and social implications of the Arab revolution;  
• To understand the relationship between the Arab Spring revolution and a need for 
democracy; and 
• To explore the barriers and challenges to the process of democratisation after the Arab 
Spring. 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘tribe’, ‘tribal’ and ‘tribalism’ are used in the context of the tribal system that refers to people who 
share a common culture and ancestry, and who live in a particular region.  
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1.6 Research objectives 
• To analyse the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and the need 
for democracy in Libya; and 
• To understand the challenges to the process of democratisation, after the Arab Spring in 
Libya. 
1.7 Problem statement 
Although the purposes and tasks of many theoretically oriented social sciences studies, in recent 
years, have been to critically explain the causes and events of the Arab Spring, additional 
research that examines the further implications of the Arab Spring, is still necessary, to 
determine whether it had indeed yielded some of its aims, in terms of political, economic and 
social reform, within the democratisation process (Hussain & Howard, 2012). The Arab Spring 
revolution imported global and historical significance, and is considered a process that was 
borne out of a need for economic, political and social reform in the MENA regions (Anderson, 
2011). Academic researchers have often examined the causes and reasons for revolutions, but 
the case of Libya has been under-studied, and still appears to be limited, in comparison to other 
MENA states (Bogaert, 2013).  
 
However, according to the researcher, Libya still lives in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 
revolution, and contentious politics have not addressed the very real issues faced by the Libyan 
people. In addition, the quest for ‘democracy’ has not even begun yet, and has been set off by 
basic democratic tools of elections and multi-partyism (Møller & Skaaning, 2013). Therefore, 
this current study aims to understand what ‘democracy’ means to the people of Libya, and their 
perception of how a revolution relates to it. Additionally, with its colonial legacy, dictatorial 
history of the Libyan society, as well as its deeply rooted tribal base, it is assumed that the idea 
of democracy may be almost alien to Libyan people, which may present another challenge to 
the process of democracy (Ahmida, 2013). Besides, pressing issues such as internal and 
external security, imbalances in the economic and political structures, the relationship between 
the revolution and a need for democracy, as well as how the people view that democracy, have 
not been dealt with, or identified (Jdey, 2012). The researcher is of the opinion that, in order 
for these challenges to be addressed, they should be identified and, subsequently, solutions 
should be developed. 
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1.8 Theoretical framework  
This study draws its insights from four approaches within the Social Movement Theory, 
namely, relative deprivation, political opportunity structure, resource mobilisation, and framing 
processes. Relative deprivation explains the quest for social change that develops from 
communal feelings of relative deprivation, in relation to economic and socio-political 
problems, whereas the political opportunity theory focuses on the significance of political 
factors that either force, or expedite the rise and the advance of protests (Dalacoura, 2012a). 
The resource mobilisation approach emphasises the importance of protest organisation, via the 
establishment of links between sections of the population. Framing processes aid the political 
opportunity structure resource mobilisation, by providing an insider perspective, which entails 
explaining the reasons why social movements mobilise from the social movements themselves. 
The use of these inter-related approaches may assist in the comprehension of the socio-political 
impacts of the Arab Spring in Libya, and how the actors of the Arab Spring used these social 
movements to bring about political and social reform. 
 
1.9 Delineation of the case  
Libya is divided into three major regions, namely, Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Sabha. This study is 
limited to the students and lecturers of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at the 
three universities of Tripoli (Tripoli), Benghazi (Cyrenaica) and Sabha (Sabha). The researcher 
is of the opinion that it will be interesting to note the different perspectives on the revolution 
from these three sites, and how the respondents feel it has impacted on the democratisation 
process, owing to the fact that the three sites are polarised in different directions. The researcher 
anticipates that this will provide rich data and significantly contribute to future studies of Libya. 
This current study aims to describe the relationship that exists between the revolution and 
democracy, according to the perspectives of lecturers and students, as well as how they imagine 
the process of democratisation is unfolding in Libya. The data generated from this study is 
reflective of their opinions only, and is not representative of the entire Libyan society. The 
opinions expressed may not be an actual depiction of the current political state of Libya, and 
cannot be generalised to the entire MENA region.  
 
1.10 Rationale for sample 
The military was not selected, especially, as, in the past, they have been funded, primarily, by 
the Gaddafi regime. It was assumed that their opinions may be eschewed, in favour of the 
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previous regime. The current National Libyan Army (NLA) support Field Marshall Haftar, and, 
as such, their opinions may be inclined in his favour. Regarding local businessmen, it is 
assumed that, based on the literature provided, a large sector of the economy has been funded 
by the pro-Gaddafi regime, and that their perspectives would be in support of the pro-Gaddafi 
regime. In terms of local street vendors, the researcher assumed that they may not have a deeper 
understanding of the processes of democracy, and the stages of its development, due to a lack 
of knowledge on the subject. It is assumed that their opinions would be in support of whosoever 
they received support from, and as such, would not be a true reflection of the actual processes. 
Additionally, the questions in the instruments require the respondents to have some background 
knowledge of concepts such as democracy, revolution, challenges to democracy and 
dictatorship. Therefore, it is assumed by the researcher that ordinary traders may not have 
exposure to these concepts.  
 Lecturers and students 
Although Libyan society comprises many groups, such as labourers, members of unions, 
the military, businessmen and traders, the researcher argues that, although the 
perspectives of these groups of people are valuable and useful, the opinions of students 
and lecturers, who already understand the concept of democracy, would be much more 
suitable to this current study. In as much as their opinions may not be completely bias-
free, the researcher assumes that they would be able to provide some insights into how 
they think democracy is developing in the country. The researcher argues that students 
and lecturers would be the best group to represent the views on the democratisation 
process, as the selected sample would form part of an academic group, and would be less 
prone to over-exaggeration and biases in their opinions. 
 
The researcher argues that the expertise and knowledge of lecturers, their exposure to the 
political atmosphere, as well as first-hand experience of demonstrations, would generate 
thicker and richer insights and information, regarding the impacts and implications of the 
Arab Spring on the process of democratisation. Lecturers with a background in political 
studies were able to provide additional insights into the current process, or conditions of 
democracy in the country. Additionally, both populations were easily accessible, and 
cooperated to participate in the study, ensuring a high rate of response. 
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Students have been selected as the second population, as they have historically played 
major roles in shaping the educational, political, and social landscapes of their countries. 
Besides, students with a better understanding of democracy, participate more in political 
activism. In the past, and more recently, students have played major roles in influencing 
political change through uprisings. Although most student activism is related to left-wing 
politics, there are those who have participated in right-wing movements (Branch & 
Mampilly, 2015). This was the case in South Africa, where students both supported and 
opposed the apartheid regime, and fought on both sides (Beresford, 2015). The researcher 
assumes that the opinions of students would be valuable in this regard. Countries which 
saw major changes along the lines of educational, social, and political reform include, 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Eastern Europe and the post-
Soviet Union states, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, 
Malaysia, México, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
United States, Taiwan and the MENA countries, to mention but a few (Jarausch, 2014).  
 
In Argentina, for example, during the University Revolution, student activism became a 
major force, where students fought towards democratisation (Rhoads, 2016). The student 
activism and resistance movements in Indonesia have, reportedly, enacted some of the 
biggest acts of student resistance in the history of the world (Rhoads, 2016). The 
university students were among the first to demand governmental changes, such as those 
student-led demonstrations of Jakarta, Medan and Yogyakarta, which spoke against the 
military government (Luescher-Mamashela, 2015). In Tunisia, for example, protesters 
were mostly young people, who also demanded economic and political reform 
(Anderson, 2011). In addition, most students have participated in demonstrations across 
Libya, and, therefore, will be able to provide first-hand raw information about the Arab 
Spring, as well as how they imagine it has impacted on Libya (Anderson, 2011). 
 
The last reason for selecting academics was related to the current instability of the country 
and the tense political atmosphere (Aras & Falk, 2015). The researcher feared that, due 
to the sensitivity of the subject matter, there was a risk of being exposed to danger during 
the data collection process. However, if the data collection was conducted on the premises 
of the universities, the risk would be less, and hopefully, non-existent. For these reasons, 
the researcher decided on students and lecturers as the population for the study.  
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1.11 Organisation of the study 
 
The study is divided into six chapters as outlined below: 
Chapter One: The researcher introduces and contextualises the research topic and research 
problem. The research questions, problem statement, main arguments and objectives are also 
provided.  
Chapter Two: This chapter provides an account of the state of Libya as the case study, as well 
as an overview of the history of Libya, including the ancient, colonial and post-colonial eras. 
The era of Gaddafi is also highlighted and, in conclusion, it provides an overview of post-Arab 
Spring Libya, leading up to current developments in the region. 
Chapter Three: This chapter provides a contextual account of the MENA region and covers 
the causes, outcomes and goals of the Arab Spring. 
Chapter Four: The research design and methodology used in this study is discussed in this 
chapter, together with the sample and sampling techniques employed for data collection, are 
discussed. The structure of questionnaires and interview schedules are described as the main 
research instruments in this study, followed by the ethics statement, in conclusion. 
Chapter Five: A description and analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data, in relation to 
the research objectives, are presented here. The major findings are related to the theoretical 
framework, from which the study’s theory derives. The researcher also provides a list of 
findings drawn from the data.  
Chapter Six The researcher presents an in-depth discussion of the findings and how they relate 
to the main arguments of the study, with a special focus on democracy and protests in Africa. 
Chapter Seven: This chapter presents towards a Libyan democracy, and the researcher, as well 
as principles for the development of a new alternate democracy, based on the findings of the 
surveys. 
Chapter Eight: This chapter will provide suggests guidelines for recommendations for 
policy-makers, recommendations for economic reform and recommendations for social 
reform. 
 
This chapter outlined the main arguments, research questions, problem statement, aims and 
objectives of the study. Finally, the rationale for the sample was provided, and the chapter 
concluded with the organisation of the study. The next two chapters provide a comprehensive 
historical, cultural, social, economic, political and geographical review, with a special focus on 
Libya, as the case study, within the broader MENA region.   
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LIBYA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an historical overview of Libya, as the case study. The chapter 
commences with an overview of the ancient, colonial and post-colonial eras of Libya. The 
chapter then reviews Libya after the Arab Spring as well as events leading up to current 
developments in the region. This chapter concludes with a summary of the sectarian conflicts 
that arose after the Arab Spring in the region. 
2.2 Libya: Historical overview 
The history of Libya is an extraordinary story in the Middle East, ranging from an Ottoman 
backwater state, to an Italian colony, and recently, from a traditional monarchy, to a 
revolutionary state. Libya is a country riddled with history and influences of the great Greek, 
Roman, and Ottoman empires of the old world. Through the ages it has succumbed to Arab and 
Italian colonialism that left a country, rich in Arab culture, in its wake (Wright, 2012). Libya is 
still in the process of attaining statesmanship, and, for the most part of the twentieth century, 
had been subjected to some, or other, form of marginalisation (Hilsum, 2013). It finally gained 
its independence from Italian occupancy, and was united, with the incorporation of the three 
major regions, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, in 1951, presently known as Tripoli, 
Benghazi and Sabha (Wright, 2012). These regions were side-lined, as a succession of local 
and foreign rulers shaped the social, political and economic landscapes of their country.  
 
During the Italian occupation (1911-1942), Libya was excluded from political legitimacy and 
participation, followed by political marginalisation, during the Sanūsī monarchy, and 
subsequent exposure to a new mode of socialism, prior to the military coup d’état of Gaddafi 
in 1969 (Wright, 2012). More recently, with the dust of Libya’s tumultuous political history 
not even settled as yet, it was refuelled with the revolutionary regime that sought complete 
political, social and economic reform (Capasso, 2013). Additionally, the degrees of 
separateness between the three regions were still tangible towards the end of the 1980s, and 
presented a significant hindrance for efforts to achieve a fully unified Libya (Hilsum, 2013). It 
is also clear that Libya’s historical separateness has somewhat impacted, and generated further 
political complexities in the new post-Gaddafi era.  
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The study of these three regions is essential to this research, as the three major universities are 
based there. The data generated will provide insight into the reasons behind possible political 
conflicts in Libya, and separatist creativities after the revolution.  
 Geographical background of Libya 
The name Libya was seldom used to reference what is presently known as modern Libya 
(Capasso, 2013). The inhabitants of the country were referred to as natives of the 
particular region they emanated from, and not as Libyans (Wright, 2012). Libya is the 
fourth largest country in Africa, and the fifteenth in the world, with an area of 1,760,000 
square kilometres, and a Mediterranean coastline of nearly 1,800 kilometres (Wright, 
2012). It has an abundance of natural resources, further intensified by the discovery of 
oil in the 1960s, bringing with it vast petroleum wealth (Capasso, 2013). 
 
Pre-independent Libya suffered from scarce resources, and to the outside, represented a 
poor desert state whose only important physical asset appeared to be its strategic location 
at the mid-point of Africa’s northern rim (Wright, 2012). It lies in a critical location, 
within easy reach of the major European nations, linking the northern Arab countries to 
those of the Middle East. Therefore, it was considered a bustling stopover and crossroad 
for travellers and merchants, and was exposed to external social and cultural influences 
(Wright, 2012). As a result, a large social divide emerged between the cities, with 
cosmopolitan cities, such as Tripoli, largely populated by foreigners, while desert 
localities were occupied and ruled by tribal chieftains, with minimal social change 
(Anderson, 2014).  
 
The most prominent features of Libya are, its location on the Mediterranean coast, and 
the Sahara Desert (Hilsum, 2013). There are no true mountain ranges, except near the 
Chadian border in the South, which mostly has rising highlands (Hilsum, 2013). Its 
productive agricultural regions are located along a narrow coastal strip and highland 
steppes (Wright, 2012). Further south, pastoral grassland areas abound, leading to the 
Sahara Desert, a desolate desert of rocky plateaus and sand. With only a few speckled 
oases, it retains insignificant human habitation and agriculture (Wright, 2012). 
 
Sirtica, is a region in north-central Libya and lies between Tripoli and Benghazi. The city 
of Sirte is located therein. It is famously known for its loyalism to Muammar Gaddafi and 
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was made the capital of Libya (as Tripoli's successor) for a brief period of 11 September 
2011 to 20 October 2011 (Hilsum, 2012). To the east, lies the area, historically known as 
Cyrenaica, with deeply entrenched Arab identities, and, in the past, was especially 
recognised by Arab states in the Middle East. The shore of Tripolitania is extended for 
more than 300 kilometres, where coastal oases are alternated with lagoons and sandy 
spaces (Wright, 2012). 
 
Cyrenaica has lesser coastal oases, for example, the Marj Plain, covering a small area, 
extending and rising to form Jabal al Akhdar (Green Mountain) in a limestone plateau 
(Wright, 2012). From Jabal al Akhdar, Cyrenaica spreads south until it reaches the Sahara 
Desert, eventually leading to the Chadian border, unlike Tripolitania which does not 
reach the desert. Sabha, historically known as Fezzan, in the south-western desert, was 
disjointedly administered from Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, during the Italian regime, and 
again during the federal period of the Libyan monarchy (Capasso, 2013). 
 
Map 1: The three regions of Libya (https://fanack.com/libya/geography/) 
In terms of borders, Tripolitania shares one with Tunisia, with countless legal and illegal 
crossings being reported, similar to the Cyrenaica province attached to Egypt, due to the 
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absence of naturally defined borders. However, the borders of Fezzan (Sabha) shared 
with Chad, Algeria and Niger, are rarely penetrated due to the region’s barren desert 
countryside (Wright, 2012). 
 
The three regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, as well as their political 
influences over the years, are of particular focus and interest in this current study. The 
three regions have their own unique identities, and were historically divided into smaller 
governorates and municipalities and maintained their specificity. In 1969, under the 
revolutionary government of Gaddafi, the provincial designation of Cyrenaica was 
officially amended to eastern Libya, Tripolitania to western Libya and Fezzan to southern 
Libya (Wright, 2012).  
 
The largest of the three regions is Cyrenaica, which comprises fifty-one percent of 
Libya’s area, followed by Fezzan at thirty-three percent and Tripolitania with sixteen 
percent (Chorin, 2012). 
 
2.3 The three major regions in Libya 
 Tripoli (Tripolitania) ‒ The western region 
Tripoli is a historical region, located in the north-west of Libya, which was originally 
inhabited by the Berbers. The Berbers are believed to be the earliest inhabitants of Libya, 
and currently known as the Amazigh.  
 
Tripoli, therefore, has had a long and tumultuous history and is considered the first 
republic to be established in the Arab world. In comparison with Sabha and Benghazi, 
Tripoli is the most populous region of Libya. In 1963, the declaration of Tripoli’s 
independence marked the creation of a consultative assembly, and a republican assembly, 
as well as the election of the members of both (Vandewalle, 2012). The world powers 
were all informed of the independence of Tripoli; however, the election of a president 
was deferred, pending the stability of the region (Wright, 2012). 
 
The military coup d’état of Gaddafi occurred in 1969 (Wright, 2012). Tripoli was the 
administrative capital of Libya, and the government of Tripoli comprised the Local 
People’s Congress (LPC), wherein different issues and matters were discussed by the 
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population. There were twenty-nine Local People’s Congresses; however, its liberty was 
limited by the former revolutionary committees, which by extension limited the 
democratic process, by submitting them to close supervision at all times (Ajami, 2012). 
 
In 1977, revolutionary committees were organised and assigned the task of absolute 
revolutionary supervision of people’s power; that is, they were to guide the people’s 
committees, raise the general level of political consciousness and devotion to 
revolutionary ideals. In reality, the revolutionary committees were used to survey the 
population and repress any political opposition to Gaddafi’s autocratic rule. In 1979 the 
revolutionary committees assumed control of the BPC elections. Although they were not 
official government organs, the revolutionary committees became another mainstay of 
the domestic political scene. As with the people’s committees and other administrative 
innovations since the revolution, the revolutionary committees fit the pattern of imposing 
a new element on the existing sub-national system of government, instead of eliminating, 
or consolidating already existing structures. By the late 1970s, the result was an 
unnecessarily complex system of overlapping jurisdictions, in which cooperation and 
coordination among different elements were compromised by ill-defined authority and 
responsibility. The ambiguity may have helped to serve Gaddafi’s aim to remain the 
prime mover behind Libyan governance, while minimising his visibility at a time when 
internal opposition to political repression was rising. 
 
The RCC was formally dissolved and the government was again reorganised into 
people’s committees. A new General People’s Committee (cabinet) was selected, each of 
its secretaries becoming head of a specialised people’s committee; the exceptions were 
the secretariats of petroleum, foreign affairs, and heavy industry, where there were no 
people’s committees. 
 
All legislative and executive authority was vested in the GPC. However, this body 
delegated most of its important authority to its general secretary and General Secretariat. 
Gaddafi, as general secretary of the GPC, remained the primary decision maker, just as 
he had been, when chairman of the RCC. All adults had the right and duty to participate 
in the deliberation of their local Basic People’s Congress (BPC), whose decisions were 
passed up to the GPC for consideration and implementation as national policy. The BPCs 
were, in theory, the repository of ultimate political authority and decision making, 
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embodying what Gaddafi termed direct people's power. The 1977 declaration and its 
accompanying resolutions amounted to a fundamental revision of the 1969 constitutional 
proclamation, especially regarding the structure and organisation of the government, at 
both national and sub-national levels.  
 
As the previous capital city, Tripoli was chosen as one of the research sites, owing to its 
rich historical background, as well as its role in the revolution. During Arab Spring, large 
scale protests were reported from Tripoli, which suffered the most significant losses, in 
terms of human life and infrastructure. Tripoli was viewed as the seat of power, and 
therefore, became the symbol of power for the pro-Gaddafi forces, as well as the anti-
regime fighters (Wright, 2012). For these reasons, the researcher, specifically, chose the 
University of Tripoli, Department of Economics and Political Science, as a research site. 
2.3.1.1 The University of Tripoli 
The University of Tripoli is considered the largest university in Libya, and is 
situated in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. It was founded in 1957, as a branch of the 
University of Libya, before becoming autonomous in 1973, and known as the 
University of Tripoli, as it still does, currently (Wright, 2012). Certificates and 
academic degrees that the University of Tripoli confer include, diploma, bachelor, 
Bachelor of Arts (BA), as well as Master’s and Doctoral degrees. The major 
colleges and faculties of the University of Tripoli include, the College of 
Engineering, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Faculty of Agriculture, 
Faculty of Education, Faculty of Information Technology, College of Science, 
School of Law, College of Physical Education, College of Human Medicine, 
College of Veterinary Medicine, Faculty of Medical Technology, Faculty of 
Pharmacy, College of Languages, Faculty of Dentistry, College of Literature, and 
Faculty of Arts & Media (Arjomand, 2015). 
 
 Benghazi (Cyrenaica) – the eastern region 
The eastern province of Libya is known as Benghazi, originally Cyrenaica, named by the 
Greeks as such, in 630 B.C., after the city of Cyrene (Vanderwalle, 2012). Originally, it 
was known as Koranaiah, which became Kyrene, then Cyrene and, finally, Cyrenaica. 
The region is also known as Burqa in Arabic, which was taken from the ancient names, 
Barcaia or Barcaei. However, Cyrenaica has maintained its Greek name (Wright, 2012). 
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Cyrenaica was declared an Italian colony in 1919 (Vandewalle, 2012). In 1943, during 
World War II, Libya was occupied by the Allied Forces, and subsequently, both 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania became British colonies (Wright, 2012). On 1 June 1949, the 
emirate of Cyrenaica declared its independence from the British United Kingdom. In 
1951, the United Nations granted Libya its independence, and the three regions 
(Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) formed the United Kingdom of Libya, and was 
governed as a federal state, with Sheikh Idrīs, as the leader of the Senūsī order. During 
the federal system period (1951-1963), the rule of the state of Cyrenaica, in the Kingdom 
of Libya, was under the leadership of the following governors: Muhammad Sakizli (1951-
1952); Hussein Maziq (1952-1961); Mahmoud Buhedmah (1961-1962) and Muhammad 
Sakizli (1962-1963). Subsequently, in 1963, the Libyan Kingdom was reorganised from 
a federal state, into ten governorates (Watanabe, 2016). 
 
Benghazi is the second largest city in Libya, and the largest in Cyrenaica. Benghazi has 
shared-capital status with Tripoli (Wright, 2012). This is partly due to the fact that the 
King and the Sanūsī royal family were associated with Cyrenaica, rather than Tripoli 
(Clark, 2004). Benghazi has been the provisional capital of the National Transitional 
Council (NTC) since 21 February 2011, and has all the institutions and organisations of 
a national capital city (Anderson, 2014). The General National Congress (referred to 
under the section on Tripoli) took power from the National Transitional Council on 8 
August 2012, and was the legislative authority of Libya for two years, following the end 
of the First Libyan Civil War. It was elected by popular vote on 7 July 2012 (Lieberman 
& Collins, 2012). 
 
Benghazi has been the seat of Libya’s parliament since 2011, which has led to a rivalry 
between the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, and sensitivities for power and authority have 
been exacerbated (Anderson, 2014). Rivalry between the two regions can be traced back 
to ancient Greek and Roman times, but can also be traced back to the era of King Senūsī, 
who was not supported by Tripolitania/Tripoli, and was based in Cyrenaica/Benghazi 
(Wright, 2012). In addition, the King and the Senūsī royal family were associated with 
Cyrenaica/Benghazi, rather than Tripolitania/Tripoli (Clark, 2004). After the coup of 
Gaddafi, loyalists to the Gaddafi regime were concentrated in the city of Tripoli, and 
during his rule, Benghazi was marginalised. This rivalry extended to the states of 
Benghazi (Cyrenaica) and Tripoli (Tripolitania). Therefore, the first uprisings emanated 
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from Benghazi/Cyrenaica. Because of this, the rivalry and competition to rule has always 
existed, and still exists, between these two regions. 
 
On 15 February 2011, popular insurgent movements erupted in the eastern part of 
Benghazi, with an uprising against the government of Gaddafi (Anderson, 2014). 
Benghazi, therefore, has been regarded as the capital of the revolution, where the initial 
protests started. In addition, it also has the largest university in the Cyrenaica/Benghazi 
region, which has been chosen as a research site. 
2.3.2.1 The University of Benghazi in Cyrenaica/Benghazi 
The University of Benghazi is regarded as the oldest and finest university in Libya. 
It was the first modernised university in the country, and covers an area of about 
460 hectares in the suburb of Qaryounis (Clark, 2004), in the south of Benghazi. 
The University of Benghazi was founded on 15 January 1955, after the 
independence of Libya, and was directly associated with the Libyan university, and 
affiliated to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Clark, 
2004). In addition, it was affiliated to the current National Transitional Council 
(NTC). Numerous subsidiary colleges are also affiliated to the University of 
Benghazi, in Qaryounis, namely: College of Arts and Sciences in Kufra, College of 
Arts and Science in Ajdabiya (a decision dependent of the University of Benghazi 
in 2004), Faculty of Literature and Science in Biar, College of Agriculture in Suluq, 
College of Arts and Sciences in the Marj (total dependency was relinquished to the 
University of Benghazi in 1995), College of Arts and Sciences in al-Wahat District 
(2003) and Teachers College in Qaminis (Clark, 2004). 
 Sabha (Fezzan) – the southern region 
To the south-western part of Libya lies the historical region of Sabha, formerly known as 
Fezzan, which is considered the desert outback of Libya, abundant in mountains and 
valleys (Wright, 2012). Sabha also houses a significant portion of the country’s oil 
reserves and was initially occupied by Italy in 1911. However, they were soon defeated 
by French troops in World War II (Hilsum, 2012). The main city of Murzuq remained 
under military French authority until 1951 (Hilsum, 2012). Fezzan (Sabha), like 
Cyrenaica (Benghazi), also became one of the three major regions, and agreed to be part 
of the United Kingdom of Libya, which was initially ruled as a federal state, and later 
divided into governorates (Wright, 2012). The rest of its history is similar to 
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Tripolitania/Tripoli and Cyrenaica/Benghazi. In early 1911, Fezzan/Sabha was occupied 
by Italy, however, absolute control over the area was not exercised until 1912, and 
stabilised when fascism surged to power in Italy (Wright, 2012). King Idrīs al-Sanūsī 
announced the United Kingdom of Libya on 24 December 1951. The district of Sabha, 
throughout the federal system period (1951-1963), during the era of the United Kingdom 
of Libya, witnessed several governors; Ahmed Saif Al-Nasr (1951-1954); Omar Saif al-
Nasr (1954-1962) and Ghaith Abdul -Majid Saif al-Nasr (1962-1963) (Anderson, 2014) 
 
Currently, Sabha is regarded as one of the most important regions in Libya. Sabha has 
been chosen as the third research site, as initially, the coup d’état of Gaddafi emanated 
from this region, and was, previously, the seat of the United Kingdom of Libya (Clark, 
2004). Sabha represents the old Libya, before Gaddafi came into power, and is perceived 
as the foundation for Gaddafi loyalists (Benkato, 2012). It has been chosen due to its rich 
political history, and is considered the last standing stronghold of the Gaddafi regime 
(Mokhefi, 2011). Additionally, the University of Sabha is also the largest in the Sabha 
region.  
2.3.3.1 University of Sabha/Fezzan 
The University of Sabha was founded in 1976, was established as an independent 
university in 1983, and is affiliated to General People’s Board for Higher 
Education. The College comprises fifteen faculties that serve more than 9,500 
students, including foreigners (Clark, 2004). These faculties include, Faculty of 
Human Medicine, Dentistry, Science, Agriculture, Arts, Engineering and Technical 
sciences, Economics and Accounting, Arts and Sciences and Teaching. 
 
Essentially, Cyrenaica/Benghazi has a longer history as an Arab region because it became 
arabised at a much earlier date, as opposed to Tripolitania/Tripoli (Vanderwalle, 2012). 
Cyrenaica/Benghazi was ruled by Arabs, whereas Tripolitania/Tripoli still has some form 
of residual strains of the indigenous Berber people. In the South, Sabha has remained a 
desert outback, with its numerous oases, and has become mostly occupied by minority 
ethnic groups, such as the Tuareg and Toubou (St. John, 2014).  
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2.4 Historical Background of Libya 
 Ancient era 
The earliest recorded inhabitants of Libya were the Afro-Asiatic ancestors, of which the 
earliest can be traced to the Garamantes tribe (Reitano & Shaw, 2018). They were 
originally Berbers of Saharan origin, and were predominantly based in what is referred 
to as present day Sabha, by about 1000 BC. They were considered a local power in the 
Sahara between 500 BCE and 500 CE. When the Phoenicians arrived in Libya, the 
Berbers had already been adequately established (Hilsum, 2012).  
2.4.1.1 Phoenician and Greek eras 
On the arrival of the Phoenicians in Libya, they established trading posts, due to 
the strategic trade route of Libya, subsequent to the development of commercial 
relations with the Berber tribes (Wright, 2012). During the fifth century BCE, the 
Phoenician Carthage colony had established its sovereignty across large areas of 
North Africa, bringing into existence the Punic civilisation (Anderson, 2014). The 
Punic civilisation settled along the Libyan coast, and occupied Oea, known as 
present day Tripoli, Libdah (present day Leptis Magna) and Sabratha (Anderson, 
2014). These three cities were together labelled as Tripoli, literally meaning ‘three 
cities’, from which the name of Tripoli originated (Wright, 2012). 
 
During the sixth century BCE, eastern Libya was colonised by the ancient Greeks, 
who established Cyrene (Wright, 2012). Subsequent to the development of Cyrene, 
the Greeks established four other major cities, which collectively constituted the 
Cyrenaica region. These cities included Euhesperides (present-day Benghazi); 
Barce (present day Marj); Taucheira (present day Taucheria); Balagrae (present-
day Bayda); and Apollonia (present day Susa) (Wright, 2012). The cities 
collectively were known as the Pentapolis meaning the ‘five cities’ (Wright, 2012).  
 
Owing to its great Greek origins, Cyrene developed into a profound Greek centre 
for intellectual and artistic activities, and made considerable contributions to the 
architectural and academic developments in the Greek world (Anderson, 2014). 
The Greeks of Pentapolis were subjected to attacks from the east by the Egyptians 
and from the west by the Carthaginians, but were eventually overrun by the Persian 
army of Cambyses II (Wright, 2012). 
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2.4.1.2 Persian era 
For the next two centuries, Cyrenaica was under the rule of Persia or Egypt. 
Alexander was greeted by the Greeks, when he entered Cyrenaica in 331 BCE. 
Cyrenaica again fell under the rule of the Greeks, and formed part of the Ptolemaic 
Kingdom (John, 2008). 
2.4.1.3 Roman era 
After the fall of Carthage, the Romans did not immediately occupy Tripolitania. 
Cyrenaica was eventually bequeathed to Rome, making it a part of the Roman 
province (John, 2008). This was followed by a succession of civil wars, until the 
Romans established conquest of the region, and occupied northern Sabha, which 
after Tripolitania, became a prosperous city (John, 2008). 
 
For over four centuries, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were part of a cosmopolitan 
state, in which its citizens shared a common language, legal system, and a Roman 
identity (John, 2008). This is evident in the ruins of Leptis Magna and Sabaratha. 
However, the distinct identities of the two regions still remained separate, a Punic 
Tripolitania and a Greek Cyrenaica (Hilsum, 2012). 
 
The decline of the Roman Empire, in the fifth century, witnessed the emergence of 
decadent classical cities, which were further accelerated by the destructive 
conquests of the Vandals (John, 2008). Vandal domination contributed to the 
disruption of the old Roman political and social order. The Justinian’s re-conquests 
of the sixth century planned to consolidate the old cities, but attempts were futile, 
as the cities had fallen to disuse, including Cyrenaica, which later was transformed 
into an armed camp. Byzantine rule also prevented the ascendancy of the Amazigh 
nomads in the coastal region, for one and a half centuries, but eventually weakened 
and dissipated towards the beginning of the seventh century (Hilsum, 2012). 
Unpopular Byzantine rule was met with numerous Amazigh rebellions, which 
presented an opportunity for Arab invasion (Wright, 2012). 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have been 
influenced, significantly, by numerous cultures, such as the Phoenicians, Greeks, 
Roman, Egyptian and Arabs, and to a lesser degree the Persians, Jewish, Vandals 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
21 
and Byzantine cultures. However, Sabha was primarily influenced by the Islamic 
Arab culture and sustained a powerful Garamantes kingdom (Varvelli, 2013). 
 Colonial era 
2.4.2.1 Islamic era  
In the seventh century, Arab conquerors entered the Pentapolis, and were met with 
little resistance (Varvelli, 2013). Subsequently, Cyrenaica was conquered and 
renamed Burqa by the Arabs. This was soon followed by Tripolitania and 
eventually, Fezzan (Varvelli, 2013). Thereafter, Libya was ruled for centuries by a 
series of Islamic autonomic dynasties, ranging from the Ummayad and Abbasid 
dynasties, to the Fatimid caliphates of the time (John, 2008). Arab rule was 
imposed, effortlessly, on the locals, which led to the development and prosperity of 
many towns, while Arab patronage provided locals with security of person and 
land, and therefore, was not overtly challenged (Wright, 2012). This resulted in the 
conversion on many Berbers to the religion of Islam, even though they resisted 
Arab political rule (John, 2008). 
2.4.2.2 Ottoman era 
Tripoli was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in 1551, which was extended to Sabha 
in 1580; however, Cyrenaica did not fall under Ottoman authority (Wright, 2012). 
This period was characterised by frequent mutinies and coups, and eventually, 
Cyrenaica succumbed to Ottoman rule (Wright, 2012). After years of mutinies and 
constant exchange of leaders, Tripolitania eventually came under the leadership of 
Ahmed, and acted as an independent kingdom, surviving several dynastic crises, 
without invasion. During the Libyan civil war (1791-1795), which resulted in the 
deposition of Hamet Karamanli by the Turkish officer, Ali Benghul, Tripolitania 
was restored to Ottoman rule (Gazzini, 2009). It was only during the rule of Yusuf 
(1795-1832), that the independence of Tripolitania was regained and re-established 
(John, 2008). 
 
During the early 1800s, a war erupted between the United States and Tripolitania, 
resulting in a series of battles, which was later named the First and Second Barbary 
Wars (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). By 1819 the economy of Tripolitania dissipated, 
owing to treaties of the Napoleonic Wars that enforced the desistance of piracy in 
the region (John, 2008). The throne of Yusuf was abdicated to his son, Ali II, in 
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1832, resulting in a civil war. Consequently, Ali II was deposed by Ottoman, Sultan 
Mahmud II, marking the abrupt conclusion of the Karamanli dynasty, and the dawn 
of an independent Tripolitania era. However, the order did not last, and was easily 
disrupted by the Libyan revolt, led by Abd-El-Gelil and Gûma ben Khalifa, whose 
rule lasted until 1858 (Wright, 2012). 
 
A period of direct Ottoman rule followed that instated administrative changes, and 
realised a somewhat greater sense of order in the governance of the three regions. 
Subsequently, European colonial interests were directed to the marginal Turkish 
provinces of Libya (Gazzini, 2009). The Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912) brought 
about some form of reunification.  
2.4.2.3  Italian colonial era 
Italian occupation started from 1911, when the three regions were reorganised into 
colonies (Gazzini, 2009). Libya was seized by the Italians, following a brief war in 
1912. This was met with Libyan resistance, after which fighting erupted. The 
British brokered a truce, subsequent to Italy joining the Allies in World War I, in 
1915 (John, 2008). This was followed by more fighting after the war, resulting in 
an extended colonial war (Gazzini, 2009). Italy was determined to colonise Libya, 
with grand ideas of re-establishing the Roman Empire in the region, by Mussolini.  
 
In the hope of realising this dream, Mussolini declared a merciless campaign, to 
arrest Libyan resistance to Italian rule (Wright, 2012). The coastal cities were the 
first to be sieged by Italian rule, but the interior posed some difficulties for them. 
The regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were unified under colonial rule in 1929.  
 
During the mid-nineteenth century, Italy was unable to participate in the scramble 
for Africa campaign, because it was not a unified state, until after 1860 (Gazzini, 
2009). This campaign sought, essentially, to partition Africa, to be claimed by 
overseas European countries. However, the eyes of Europe were not set on the 
insignificant poor colonies in East Africa, but on Tunisia, due to its proximity to 
Sicily. However, it was seized by the French (Wright, 2012). 
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As a fall back, and bereft of Tunisia, the Italians focused on Libya, which was still 
notionally under Ottoman Turkish rule, and, at the time, exerted very little control 
over the area (Gazzini, 2009). Libya presented itself as an ideal colony, and Italy 
started with the development of economic interests in the area. A diplomatic 
campaign was initiated by the Italians, in the hope of gaining Great Power 
recognition that Libya was within the Italian sphere of influence. Thereafter, Italy 
crafted a crisis, claiming that the Turks armed the local Arabs, and demanded the 
right to occupy Libya (Wright, 2012). This was in reference to the then Ottoman 
provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in order to preserve Italian interests 
(Wright, 2012). On refusal by the Ottomans to reply, Italy decided to declare war, 
which was known as the Italian-Turkish War [1911-1912] (Gazzini, 2009). 
 
War was declared on the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman army was significantly 
weakened, as the Italian navy barraged the main ports (Sawani, 2012). On 3 
October 1911, Tripoli was seized and met with minimal resistance. This was 
followed by the occupancy of Tobruk, Al Khums, Darnah and Benghazi (Sawani, 
2012). The small Ottoman forces of 5,000 troops were no match for the Italian 
expeditionary force of about 35,000 men (Wright, 2012). By arming the Arab 
tribes, Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), resisted the Italians (Wright, 
2012). However, due to a more pressing war in the Balkans, the Ottomans yielded 
Libya to the Italians (Gazzini, 2009), and independence was awarded, by the 
Ottoman Empire, to the regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in adherence to the 
terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, in October 1912 (Gazzini, 2009). 
2.4.2.4 Sanūsī era 
The Sanūsī’s, therefore, were forced to resist Italian violations, without Ottoman 
intervention, leading to the immediate annexation of both the provinces of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the Italian colony (John, 2008). Under the Treaty of 
Lausanne, the Sultan was allowed religious jurisdiction, owing to his position of 
caliph (leader of Islam). The Italians allowed this privilege, fully aware that Islamic 
courts exercised religious authority, which also extended to civil matters. As a 
result, Ottoman influence was perpetuated in Libya (Wright, 2012).  
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During World War I, Libyan nationalists were torn between the pro-British and the 
pro-Ottoman, and eventually directed their allegiance towards the Ottomans, their 
former colonial masters (John, 2008). As a result, the First Italo-Sanūsī War was 
initiated, and in November 1915, an uprising against the Italians was staged by 
Sanūsī tribesmen (Wright, 2012). The uprising was a relatively limited action; 
however, it did cause the deployment of a substantial Allied force, with 110,000 
British, French and Italian troops, which resulted in truce terms by April 1917 
(John, 2008).  
 
Italy was unable to extend its authority well beyond the coastal cities, due to the 
Muslim Bedouin tribesmen, who were against Italian rule (John, 2008). Even 
though Arab nationalism was a poignant movement, at the time, the nationalistic 
divisions between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were still significant. In addition, 
major splits occurred in the two regions, more so in Tripolitania. Consequently, 
units under the Sanūsī leadership of Ahmad ash-Sharif, efficiently repelled the 
Italians in Cyrenaica, Sabha, and southern Tripolitania (Wright, 2012). Because of 
the absence of Sanūsī influence in northern Tripolitania, the Italians were more 
effective in establishing their authority there (Anderson, 2014). In addition, tribal 
rivalries made effective resistance to the Italians impossible, who later became 
entangled in World War I (Wright, 2012). The Sanūsī resistance erupted, and 
became known as the First Italo-Sanūsī War (1914-17). 
 
After successful defeat of Ahmad by the British, military and political leadership 
was granted to Idrīs Sanūsī, who recognised Britain as an ally, and was determined 
to resist the Italians (Benkato, 2012). Negotiations with the Allies, on behalf of 
Cyrenaica, began in 1917, resulting in a truce, as neither side compromised their 
claims (Wright, 2012). Eventually, Idrīs was officially recognised by the Italians 
and British as the emir of interior Cyrenaica. The future status of Cyrenaica was 
held in abeyance, until the conclusion of World War I.  
2.4.2.5 Modern colonial Libya 
In 1934, Italo Balbo, who was appointed as the governor of Libya, by Mussolini, 
divided the area into four official provinces, namely, Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi 
and Darnah (Wright, 2012). Sabha was renamed South Tripolitania and remained 
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a military territory. All government positions were occupied by Italians and Italy 
invested heavily in the transportation and economic infrastructure of Libya, leading 
to the development of two economic sectors (John, 2008). The one was the 
traditional village Arab agricultural economy, and the other, a dominating modern 
Italian sector (Vanderwalle 2012). 
 
At that time, the alleviation of over-population and unemployment in Italy was the 
major goals of the Italian colonialists (Wright, 2012). Therefore, Mussolini’s 
design was to turn Libya into a politically and ethnically transformed colony. In an 
attempt to realise this goal, thousands of settlers were imported and given the lands 
of the local Bedouins (Vanderwalle 2012). The Italian authorities brought modern 
medical care and sanitation to Libya, and invested heavily in the country, in order 
to extract Libya’s natural resources, much to the disadvantage of local Arab 
Libyans (Gazzini, 2009). Therefore, even though schools were erected, they were 
destined for Italian settlers, and not Libyans, leading to a gross level of 
underdevelopment among the Arabs, who did not receive modern education. 
 
During the period from 1943 to 1951, Libya was subjected to Allied occupation. 
The Italian provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were under British 
administration, and Sabha under the French (Vanderwalle, 2012). King Idrīs 
Sunūssī returned from exile in Cairo, but refused to take up residence in Cyrenaica, 
until certain aspects of foreign intervention and control were disbarred. Subject to 
the terms of this treaty, Italy along with the Allied forces relinquished all power 
and claims to Libya (Wright, 2012). At the onset of World War II, approximately 
150,000 Italian settlers formed about one-fifth of the country’s total population. 
The North Africa campaigns (1941-1943) caused the destruction of Italian 
economic development in the area (John, 2008). 
 
Tripolitania, by contrast, showed considerable economic and administrative 
development and growth, but stagnated and decayed towards the mid-forties 
(Wright, 2012). During that time, Libya was not only divided into three major 
regions, but was also under-populated and impoverished. The three regions each 
had their distinct political, economic and religious characteristics (John, 2008). 
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 Independence 
In 1942, the British foreign minister assured the Sanūsīs that Libya would no longer be 
subjected to Italian rule (John, 2008). This was followed by discussions lasting almost 
four years, resulting in the UN General Assembly voting that the unison and 
independence of Libya be achieved no later than 1952 (Wright, 2012). As a result, a 
federal state, with a constitution, delegating a separate parliament for each region, was 
drafted.  
 
Figure 1: King Sīdī Muḥammad Idrīs al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī (1951-1969) 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idris_of_Libya) 
Sīdī Muḥammad Idrīs al-Mahdī al-Sanūsī, was elected king by a national assembly in 
1950. This was followed by a declaration of independence by King Idrīs I on 24 
December 1951. The country was a sovereign state with powers vested in the king, and 
the formation of political parties was disallowed (Wright, 2012). Even though the 
Tripolitanians did not, historically, support the Sanūsīs, they, however, acknowledged the 
monarchy, in part, to enjoy the advantages promised to them by the British (Wright, 
2012). Cyrenaica was selected as the marked preference of the king, where he erected his 
new capital, on the site of the Sanūsī Zāwiyah at al-Bayḍa (John, 2008).  
 
With the discovery of considerable oil reserves towards the end of the fifties, and the 
resultant income from petroleum sales, Libya had become transformed from one of the 
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poorer nations, to an almost immediately wealthy one (Wright, 2012). However, the 
wealth of the country was concentrated in the hands of King Idrīs, and, as a result, fuelled 
discontent among the people, causing the development of resentful factions. In 1963, 
King Idrīs changed the federal system of Libya to a unitary state (Wright, 2012). 
 
He showed considerable affinity to the western powers and permitted the erection of 
British and American military bases in the country, in exchange for economic aid 
(Anderson, 2014). After the discovery of oil in Libya, King Idrīs administered the 
flourishing oil industry, which resulted in rapid economic development. However, his 
regime began to crumble at the emergence of Arab nationalist and socialist sentiments, 
in addition to popular discontent and frustration concerning the corruption in the 
government, and its affinity to western nations (Wright, 2012). In 1969, King Idrīs was 
deposed by coup d’état under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi. At the time, he was 
receiving medical treatment in Turkey. 
 The Gaddafi era 
2.4.4.1 Muammar Gaddafi 
On 1 September 1969, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi lead a group 
of rebel military officers, in a coup d'état against King Idrīs (John, 2008). At the 
time, Gaddafi was only twenty-seven years old, and later the coup became known 
as the Al-Fateh Revolution (Wright, 2012). He was referred to as the brother leader 
and guide of the revolution in government statements and the official Libyan press 
(Wright, 2012). Subsequent to the coup, for the first seven years, the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) was formed by Colonel Gaddafi and twelve of his fellow 
army officers (Mokhefi, 2011). The aim of the RCC was to initiate a complete 
economic, political and social transformation of the country.  
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Figure 2: Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi 
(https://qz.com/africa/1009354/u) 
2.4.4.2 Arrangement of Libyan society under Gaddafi 
Gaddafi had grand plans to institute a new programme, in order to rearrange Libyan 
Society, and created a new political party, called the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). 
This party was modelled after the Egyptian one, created by President Nasser, at the 
time, which was no surprise, as Gaddafi idolised Nasser (Capasso, 2013). Gaddafi 
also invested heavily in the military and army, and as is the trend with dictators, 
depended heavily on military support (John, 2008). He was more concerned with 
the creation of a formidable army, than actually running the country, and menial 
and technical duties of government administration were vested with Major Abdel 
Salaam Jallud, who became Prime Minister in 1972 (Capasso, 2013).  
 
Gaddafi focused on international and ideological issues, and in 1973, attempted to 
instate a cultural revolution moulded on Chinese revolutionary ideas (Wright, 
2012). This approach to governance advocated that the people may remove 
administrative incompetence through a direct challenge of the ruling government. 
In order to achieve this, Gaddafi advised the formation of People’s Committees, 
heading various spheres of society, such as universities, businesses, media 
organisations, and more importantly, bureaucracies (Anderson, 2014). The duties 
of the People’s Committees would include the performance of administrative tasks, 
as well as dispatching their official representatives to represent them at higher 
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levels of government, such as the National People’s Congresses, and finally the 
General People’s Congress (GPC), which would gradually replace the RCC 
(Capasso, 2013). 
 
It was Gaddafi’s plan to have this gradual integration of Peoples Committees into 
the GPC, in an attempt to realise direct democracy. The theory for such political 
constructions was set out in 1975, in Gaddafi’s Green Book (Hilsum, 2012). The 
Green Book was authored by him, and, apparently, based on Mao’s sayings in 
China (Sawani, 2012). 
2.4.4.3 The Green Book 
Gaddafi’s rule ushered in a new era of rule for the Libyan people and was 
characterised by the use of co-option and coercion, as well as the manipulation of 
tribal alliances and informal power networks, in order to maintain power for 
decades (Wright, 2011). Although Gaddafi proposed a direct democracy to his 
people, enshrined in his Green Book, his legacy was a state characterised by a gross 
lack of political institutions and parties, civil society and a complete deficit of the 
pillars for a democratic system (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh & Zahar, 2012). 
 
The system of Libya’s governance was primarily based on the Green Book, in 
which Gaddafi outlined his theories (Hilsum, 2012). The system of rule, known as 
the Jamahiriya system, was underpinned by 2,000 local Peoples Committees. These 
committees were granted the ability to raise political issues at ground level, and 
thereafter, raise them with the central general committee, who had elected 
representatives (Wright, 2012). The representatives, in turn, would raise issues at 
the GPC level, and influence the outcomes of national decisions. By March 1977, 
Gaddafi declared that Libya was the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(Capasso, 2013).  
 
The GPC acted as the general secretariat, comprising members of the RCC, mostly, 
with Gaddafi as the general secretary (Chorin, 2012). This was further restructured 
by the creation of 187 Basic People’s Committees (BPCs), delegated by Gaddafi, 
in order to further consolidate the transfiguration of Libya’s political structure. 
Libyans, therefore, had the duty to participate in the operation of their local BPC 
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(Pargeter, 2012). In addition, matters were complicated by the creation of the 
Revolutionary Committees (RC), which were accountable for the supervision of 
the BPCs, as well as the monitoring of any form of internal opposition and dissent, 
within the BPCs. In 1979, Gaddafi resigned his position as General Secretary of the 
GPC, but still maintained his position as commander of the armed forces of Libya 
(Sawani, 2012). He set about compiling the second edition of the Green Book, in 
which he outlined, in detail, that rental housing, retail trade and wage payments 
were all forms of exploitation. In an attempt to encourage state owned enterprises, 
employees were authorised to take control of their businesses (Capasso, 2013). Six 
years after Gaddafi’s ascension to the position of power, he took it upon himself to 
author and publish his Green Book, entitled, The Solution of the Problem of 
Democracy (Ronen, 2008). The aims of this book were to enlighten the rest of the 
world, and rescue the, from the dismal failure, of communism and the western 
notion of democracy (Kawczynski, 2011). Gaddafi proclaimed that the masses 
would be enabled to rule themselves, in a more participatory government, 
practicing a direct democracy, and viewed it as a guide, based on the new Third 
Universal Theory (Sawani, 2012). 
 
Gaddafi spoke against democratic tools, such as elections, the formation of political 
parties and popular representation and stated, “…the most tyrannical dictatorships 
the world has known have existed under the shadow of parliaments” (Anderson, 
2011: p. 4). Additionally, the Book also dictates that votes are regarded a fraud 
against democracy (Kawczynski, 2011). For Gaddafi, true democracy could only 
be achieved through the formation of people’s committees, popular assemblies and 
professional associations (Wright, 2012). Based on this interpretation, he viewed 
that the “the problem of democracy in the world is completely solved.” (Al-
Gaddafi, 2016: p. 19). In the second volume, Gaddafi outlines his solution to the 
economic problems of the world (Wright, 2012). 
 
The second volume is characterised by a set of capitalist ideas and quasi-socialist 
ideals (Anderson, 2011). In some parts, he encourages the socialist ideal that there 
are only partners and no wage-workers in the socialist society (Wright, 2012). Other 
parts expound on the ownership of property, wherein he states that, “there is no 
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freedom for a man who lives in another’s house, whether he pays rent or not,” and 
“your vehicle should not be owned by others” (Anderson, 2011: p. 231).  
 
According to the researcher, the ramblings of the Green Book was Gaddafi’s 
attempt to demonstrate his self-proclaimed identity as a statesman-philosopher, but 
it remained just that, incoherent ramblings. Orthodox Islamic leaders disagreed 
with some of Gaddafi's writings in his Green Book (Ayub, Ahmad, Da Wan, Ismail 
& Lai, 2016). Gaddafi responded to this criticism by nationalising the property of 
religious orders, and exhorted the people to take control of mosques (Ayub et al., 
2016). For decades, Gaddafi tried to portray himself as a statesman-philosopher, 
which culminated in a three-part meditation on politics, economics, and everything, 
from the evils of mechanised poultry farming, to the importance of owning one’s 
car (Anderson, 2011). In Libya, the text is everywhere, and has been studied by 
many, even though it stated the obvious, such as “woman is a female and man is a 
male” (Anderson, 2014: p. 235). However, the Green Book does have its own 
unusual logic. It is a concoction of idealistic socialism, Arab nationalism and the 
third world revolutionary philosophies, with a hint of Bedouin supremacy 
(Kawczynski, 2011).  
2.4.4.4 The General People’s Congress (GPC) ‒ 1977 
In 1977, the General People’s Congress (GPC) was proclaimed by Gaddafi 
(Wright, 2012). Therein, Gaddafi claimed to establish the people’s power, and 
amended the name of the country to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(Hilsum, 2012). As a result, power and authority was vested in the GPC, notionally. 
Gaddafi continued to act as the actual chief of state and secretary general of the 
GPC, until he relinquished his position in 1980 (Wright, 2012). However, he still 
controlled all areas of the Libyan government, employing devices, such as directly 
addressing the masses, establishing tight security mechanisms, and very 
authoritative revolutionary committees, to maintain his position of power (Capasso, 
2013). 
 
Although he outwardly refused to be addressed as the head of state, Gaddafi 
exercised absolute authoritarian power. He was a dictator by all standards, and only 
trusted a handful of very close advisers. His allegiance was tribal, and most of his 
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trusted advisers originated from his hometown in the Sirte region, ironically 
situated between the historically contending provinces of Cyrenaica and 
Tripolitania (Kawczynski, 2011). 
 
On 2 March 1977, Libya officially became the Great Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, which, according to Gaddafi, would practice direct democracy 
(Hilsum, 2012). During this time, Gaddafi officially relinquished his authoritative 
powers to the GPCs, after which he merely considered himself a symbolic 
figurehead. In October 1975, a coup d’état was attempted by military officers from 
Misrata, but it was unsuccessful (Hilsum, 2012). As a result, the perpetrators were 
arrested and executed. The period after this coup was characterised by contention 
and tension that grew between the Libyan government, the revolutionary 
committees, and the military hierarchies (Kawczynski, 2011). 
 
In May 1984, another coup to oust Gaddafi was attempted, but it was unsuccessful 
(Hilsum, 2012). This was followed by a radical shift in his rule, where in a state of 
paranoia, Gaddafi ordered the imprisonment and interrogation of thousands of 
people, accused of making of threats (Hilsum, 2012). Countless executions were 
carried out, in an attempt to flush out internal threats to his regime, and instead of 
securing his regime, he merely fed the already deepened tensions between the 
Libyan government and its people (Hilsum, 2012). 
 
In 1986, Gaddafi announced that the word Great be annexed to the name of Libya, 
officially being renamed as, Al Jamahiriya al-Arabiya al-Libiyah ash-Shabiyah al-
Ishtirakiyah al Uzma” or The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(Hilsum, 2012). The word Jamahiriya is, in fact, a word invented by Gaddafi, and 
is translated as the “people’s republic”. This name was selected, perhaps, in his 
attempt to convince his people that the government was, in fact, a participatory one 
(Wright, 2012). However, Libya, under the rule of Gaddafi, had always been ruled 
under a dictatorial autocratic system, and any allusion to democracy, was just that, 
an allusion (Kawczynski, 2011). 
 
Libya did not flourish as Gaddafi intended it to, and in 1988, mass dissatisfaction 
concerning the dire shortages of consumer goods, in addition to the war with Chad, 
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forced him to establish some form of social and economic reform (Hilsum 2012). 
In light of this, Gaddafi devised strategies such as, the release of political prisoners, 
and the lifting of restrictions banning Libyans from travelling abroad (Hilsum, 
2012). Additionally, to quell the growing discontent, concerning the lack of 
economic growth and opportunities, Gaddafi allowed private businesses to operate 
once again (Wright, 2012). 
 
In terms of religious reform, Gaddafi adopted an anti-fundamentalist Islamic policy 
(Wright, 2012). He viewed that such radical approaches to religion may cause 
dissent and disunity among the people, and ultimately generate opposing factions 
to his regime (Mcdermott, 1973). Therefore, any threats to his position of power, 
or his regime, were constantly checked by devices such as, random house arrests, 
or the reshuffling of ministerial members (Ronen, 2008). Gaddafi was determined 
to diffuse any form of threat to his rule, which proved to be insufficient, as internal 
turmoil brewed among the people, and within the government (Wright, 2012). 
 
A coup under the leadership of the Warfalla tribe was also prematurely suppressed 
by Gaddafi officials, and led to campaigns of widespread arrests, government 
reshufflings, followed by allegations of torture and executions (Ronen, 2008). 
 
Despite being a stronghold of support for Gaddafi, the military had become a threat 
to his regime (Ronen, 2008). This culminated in another attempted coup, in 1993, 
this time designed by senior military officers, causing Gaddafi to employ sporadic 
and periodic elimination of potential military opponents, replacing them with loyal 
supporters (Ronen, 2008). 
2.4.4.5 Gaddafi and Arab nationalism 
In an attempt to revive Arab Unity, Gaddafi attempted to initiate a series of efforts 
with Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia (Ronen, 2008). However, all efforts failed, due to 
the differences between the governments concerned. In addition, Gaddafi’s Libya 
was essentially a pro-Palestinian one, and had made numerous interventions to 
support the Palestinian cause. He also funded various guerrilla and revolutionary 
organisations in Africa and the Middle East, causing western countries to become 
alienated from Libya (Chorin, 2012).  
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In 1977, conflicts arose between Libya and Egypt, which led to the eviction of many 
Egyptians working in Libya (Chorin, 2012). Despite Gaddafi’s efforts to revive 
Arab unity, Libya’s relations with other Arab states rapidly disintegrated and 
deteriorated, as demonstrated by a treaty of union, signed between Gaddafi and 
King Hassan II of Morocco in 1984, which was abrogated, two years later (Ronen, 
2008).  
 
During the 1980s, with a drop in the demand for, and price of oil, Gaddafi attempted 
to make changes in the Libyan economy, but his efforts were fruitless (Hilsum, 
2012). As a result, economic and social development stagnated, which caused 
social dissatisfaction and discontent. Consequently, various Libyan opposition 
movements developed and launched intermittent attacks against Gaddafi and his 
military supporters (Hilsum, 2012). However, they were unable to remove this 
indomitable ruler, and were met with arrest and execution. 
 
Because of Libya’s support of the Palestinian cause, it was further alienated from 
the US government, an important trading partner. As a result, the US government 
led a series of retaliatory trade restrictions and military conflicts (Zoubir, 2009). 
This was crowned by a US bombing raid of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, during 
which the adopted daughter of Gaddafi was killed. The US government accused 
Libya of producing chemical warfare materials, which further exacerbated the 
already tense relationship between the two countries (Hilsum, 2012). 
 
Up until the Libyan civil war, General Abdul Fatah Younis was second-in-
command to Gaddafi in the government hierarchy, as well as interior minister 
(Hilsum, 2012). He resigned on 22 February 2011. On 1 March 2011, Gaddafi 
sacked his right-hand man, information Chief Abdullah Senussi, who was 
responsible for the brutality against the protestors. On 4 March 2011, Interpol 
issued a security alert concerning the “possible movement of dangerous individuals 
and assets”, based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. The 
warning listed Gaddafi and fifteen key members of his regime (Hilsum, 2012: p. 
152). 
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2.4.4.6 Beginnings of protests 
The Gaddafi revolution was centralised and focused on the Gaddafi family and its 
closest supporters, who were protected by its highly coercive and tight security 
mechanisms (Vanderwalle, 2012). For decades it had repressed any form of 
political and social change, which had festered to some extent, causing popular 
discontent among the people. Under the guise of the Jamahiriya system, it had 
successfully convinced the people, albeit temporarily, that Libya was, in fact, a 
direct participatory government, guided by the decisions of the numerous 
committees.  
 
The Revolutionary Committees exercised strict control, monitoring any form of 
internal dissent, with dissidents often being executed and mutilated publicly, as 
dissent was illegal, according to Law 75 of 1973 in the Green Book (Ashour, 2015). 
Numerous restrictions were imposed by the Gaddafi government on the mandate of 
the Revolutionary Committees, which consequently, led to the revival of Libya’s 
state popularity in the 1990s. However, in 2004, Gaddafi still continued with his 
old tactics, posting a $1 million bounty for journalist and governmental critic, 
Ashur Shamis, who was accused of close links to Al-Qaeda (Hilsum, 2012). 
 
In 2009, Gaddafi reported the dawn of a new political era in Libya, followed by 
elections for ministerial positions, as well as national security measures to be 
initiated (Hilsum, 2012). These elections were devised to correlate with the 
standard intermittent elections for the Popular Committees, Basic People’s 
Committees, Basic People’s Congresses, and General People’s Congresses, in 2010 
(Anderson, 2011).  
 
However, in January 2011, there was considerable upset, concerning the delays in 
the construction of homes, promised by Gaddafi (Prashad, 2012). To this end, a 
string of protesters in Bayda, Derma and Benghazi entered and occupied 
government-built housing (Hilsum, 2012). The demonstrations were initially 
peaceful, and later developed into confrontations, which were met with military 
force. This resulted in further clashes between the police and the protesters, who 
then attacked government offices. As a result, at the end of January 2011, the 
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government decided to invest an amount of €20 billion in housing and further 
developments (Hilsum, 2012).  
 
This was followed by the call of Jamal al-Hajji, a political commentator, accountant 
and writer, who rallied the public to demonstrate for freedom within Libya. 
However, he was later arrested on 1 February 2011, and falsely accused of injuring 
a civilian with his vehicle (Hilsum, 2012). Immediately thereafter, in early 
February, Gaddafi held a meeting with media figures, as well as political activists, 
and warned of imminent responses against all who dared to disturb the current 
political state of Libya (Hilsum, 2012). 
 
February 2011 witnessed more protests, confrontations and unrest against the local 
administration, with protestors gathering in the square of Zawiya, (Roumani, 2014). 
Soon after, race riots were initiated and silenced by Gaddafi supporters and the 
police (Roumani, 2014). On 15 February 2011, the Libyan protests were again 
ignited by the arrest of a human’s right attorney, Fathi Terbil, by the Benghazi 
police headquarters (St. John, 2014). Fathi Terbil represented the families of the 
1,000 prisoners, who, allegedly, had been massacred at the Abu Salem jail massacre 
in 1996, in Tripoli (Wright, 2012). The arrest was followed by the demonstration 
of 500 to 600 people, calling for the release of Terbil (Roumani, 2014). 
Confrontations ensued, and the crowds were doused with tear gas, water cannons, 
and rubber bullets, by the local police force (Roumani, 2014). 
 
On the 17 February 2011, a “Day of Rage” was declared by the National 
Conference for the Libyan Opposition. Despite heavy worded warnings from 
government officials that Libyans should pursue the proper channels, if they wished 
to raise grievances, hundreds of protesters in the cities of Zawiya and Zintan called 
for the end to the Gaddafi government (Roumani, 2014).  
 
Subsequently, television and public radio station personnel were sacked, while 
protesters set fire to security buildings, Revolutionary Committee offices, the 
interior ministry building, and the People’s Hall (Howard & Hussain, 2013). Due 
to the overwhelming crowds of protesters, the security forces were forced to retreat 
from Benghazi, on the 18 February. The peaceful protests had developed into armed 
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ones, and spread to Derma, Bayda and Benghazi, where it was reported that some 
armed personnel had joined the protesting crowds. This led to the first aerial attack 
by Gaddafi, who ordered helicopters to fire at civilians, on the 19 February 2011 
(Howard & Hussain, 2013).  
 The post-revolution era 
2.4.5.1 The NTC – 2011 to 2012 
The regime began a systematic onslaught in the area, with aerial attacks, which 
soon spread to the region of Tripolitania (Schaller, 2016). For this reason, the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) established its base in Benghazi (eastern 
Libya), the capital of the Cyrenaica region, on 27 of February 2011, but was not 
declared officially established, until 5 March 2011 (Schnelzer, 2016). The NTC, a 
self-appointed institution, whose aim was the removal of the Gaddafi despotic 
regime, independently, declared itself the true representative of the Libyan people, 
and was originally known as the Libyan Interim National Council (LINC) (White, 
2014). Subsequently, it was changed to the Interim Transitional National Council 
(ITNC), and later to the National Transitional Council. The institution was almost 
immediately accepted by many Libyans, and naturally became the symbol of the 
fight against the regime, as well as for equality, justice and freedom. Mustafa Abdul 
Jalil, Gaddafi’s Justice Minister, was elected as the Chief of the NTC, after he 
defected to Benghazi (Ashour, 2015).  
 
The NTC was at once acknowledged by France, Great Britain, Qatar and the USA, 
in July 2011. Other members of the Libya Contact Group (LCG), comprised of 
individual countries, as well as international organisations, such as the Arab 
League, United Nations and a selection of European countries soon followed suit 
(Eriksson, 2015). Interestingly, since its inception, the NTC was almost, 
immediately accepted by the international community, while any criticism thereof 
was held in abeyance, despite it being a self-appointed and created institution, with 
somewhat divided support from the Libyan people. Various confrontations and 
fault lines started to emerge (Vilmer, 2016). 
 
On 15 August 2011, rebels in the east, with the aid of NATO forces, penetrated 
Tripoli, and pierced the symbolic heart of the Gaddafi stronghold, known as Bab 
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al-Aziziyya (White, 2014). This provided just enough support and fervour to the 
NTC, who were determined to bring their plans to fruition. Subsequently, the 
battles of Bani Walid and Sirt followed, lasting, approximately, one month (White, 
2014). On 20 October 2011, Sirte came under rebel control and Gaddafi was 
brutally killed (Vilmer, 2016). 
 
It was reported in Libya that Abdul Jalil, and all Gaddafi’s loyalists, should be held 
accountable for previous violations. Soon, thereafter, the NTC was recognised by 
the Arab and western allies. The NTC quickly developed strong ties with their 
western and Arab allies, and began securing the international support it required to 
legitimise the organisation, and build the momentum to protect the Libyan civilians, 
through all means necessary (Cherstich, 2014). 
 
One of the major aims of the NTC was to head the revolts and uprisings for New 
Libya, also referred to as Free Libya, and to oversee the transitional period, initially, 
until the election of a legitimate government, that is, after Libya was liberated 
(Cherstich, 2014). The council largely comprised self-appointed defectors and 
returned exiles, the identities of whom were kept secret, due to security reasons 
(Ashour, 2015). Three days after the declaration, the NTC announced its plans to 
officially hold elections within eight months. 
 
In 2012, clashes erupted between the rebel forces of Benghazi, due to some 
disagreement regarding the nature of changes that were instated by the NTC. As a 
result, the head of the NTC, Abdel Hafis Ghoga, resigned (Ashour, 2015). One 
month later, in March 2012, the officials of the NTC, based in Benghazi, introduced 
a campaign to reconstruct sovereignty in the Cyrenaica region, further increasing 
tension with the central NTC in Tripoli (Ashour, 2015). During this time, militia 
from Ghana, Mali, and many other surrounding states, flocked into Libya and 
destabilised the political transition further in the country, with disruptions of armed 
non-state groups (St. John, 2014). In addition, the inability of the interim leaders to 
reach a firm decision, concerning the infighting in Libya, complicated conditions.  
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2.4.5.2 General National Congress - 2012 to 2016 
The election of the General National Congress (GNC) followed on 7 July 2012, in 
which, Ali Zaidan was elected as the first prime minister of Libya (Watanabe 2016). 
Numerous operations followed and militia groups in the area of Zintan were 
deemed uncontrollable by government. In August 2012, the GNC elected 
Mohammed Magarief of the Liberal National Front Party as its chairman, making 
him the interim head of State. Magarief was determined to eliminate and driving 
out militia groups, such as the Ansar al-Sharia, as well as other groups in the Derna 
area. In October 2012, Ali Zaidan, was elected as the prime minister, and Mr 
Juma’a Ahmed Ateega, as the first vice president of the GNC (Lefèvre, 2016). 
However, in the following year, May 2013, Muhammad al-Magarief declared his 
resignation, in accordance to the PIL that bans Gaddafi era officials from holding 
positions of public office (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). This was followed by the election 
of Minister Nuri Abu Sahmein, in June 2013, as the new chairman of the GNC. 
 
The Libyan Political Isolation Law (PIL), which attempted to prevent members of 
the regime of Muammar Gaddafi from holding public office during the country’s 
transition, was passed by the GNC, after pressure was exerted on the National 
Congress by Dar al-Ifta, as well as the Justice and Building Bloc of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Factions belonging to Islamic groups besieged the headquarters and 
governmental ministries, in an effort to expel supporters of the Gaddafi regime. The 
resolution was drafted by militias of the city of Misrata, who shelled the city of Ben 
Walid, on the grounds that there were members of the former regime residing in 
the city. As a result of the resolution, tribal wars emerged and escalated, such as 
those between the Zintan and Mashashiyya tribes (Schnelzer, 2016). However, 
wars were not limited to the tribes only, but extended to cities as well, such as those 
fought between the cities of Asabi’ah and Ghiryamn, Gemayel and Ritalin, as well 
as Tubo and Awlad Sulaiman in the south (Schnelzer, 2016). 
 
In November 2013, Mr al-Awaji was elected as the second first vice-president of 
the GNC; however, the position remained vacant for a few months, after his 
resignation in July 2014 (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). The GNC’s refusal to disband 
after the expiry of its mandate led to the eruption of numerous popular protests in 
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February 2014. This was followed by the sacking of Minister Ali Zaidan by the 
GNC and was succession of Ahmed Maiteg (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). 
 
In the interim, the Karama operation, under the leadership of Khalifa Belqasim 
Haftar, was launched on 15 May 2014 (Schaller, 2016). At the time, terrorists from 
some state organisations, Al-Qaeda, as well as battalions that were supported by 
the Islamic blocs of the GNC in the western city of Misrata, were fighting in 
Benghazi. 
 
At the end of the mandate of the GNC, the Daesh (Jihadist/terrorist) organisations 
emerged in Sirte, Derna, Sabrata and Benghazi (Schnelzer, 2016). The second set 
of elections was concluded on Wednesday 25 June 2014, and the new parliament 
was elected (Schaller, 2016). The Islamic bloc suffered a major loss, resulting in 
their refusal to relinquish power. As a result, an attack was launched on Tripoli 
International Airport, in addition to the Dawn of Libya operation, allegedly 
committed by disgruntled members of the political Islamic groups, who had lost 
the elections. 
 
Subsequently, the United Nations in Geneva began to monitor the dialogue between 
the conflicting Libyan parties to power, namely, the parliament, the GNC and active 
parties on the ground (Eriksson, 2015). The relevant parties agreed to continue with 
talks, aimed at bringing an end to the Libyan conflict. In November 2014, Omar al-
Hassi became head of the ministers of the government of Tripoli, illegitimately, 
and the new elected parliament was moved to the Eastern city of Tobruk (Schaller, 
2016). 
 
The GNC was a self-appointed institution like the TNC and was led by Minister 
Nouri Abu Sahmein with Omar al-Hassi and Khalifa al-Ghawi as prime ministers. 
It was in existence from 2012 to 2016, and elected the New Salvation Government 
(NSG) as an interim government (Mezran & Miller, 2017: p. 3). On 1 April 2016, 
media reports confirmed the resignation of the NSG, who had relinquished its 
authority once again to the GNC (Blanchard, 2016: p. 8). The situation was further 
confounded when the NSG, as well as the GNC, announced that power would be 
ceded to the Presidential Council (PC) in April 2016. The GNC, therefore, was 
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disbanded on the 5 April 2016, with its last elected chairman being Nouri Abu 
Sahmein (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017: p. 14).  
 
In summary, the GNC, considered as one of the major opposing forces to the east, 
was primarily dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Libyan Party, known as the 
Justice and Construction Party and Loyalty to the Martyrs Bloc, and had the 
military backing of the Libya Dawn Coalition. Although, the GNC played a major 
role in the second Libyan civil war, it was uneasy era for Libya and was 
characterised by the frequent occurrence of contentious tribal feuds, specifically, 
as a result of Resolution No. 7 (Watanabe, 2016: p. 114; Mezran & Miller, 2017: 
p. 4). 
2.4.5.3 GNA 2016 - present 
In December 2015, the GNC and members of the House of Representatives (HOR) 
signed a United Nations agreement, in support of reaching some form of political 
agreement. The agreement proposed the formation of a nine-member Presidential 
Council (PC), as well as a seventeen-member interim Government of National 
Accord (GNA), and new elections were to be held in the following two years. The 
agreement did not abrogate the HOR, which still existed as the advisory and 
legislative body for the government (Blanchard, 2016: p. 8). However, it was 
renamed as the State Council, which still comprised members elected by the New 
GNC. Subsequently, talks and meetings continued for several months, resulting in 
an agreement, signed in the Moroccan city of Skhirat.  
 
On 17 December 2015, Mr Fayez al-Sarraj was appointed as chairman of the 
Presidential Council and the Government of National Accord (GNA) was named 
(Eriksson, 2015: p. 22). Fayez al-Sarraj was the first Prime Minister of the 
Government of National Accord (GNA), and subsequent to his arrival in Tripoli, it 
was reported that the GNA had seized the prime ministerial offices (Blanchard, 
2016: p. 9). The interim authorities, as yet, had been unable to establish a form a 
stable government and failed to address urgent security issues, restructure the 
finances of the country, and develop a practicable charter to achieve post-conflict 
justice and reconciliation (Varvelli, 2013). Elections for the assembly of 
constitutional drafting and legislative bodies were held and administered with some 
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degree of transparency (Deeks, 2017). However, these transparent efforts were 
blemished by the reported decreasing rates of participation, lack of political 
competition, as well as threats to candidates and voters (Deeks, 2017).  
 
However, this agreement did not succeed in unifying the Libyans, nor did it 
suppress the probability of civil war (Schaller, 2016). Some parties belonging to 
the House of Representatives (HOR) raised concerns about items that should be 
amended, or abrogated (Eriksson, 2015). The Presidential Council (PC), therefore, 
was unable to win and obtain the confidence and support of the House of 
Representatives (Eriksson, 2015).  
2.4.5.4 The role of NATO in the Libyan civil war 
The United States was the first country to initiate a no-fly zone over Libya, due to 
the dire chaos of the Benghazi rebels. This was soon after the adoption of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (Schaller, 2015). However, this 
resolution presented some difficulties, as it also included the use of additional 
measures by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to ensure the safety of 
civilians, which instigated many possible interventions and interferences from 
NATO (Schaller, 2015). Despite this, leaders of the western world were inclined 
towards efforts that would bring about the complete removal of the Gaddafi regime. 
Therefore, the presence and intervention of NATO became absolutely necessary, 
for the rebels to maintain their positions. In addition, pro-Gaddafi loyalists required 
greater measures to be defeated, and as such, the mission of NATO was extended 
and expanded.  
 
NATO, therefore, played a leading role in the sustaining the civil war in Libya 
(Schnelzer, 2016). After the intervention of the NATO campaign, diplomatic 
initiatives were adopted as a solution to the ever-intensifying military problems 
(Vilmer, 2016). To this end, UN-Special envoy, Abd Allah Khatib, was elected to 
find a diplomatic solution. A number of solutions were proposed, one of which was 
raised by the Libya Contact Group, based on ending the civil war and 
simultaneously replacing the regime (Al Nahed, 2015). 
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The first solution, or scenario, focused on supporting the rebel groups, enabling 
them to push westwards to the loyalist province of Tripolitania. However, as a long-
standing rivalry existed between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, this scenario could 
have created more difficulties, than opportunities. Traditionally, Tripolitania had 
supported the Gaddafi regime, and had been previously governed by King Sanūsī, 
who was based in Cyrenaica. Resistance from Tripolitania was to be expected, as 
it would, once more, be subjected to the rule of Cyrenaica, enforced by foreign 
western powers (Deeks, 2017). 
 
The second solution was to simply divide the country into two states, with 
Tripolitania ruling the West, and Cyrenaica in the East. However, this option did 
not seem feasible as international and local parties did not wish to see Libya further 
fragmented into smaller states (Deeks, 2017). This would have major repercussions 
for the country as a whole, and possibly extend the civil war. 
 
The third solution proposed a waiting out of the regime (Deeks, 2017). This implied 
that the regime would self-implode, and slowly come to an end, as financial 
resources would eventually become depleted. Alternatively, this scenario proposed 
the impending occurrence of an internal coup, or, in the least, internal rebellion 
among the Gaddafi loyalists. However, it would be an arduous, time consuming 
scenario, and quite unlikely, since Gaddafi loyalists refused to relinquish power to 
the Eastern province, leading to the perpetuation of civil war (Beresford, 2015). 
 
A fourth solution emerged in July 2011 (Beresford, 2015), which involved 
diplomatic discussions between the western and eastern provinces, and appeared to 
be a more practical approach, as both sides had already sustained severe losses. 
Rebels in the east were unable to secure a solid victory in the west and the loyalists 
were running out of options. This solution set out to minimise the in-fighting among 
the opposition groups and maintain, in the least, a unified state of Libya (Beresford, 
2015). 
 
One of the focal points of the solutions was the fate of the Muammar Gaddafi and 
his family (White, 2014). The removal of Gaddafi regime was central to their cause 
of the NTC in the East, and to the western loyalists this was an unacceptable term. 
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This was further exacerbated by the decision of the International Criminal Court to 
indict Gaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam, for human rights violations (White, 2014).  
In August 2011, the new negotiated settlement seemed to have made traction, as 
the eastern rebels gained more support from a diplomatic and military perspective, 
whereas the resources of the pro-Gaddafi loyalists were running low. The country 
was still not unified, however, even after additional military and muscular support 
from NATO. Despite the firm conviction of the rebels that they would be 
victorious, greater defective lines were uncovered, and disagreements ensued. 
These defective lines were even more significant, after the killing of the rebel 
commander, Abdel Fatih Younes (Vilmer, 2016).  
2.4.5.5 Libyan National Army (LNA) 
In May 2014, General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the elected leader of the Libyan 
National Army, launched a military assault against militant Islamist groups, who 
tried to seize the parliament buildings in Benghazi (Mezran & Miller, 2017). 
Subsequently, Prime Minister Maiteg was accused of being sympathetic towards 
Islamist groups. In June 2014, the Supreme Court passed a ruling that Maitag’s 
appointment was illegal, and he was immediately dismissed from office. A new 
parliament was elected, but was blemished by a low voter turn-out, due to boycotts 
and security issues (Blanchard, 2016). Consequently, fights began to break out 
between the new parliament and the GNC.  
 
The people and tribes became even more polarised, creating further divisions on a 
larger national context (Lacher, 2015). This resulted in tribes affiliating themselves, 
either to the Libya Dawn Operation in the west, or the Operation Dignity in the 
east. At that time, Libya is dominated by three centres of power, each believing it 
had more legitimacy than the other. 
2.4.5.6 The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the Presidential Council (PC) and the 
And The Government of National Accord (GNA) 
The Presidential Council (PC) was formed, in accordance with the terms set out in 
the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), and was the second centre of power 
(Lacher, 2015). The PC represented a predominant Tripoli constituency, and came 
into existence, as a result of the LPA. The LPA was signed on 17 December 2015 
in Morocco, was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, and 
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consequently, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was recognised as the 
legitimate and only government of Libya (Mezran & Miller, 2017).  
 
The four main principles of the LPA were founded on: a) the assurance of 
democratic rights to all Libyans; b) the election of government elected by consensus 
and founded on the separation of powers; c) the supervision of all powers, and the 
establishment of state institutions, as well as necessary mechanisms, to address 
forthcoming challenges; and lastly, d) due recognition and respect for the Libyan 
judiciary and its independence from the State (Mezran & Miller, 2017). Therefore, 
the LPA focused on the separation of powers, and specified that the equitable and 
just performance of each power, was a necessary feature, in order to achieve 
political equilibrium in Libya. The GNA was granted executive authority, whereas 
the House of Representatives (HOR) was granted legislative authority (Blanchard, 
2016). In addition, the LPA also instituted the High Council of State, which acted 
as a consultative organisation, separate from the GNA (Blanchard, 2016).  
 
The PC operated as the head of the state of Libya, and was designed to exert control 
over the LNA. The PC presides over the GNA, and currently, is internationally 
recognised as the executive government of Libya. The PC is based in the Abu Sittah 
Naval Base, on the outskirts of Tripoli, and is under the leadership of Fayez al-
Sarraj, who was formerly a member of the Tobruk Parliament (Lacher, 2015). The 
PC still supervises the GNA, and should be endorsed by the HOR, but its members 
have been unable to formally vote, as yet, due to constant threats from rival party 
members. However, their verbal and written support have been expressed. 
 
The official opposition is the Government of National Salvation (GNS), under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell (Lacher, 2015). The GNC was 
initially re-established in 2012, and although also based in Tripoli, has limited 
power, in terms of its reach and influence to institutions. Most of the members of 
the GNC, also known as the Tripoli Government, have shifted to the State Council.  
2.4.5.7 Government of Tobruk and Bayda 
The third centre of power was the ruling authorities based in Tobruk and Bayda, 
located in eastern Libya, which had also conceded power to the GNA (Engel, 2015). 
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The HOR was considered the legitimate legislative authority, under the rules set 
out in the LPA. The government of Abdullah al-Thinned was based in Bayda 
(Engel, 2015).  
 
The HOR was supposed to concede power to the GNA, once it had been voted into 
office. At that time, the Tobruk and Bayda authorities were under the leadership of 
the anti-Islamist, General Khalifa Haftar, who had close alliances with the Egyptian 
authorities and was in control of the Libyan National Army (LNA) (Mezran & 
Miller, 2017).  
2.4.5.8 Prime Minister al-Sarraj, the GNA and Haftar 
Prime Minister al-Sarraj was not considered as strong a military figure as General 
Haftar, but members of the PC, allegedly, had close ties to influential stakeholders 
(Kekilli, 2017). Ahmed Maiteeq, who served as his deputy, was also removed from 
office, and was considered a powerful representative of the city-state of Misrata 
(Kekilli, 2017).  
 
At that time, Misrata was a major supporter of the GNA, in terms of military and 
political backing. The militia of Misrata also fulfilled a crucial role in bringing 
down the Gaddafi regime, and were still considered an influential and significant 
military force in Libya. Ali Faraj al-Qatrani represented Haftar, who led the LNA. 
However, al-Qatrani was boycotting meetings with the PC, on the grounds that the 
PC lacked inclusivity and representation (Faleg, 2016). Al-Qatrani also shared 
close links with Omar Ahmed al-Aswad, who represented the city state of Zintan, 
a city in Western Libya. Zintan also fulfilled a significant role in bringing down the 
Gaddafi-controlled Tripoli in 2011 (Faleg, 2016). Besides, there was also 
Abdessalam Kajman, a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had some 
support in Southern Libya. 
2.4.5.9 National Security Council - Abusahmain, Ghwell and the ‘Tripoli government’ 
Nouri Abusahmain and the PM of the GNA, al-Ghwell, originated from the cities 
of Zuwara and Misrata, respectively, and enjoyed the military support of the Jabhat 
al-Sumud (Steadfastness Front), under the leadership of Salah Badi (Lacher, 2015). 
The movement was initially coalesced under the Libya Dawn Operation, and 
included Islamists, the city state of Misrata, as well as some Amazigh minorities in 
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the western cities (Lacher, 2015). Previously, al-Ghwell and Abusahmain had both 
been subjected to sanctions, imposed by the European Union (EU), as a result of 
their hostility to the GNA. Even though their support-base had somewhat 
deteriorated, they still had the capacity to bring about disruptions to al-Sarraj’s 
campaigns. This would be the case, particularly, if the populace were to switch 
sides, or the militia, which was loyal to him, were offered a better deal.  
2.4.5.10 The power centres of Haftar, Aguila Saleh, and Tobruk 
There was a definite powerful and influential link between General Haftar and the 
prevailing speaker of the Tobruk Parliament, Aguila Saleh Issa. The headquarters 
of Haftar’s eastern city of Marj displayed very strong military control over the 
Bayda government, and the HOR in Tobruk (Lacher, 2015). Haftar had strong and 
powerful support in the east, and was firmly focused on the HOR, whose decisions 
were subject to his approval. Haftar’s forces had brought about considerable 
changes to the political and military state of the country, and had made significant 
advances against the Islamic State group (ISIS) in Benghazi and the Benghazi-
based Revolutionary Shura Council.  
 
In October 2014, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon visited Libya, in order to 
facilitate talks between the new parliament of Libya, the Tobruk-based 
governments in the East, and the Islamist Libya Dawn in Tripoli (Vilmer, 2016). In 
January of the following year, the Tripoli-based militia and the Libyan National 
Army announced a partial ceasefire, after UN talks in Geneva (Deeks, 2017).  
2.4.5.11 Tunisia-based interim government 
In January 2016, the UN announced a new Tunisia-based interim government 
(Deeks, 2017). However, this was not legitimately recognised by the Tripoli and 
Tobruk governments, or by the Tripoli parliaments. Later that year, the Islamic 
State attacked the Ras Lanuf oil terminal, and threatened to move to Tobruk and 
Brega (Deeks, 2017). The beginning of March 2016 marked the arrival of the new 
unity government, and signalled General Haftar’s control of the key oil export 
terminals in the east (Engel, 2015). At the end of 2016, Islamic State militants were 
removed from the coastal town of Sirte, which at had been under their control for 
eighteen months.  
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2.4.5.12 Field Marshall Haftar 
Haftar, who was promoted from General to Field Marshall, had, over the years, 
built a formidable military formation, the LNA, and cleared Benghazi almost 
completely of all militia and ISIS groups (Engel, 2015). He had gained the 
confidence and support of most Libyans, because he had re-gained control and 
victory over Libya’s eastern oil ports (Engel, 2015). The Tobruk government was 
the official opposition of the GNA, and the Misrata-based militia was the second 
military opposition of the LNA. Support for Haftar had grown, and he had, on many 
occasions, sworn to liberate Tripoli from internal and external threats. Al-Sarraj, 
however, appeared to be the weaker rival, with his support ebbing. Even though the 
GNA was supported and recognised by the United Nations Security Council, as the 
legitimate parliament, support for al-Sarraj was abating. He had been accused of 
paying too much attention on gaining international support and recognition, instead 
of focusing on eliminating the constant threat of ISIS, as well as the proliferation 
of militias within the country (White, 2014). He had been unable to rid the west of 
the militia, and still remained at the mercy of Tripoli’s most powerful militia. For 
the Libyan people, this was a sign of weakness, driving many al-Sarraj supporters 
over to Haftar’s camp. The Libyan House of Representatives (HOR) was 
democratically elected in 2014, and was considered the internationally recognised 
government, which preceded the formation of the GNA (Vilmer, 2016). Haftar had 
been and was still gaining power in Libya, progressively, since the launch of his 
efficacious military campaign against the Islamist and ISIS groups. His successful 
appropriation of four vital oil export ports from the Petroleum Facilities Guard in 
Eastern Libya, had been instrumental in increasing the country’s oil production, 
which had escalated and reached its highest level in years (Vilmer, 2016). 
 
There appeared to be a drastic imbalance of power between the two figures. Haftar, 
Libya’s most powerful man on the one side, and on the other, al-Sarraj, whose 
support was on the decline. Haftar had successfully disbanded most of the ISIS and 
militia groups in the east, and was gaining considerable support from the Libyan 
people, who, after seven years, were in desperate need of some form of peace and 
political stability. Haftar had, to an extent, gained the confidence of his people, and 
therefore, knew he was in a position of power. Talks between the two figures were 
scheduled for February 2017 in Egypt, which proved unsuccessful. 
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Despite efforts from President Abdul Fattah al-Sassy to convince Haftar to hold 
talks and reach some form of agreement with al-Sarraj, al-Sarraj still left Cairo 
empty-handed after Haftar’s refusal to even meet with him (Krieg, 2017). This 
clearly indicated that Haftar was aware of his position of power, which was 
strengthened even more, when he attracted the backing of Russia.  
2.4.5.13 Haftar and the fight for Libya’s oil 
At the start of 2017, cooperation between the two sides began to disintegrate 
completely and in a meeting in Cairo, Haftar and al-Sarraj were unable to reach 
some form of agreement, despite pressure from Russia and Egypt (Krieg, 2017). 
This disintegration raised a series of events. In March 2017, the Benghazi Defence 
Brigades were able to retain the ports for a while, until it was recaptured by Haftar’s 
LNA (Krieg, 2017). Subsequently, fighting between the Haftar led LNA and armed 
groups in Benghazi escalated for control of the oil parts. Control of the oil ports 
was an integral feature for political negotiation and manipulation. The LNA had 
gained control over four ports on September 2016, and ended the blockade that was 
previously placed on them. Oil is a key asset in Libya, a country that is in dire need 
of revenue from the crude exports, in order to rebuild the economic infrastructure 
and restore economic stability. The country has two National Oil Controls (NOC): 
the eastern one, based in Benghazi, and the western one, in Tripoli. Both are self-
created. Recently, the NOC in Benghazi had endeavoured to regulate control over 
oil processes, but had remained ineffective. 
2.4.5.14 Haftar’s allies 
Haftar is a strong man, who has sought out regional and international allies, and 
had been seen with Russian officials, spurring speculation about the possibility of 
a Russian presence in Libya. In addition to Russia, other foreign sponsors included 
Egypt, UAE and France (Vilmer, 2016). This aided Haftar in the gradual erosion 
of his opposition, the GNA. In March 2017, the pro-GNA Benghazi Defence 
Brigades seized control of the oil facilities in the Gulf of Sidra region, from the 
eastern parliament’s LNA (Sinclair, 2017). The LNA hurled a counter-offensive, 
and the Tobruk government commanded that the GNA condemn their acts. As a 
result, the Libyan HOR later withdrew its recognition of the GNA, and called for 
new elections to be held by early 2018. During early 2016, the GNA lacked popular 
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support, owing to its inability to gain control of Tripoli, and eradicate the powerful 
militia (Krieg, 2017).  
 
During early 2017, the GNA still lacked popular support, due to its weak military 
force, and inability to control Tripoli. In April 2017, and early May, a meeting was 
held between Prime Minister al-Sarraj and, at that time, Field Marshal Haftar, in 
Abu Dhabi. The outcome of the meeting suggested that both sides agreed to the 
necessity of reaching some form of agreement, and a peaceful solution seemed most 
apt (Krieg, 2017). 
2.4.5.15 The New Parliamentary Council and Declaration of Principles 
The agreement entailed the formation of a new PC, which would be founded on a 
power-sharing agreement, with elections to be held in March 2018. In addition to 
the existent LPA, the Libyan HOR and GNC parties also signed a Declaration of 
Principles, which was aimed at the formation of a national unity government 
(Krieg, 2017). The new Declaration of Principles was separate to the LPA, despite 
having parallel objectives.  
 
This new declaration outlined the establishment of a ten-person committee, five 
from each party, who would jointly elect an interim Prime Minister, and two 
deputies, in addition to full legislative elections, to transpire within the ensuing two 
years (Smith & Pack, 2017). 
2.4.5.16 Libya’s key armed groups and actors  
There were many groups competing for the control of Libya. A brief overview of 
the key military groups in Libya follows in the following section.  
• The Libyan National Army (LNA) 
The Libyan National Army appeared to be the most powerful and was under 
the leadership of Haftar’s armed forces. It was the official military backing 
of the elected House of Representatives (HOR) in Tobruk. The HOR in 
Tobruk provided Haftar’s LNA with the legitimacy it required, as Libya did 
not have a functioning institutional army in the previous regime (Schaller, 
2016).  
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• The Benghazi Brigades 
The Benghazi Brigades opposed the LNA and were formed in 2016, 
comprising opposition fighters, exiled from Benghazi after Haftar’s 
takeover in 2014 (Schnelzer, 2016). Their primary goal of the Benghazi 
Brigades was to return to Benghazi, and as such, they were constantly 
clashing with Haftar’s forces. They succeeded in the capture of two oil ports 
on their way to Benghazi, a victory that was short lived, as they were soon 
recaptured by the LNA (Schnelzer, 2016). 
• The Libya Dawn Alliance 
The Libya Dawn Alliance also opposed Haftar’s forces and the Zintan 
fighters during Operation Dignity in 2014, in the city of Tripoli (Schnelzer, 
2016). The Libya Dawn Alliance comprised various fighters, including 
those from Misrata. However, fractions soon occurred within the group, 
which became fragmented as a result of the internal tensions.  
• The al-Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM) 
The al-Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM) comprised a mostly Misrata-based 
constituency, whose primary goal was to fight the Islamic State of Iraq, and 
the Levant (ISIL) (Watanabe, 2016). The group eventually declared victory 
when they captured Sirte in late 2016, at the cost of losing hundreds of lives.  
The GNC was elected in 2012 as the proposed replacement of the National 
Transitional Council, and mostly comprised moderate officials. The only 
Islamist protagonists were President Nouri Abusahmain and a few other 
officials. However, the GNC later became fragmented and split from the 
Islamist groups, raising concerns that the group had gained the support of 
Islamist militias, who perpetrated many violent crimes. Currently, the GNC 
is supported by uncompromising Islamist groups and militias in Misrata and 
Tripoli, and have almost no foreign and international support. 
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2.5 International players in the Libyan political landscape 
 Egypt and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had also played an influential role in Libya’s political state. 
He had expressed concerns that a settlement between the GNA and the Libyan House of 
Representatives was a necessary feat, in order to end the civil war. In addition, he 
maintained that the continuance of the civil war would only serve to perpetuate the 
proliferation of Jihadist and Islamist movements in the country (Howard & Hussain, 
2013). Egypt also maintained that groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, would use 
the lack of political stability in the country to gain greater influence (Sasnal, 2017). 
However, Haftar’s repudiation to negotiate with GNA Prime Minister al-Sarraj in 
February 2017, frustrated the Egyptian president, despite supplying Tobruk’s 
government with substantial arms deals, in the hope of maintaining a buffer zone with 
ISIS, and consequently, eliminating the possibility of any opposition to al-Sisi’s 
government (Sasnal, 2017). 
 The Russian Government  
The Russian Government confirmed its intention to play some part in the restoration of a 
robust regime in the country (Sasnal, 2017). Russia had met with al-Sarraj’s rival factions, 
and the previous year, Haftar had paid a visit to Russia (Lefèvre, 2017). Days before al-
Sarraj’s visit to Russia, in March 2017, Putin’s spokesman said, “Russia is interested in 
Libya finally becoming a working state after this barbaric intervention that was conducted 
from outside, that led to catastrophic consequences from the point of view of the Libyan 
state and the future of the Libyan people” (Lefèvre, 2017: p. 330). This is the reason for 
the interest in the swift development of a durable power in Libya that could initiate the 
process of restoring and recreating the state. 
 United States of America 
Even though the United States of America and the European Union were eager to 
recognise the legitimacy of the GNA, as Libya's new unity government, they encouraged 
all Libyans to support the Libyan Political Agreement, in an effort to bring about peace, 
stability, and the substantive rule of law (Lefèvre, 2017). Since 2015, the USA has carried 
out three airstrikes in what it deemed an air campaign to aid anti-Islamist groups to drive 
out Islamist groups (Sasnal, 2017). The USA and France proposed despatching 6,000 
troops, from various NATO countries, to help train local fighters in fighting IS-associated 
groups. However, the GNA was hesitant, and disallowed such a presence in Libya. 
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 Algeria and Tunisia 
Algeria and Tunisia have been avid supporters of reconciliation and finding political 
solutions to end the civil war in Libya, and have made concerted efforts to prevent a spill 
over of ISIS affiliated groups into their territories (Sasnal, 2017). 
 The Islamic State (ISIS) 
The Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC) declared that Derna, a small town on the north 
eastern coast of Libya, had joined the global caliphate in 2014 (Schnelzer, 2016). Later 
that year, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi acknowledged an ISIS presence in Libya, followed by 
the declaration of three governorates, namely, Cyrenaica, with Derna as its base; Tripoli, 
with Sirte as its base; and Sabha, in the south (McGregor, 2016). However, the Islamic 
State was driven from its first headquarters in Derna in 2015 by anti-Haftar forces, and 
started to establish a new base in Sirte, which became the Islamic State’s stronghold in 
Libya, until May 2016 (Barmin, 2017). However, al-Bunyan al-Marsous (BAM) forces 
declared war on the Islamic State there, and in April 2016, declared their loyalty to the 
GNA, in an attempt to legitimise them as an armed force fighting for the country’s 
internationally-backed government (Barmin 2017). On 6 December 2016, the LNA 
united with the GNA, to re-capture Sirte, resulting a declaration of victory later that 
month. Despite losing Sirte, the Islamic State is dormant in Libya, and operates in sleeper 
cells across the country (Lefèvre, 2017). 
 The fight for Southern Libya – Sabha 
The conflict in Libya continued and spread to the southern region of Sabha. In Sabha, the 
proliferation of armed forces and groups seemed to be advancing; therefore, the LNA 
embarked on an on-going offensive campaign to gain control of the area (Sasnal, 2017). 
Much attention was paid to the oil crescent region and the balance of power between the 
major armed groups, such as the militias and the LNA. However, very little was 
mentioned about the South, which appeared to be off the radar.  
 
The situation in Sabha worsened, considering the major power outages that occurred in 
January of 2017. These disruptions were attributed to the armed groups of Zawiya, who, 
in an attempt to release militia men captured by their opposition group, the Warshefenaa, 
cut off gas supplies to the entire region (Sasnal, 2017). The situation merely confirmed 
the inability of the GNA to affirm its power in the region, and demonstrated the non-
existence of functional rule of law in the country. Southern Libya had been grossly 
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neglected by the authorities, and was declared a disaster area by some mayors (Sasnal, 
2017). Mayors in the area had reportedly expressed their dissatisfaction with their 
representatives in the Tobruk and Tripoli governments (Lefèvre, 2017). In addition, some 
called for protests against the disruptions that had occurred in the area, as well as the lack 
of interest and intervention from the higher authorities. Consequently, many members of 
the HOR and the Tobruk-based parliament were compelled to leave Tripoli, with a 
suspended membership (Lefèvre, 2017). This decision directly impacted on the activities 
of the HOR, as well as the reconciliation process, to such an extent that, towards the end 
of January 2017, the HOR was unable to assign members of its delegation to the Libyan 
Political Dialogue, due to the boycott by southern representatives (Lefèvre, 2017).  
 
Sabha had also become a melting pot for various militia and armed groups. One such 
group was the Third Force, a Misrata-based militia, which had been based in Sabha since 
2015 (Krieg, 2017). At that time, two air bases were under the control of the Third Force, 
namely the Jufra airbase, in central Libya, and Tamanhent, near Sabha. The Third Force 
were facing escalating pressure from the LNA, to reduce its presence in Fezzan (Krieg, 
2017). In December 2016, the LNA launched an offensive against the Third Force 
fighters, with launched attacks on the Jufra and Tamanhent air bases (Sasnal, 2017).  
 
The LNA eventually took control of the Brak al-Shati air base in Sabha and, by the end 
of March 2017, the Third Force was compelled to relinquish another major checkpoint 
near Tamanhent to the Sabha security department (Krieg, 2017). The control of 
Tamanhent had become unsustainable, and local tribal elders were mediating between 
warring factions, to facilitate a peaceful handover, and prevent further clashes (Lefèvre, 
2017).  
 
Haftar was determined to gain control of central and southern Libya, as it was considered 
a strategically positioned military stronghold. Control of the Jufra air base would allow 
Haftar to launch airstrikes across Libya, and as a result, presented a direct threat to the 
GNA, as well as the Misrata power brokers (Sasnal, 2017). A stalemate in the oil crescent 
region ensued, causing tensions and internal turmoil to fester in Sabha, as Haftar’s interest 
grew in the area (Lefèvre, 2017). As a result, periodic clashes occur red close to the two 
air bases, further demonstrating the snowballing insecurity in the area. In addition, Sabha 
was exposed to a third factor of insecurity, as instability in the Sahel region, and the 
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southern border with Chad, Niger and Sudan was allowing various non-state armed 
groups (NSAGs) to penetrate into Fezzan (Mezran & Miller, 2017). These NSAGs had 
created multi-faceted systems of coalitions and oppositions in the area. In December 
2016, Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT), a Chadian group, 
claimed that the LNA had attacked them. FACT was considered a close ally of the Misrata 
militias, despite its claims of neutrality in the Libyan conflict (Ibrahim & Otto, 2017). 
Haftar hadalso gained the support of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). 
The JEM was a Sudanese opposition group, previously assisted by the former Gaddafi 
regime in the LNA’s offensive in southern Libya (Igwe, Abdullah, Kirmanj, Fage, & 
Bello, 2017). In November 2016, it was reported that the Qadhafa tribe was supported by 
JEM fighters, during clashes with the Awlad Suleiman tribes in Fezzan. It was also 
reported that Haftar forces were accompanied by JEM fighters throughout the latest 
clashes in the oil crescent region (Igwe et al., 2017). 
 
Southern Libya was riddled with political tensions and strategic challenges, considering 
the aggressive presence of the LNA in the area, and its objectives to expand towards the 
South, in addition to the proliferation of NSAGs along the southern border. In addition, 
ISIS fighters had been moving towards the South, after their defeat at Sirte. To exacerbate 
the situation even further, ISIS established the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
creating a probable location for a new phase of an imminent conflict (Igwe et al., 2017). 
 
In this chapter, the researcher provided a comprehensive historical, cultural and political 
background of Libya, and highlighted events that occurred after the Arab Spring, as well 
as the roles of various actors in the reshaping of the Libyan political landscape. The 
following chapter presents an historical overview of the MENA region. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE 
MENA REGION  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries share similar political, economic and 
historical backgrounds. Understanding the Arab Spring and its impact on the democratisation 
process in Libya can only be fully understood after careful study of the MENA region as a 
whole. Therefore, this study seeks to study the MENA region holistically in order to provide 
deeper insights. The twenty-four MENA countries and territories share challenges and cultural 
ties, unique and different from neighbouring economies. The MENA region holds, 
approximately, three-quarters of the world’s reserve of crude oil, of which thirteen are oil-
exporting countries (Menaldo, 2012). These are Algeria, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Farhani & Ben Rejeb, 2012). The primary religion is Islam, 
although minority religious groups do exist in several countries. Arabic is the principal and 
official spoken language throughout the region, excluding Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and Pakistan (Vatikiotis, 2016).  
 
This chapter provides a broad historical overview the MENA region.  
3.2 History of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
The Middle East, or what is currently known as the Middle East, historically, has always been 
a melting pot of activity, as well as vulnerability, and considered an epitomic centre for world 
affairs. Its vast oil reserves and affinity to the three major religions of the world, has caused the 
Middle East to be a religiously, culturally, strategically, economically and politically delicate 
area (Brady, 2014). It lies at the juncture of Africa and Asia, between the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea, and is considered the birthplace, and spiritual centre of the major religions 
of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Yezidi, Mandeanism, Zoroastrianism, Druze, Yarsan and 
Mithraism, which have all claimed the region as their religious and spiritual source (Havilland, 
Prins, McBride & Walrath, 2013). 
 The Ottoman Empire and the Middle East 
The territories of the Ottoman Empire (1300-1922) were massive and extended to the 
Balkans, Anatolia, the central Middle East towards the borders of Iran, and some 
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countries in North Africa (Wright, 2012: p. 47). The Ottoman Empire was a multi-
religious and multi-ethnic state, where Islamic law was administered, in addition to the 
dictates of the Sultan (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 523). However, the power of the 
Ottoman Empire waned towards the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1774, the 
empire was forced to relinquish considerable Muslim territories to Russia (Tiliouine & 
Meziane, 2017: p. 524). Structural changes on an international level soon outweighed the 
decentralised system of the Ottomans, causing an increase of European influence over 
the region. Russia, Germany, Britain and France contested to gain control over the 
region’s natural resources, vying for the political and economic influence of the Ottoman 
Empire, Egypt, North Africa, and Iran, prior to World War I (Goodwin, 2011: p. 452). 
France occupied Algeria, and later Tunisia in 1881; followed by Britain who took control 
of Aden, as well as Egypt in 1882 (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 9). Libya was occupied by Italy 
in 1911. Nationalism had been steadily growing among the individual states, and 
challenging the authority of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Greece gained its 
independence in 1932, and was soon followed by other Balkan nations (Menaldo, 2012: 
p. 707).  
  
The Modern Middle East began after World War I, when the Ottoman Empire, which 
was allied with the central powers, was defeated by the British Empire and its allies 
(Wright 2012: p 48). It was partitioned into a number of separate nations, which was 
initially under British and French mandates (Menaldo, 2012: p 708). Other defining 
events in this transformation included the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the 
eventual departure of European powers from the region, notably Britain and France, by 
the end of the 1960s (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 10). They were supplanted, in some part, by the 
rising influence of the United States, from the 1970s onwards.  
 
Subsequently, the Middle East became the centre of a socio-political struggle between 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), backed by America, and the Soviet 
Union, backed by the Warsaw Pact and its allies (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 10). Both powers 
contended to gain strategic control over the region, as it contained approximately two-
thirds of the world’s oil reserves (Vatikiotis, 2016: p. 11). It was this context and ambition 
that inspired the United States to dissuade the Arab world from Soviet influence. The 
region, over the last two centuries, had experienced both periods of relative peace and 
tolerance, as well as periods of conflict, particularly between Sunnis and Shiites 
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(Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 527).  The map of the Middle East, as it is currently, was 
shaped by the events of World War I, but the region, previously, had been under the 
control of the Ottoman Empire (Tiliouine & Meziane, 2017: p. 530). 
 World War I, the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East 
In 1920, the Ottoman Arab provinces were separated and distributed between France and 
Britain, in accordance to the precepts of Sykes-Picot Agreement (Menaldo, 2012). These 
borders were completely decided and drawn up by colonial powers. Dictates of the 
League of Nations awarded France control of Lebanon and Syria, while Britain’s mandate 
was extended to Iraq, Palestine, and the newly formed, Transjordan (Tiliouine & 
Meziane, 2017). In an attempt to placate the Arabs, the sons of the sharif of Mecca were 
granted the rule of two states by Britain (Sykes, 2016). Faisal was made king of Iraq, and 
Abdullah was made king of Transjordan, known as modern day Jordan (Sykes, 2016). 
The Kurds were briefly assured of their own independent state by the Allies in 1920, but 
they were grossly marginalised and their territories were divided among Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran (Menaldo, 2012). 
 
The MENA region expands over Europe, Iran, North Africa and the Arabian Gulf.  
 
Turkey represented the head of the Ottoman Empire, from the sixteenth century onwards, 
and controlled parts of Europe, a part of North Africa, the entire Fertile Crescent, but 
none of the Gulf area (Menaldo, 2012). It had lost North African provinces and most of 
its territories by the end of the nineteenth century, but still remained an independent state, 
and was re-established under Ataturk in 1923 (Menaldo, 2012).  
 
Iran was earlier known as the Persian Empire, and formed part of the Islamic Empire. 
Iran was a hotspot for sub-division, was subjected to Russian influence in the north, and 
British influence in the south, during the nineteenth century (Sykes, 2016). However, Iran 
remained superficially independent (Sykes, 2016). 
 
Egypt was under British rule from 1882 and became a British protectorate in 1914 
(Sykes, 2016). It became a constitutional monarchy, under British instruction, from 1922, 
and obtained more autonomy from 1936 onward (Sykes, 2016). In 1956, the last 
remaining British troops departed from Egypt (Vatikiotis, 2016). 
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Sudan was under British rule from 1899, and gained its independence after 1956 (Sykes, 
2016). 
Tunisia was a French colony from 1881 and gained its independence in 1956 (Sykes, 
2016). 
Algeria was conquered by the French in 1830 and gained its independence in 1963 
(Vatikiotis, 2016). 
Morocco was a French protectorate from 1912 and gained its independence in 1956 
(Vatikiotis, 2016). 
Libya was an Italian colony from 1911; however, it gained its independence in 1947, 
established a monarchy in 1951, which was subsequently overthrown in 1969 (Cleveland 
& Bunton, 2016). 
These countries were formally under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, until World War I, 
but were later divided between Britain and France, in accordance to the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). 
Syria became a French colony in 1918, and gained its independence in 1946 (Sykes, 
2016). 
Iraq was occupied by the British in World War I, and gained nominal independence after 
1932. Prior to 1918, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon were all part of Greater Syria (Sykes, 
2016). 
Jordan was made a British Mandate territory after 1918, and gained its independence in 
1946 (Menaldo, 2012).  
Palestine also became a British Mandate territory after 1918, but lost to Israel from 1948 
to 1967. Palestine still fights for its independence and freedom from the occupying Israeli 
forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).  
Lebanon was under French Mandate after 1918, and became decolonised in 1943 (Sykes, 
2016).  
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates are all 
considered new states, and only came into existence during the 1960s and 1970s. They 
were mapped out of the region that, formally, had been under naval and military 
protection of the British, since the 1830s (Vatikiotis, 2016). Present Saudi Arabia is still 
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a fairly new state, and dates back to the 1930s, whereas Kuwait only emerged in the 
1950s, when it appeared under Iraqi-British tutelage. Yemen was historically delineated 
to North and South Yemen (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). South Yemen emerged because 
of the ex-British colony at Aden, as well as a Marxist-Leninist revolution. North Yemen 
emerged because of a ‘loyalist’ holdout, and is almost regarded as a minor region of Saudi 
Arabia. Northern and Southern Yemen combined in 1990; however, regional divisions 
still remain (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). 
 
3.3 Dictatorship in the MENA region 
 Mechanisms of totalitarianism 
An authoritarian regime refers to a state governed by a solitary power holder (Jdey, 2012), 
which may be in the form of a dictator, a small group of political elitists, or a committee, 
who completely monopolise political authority and power (Gause III, 2011). The aim of 
the authoritarian state is to maintain uncontested political power, while granting its 
society a certain degree of freedom and liberty (Gause III, 2011). Such a state merely 
attempts to maintain this position, and not alter the world with its ideologies, or change 
human nature (Menaldo, 2012).  
 
By contrast, a totalitarian regime seeks to exercise control and monitor, practically all 
aspects of citizens’ social lives (Gause III, 2011). The proclaimed ideology is virtually 
imposed onto the deepest reaches of societal organisation, completely controlling the 
actions and very thoughts of its citizens, and mobilises the whole population, to achieve 
its goals (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).  
 
Totalitarianism is fuelled by the ambition of seeing its indoctrination coming to fruition, 
and being practiced by the masses it wishes to rule by employing ideological doctrines as 
tools to realise this end (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Gaddafi also, sought to form allies 
with many African countries, especially South Africa, on numerous occasions. Even 
within Hitler’s inner circle, he employed propaganda as a tool to retain their loyalty, as 
they were not reliably indoctrinated, and, as such, not fully dominated (Cleveland & 
Bunton, 2016). A totalitarian regime is constantly aware that the threat of an internal 
rebellion, is always possible and real (Jdey, 2012). It should be noted that Gaddafi rotated 
his affections and affinities, on many occasions, not only to the local tribes, but also to 
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his very kin, namely his sons, in the hope of preventing an internal rebellion of some sorts 
(Pargeter, 2012). 
 
Indoctrination and terror increase the strength of the totalitarian movement. To illustrate 
the Libyan case, Gaddafi systematically indoctrinated his people with the dictates of his 
Green Book, a way of life that he carved for his people, based on his system of 
Jamahiriyyah (Jdey, 2012). The Green Book outlined the social and economic lives of 
the Libyan people. Terror and fear were instilled in the Libyan people, if they did not 
adhere to its precedents. It formed part of Gaddafi’s dictates, in which he sought to 
completely introduce a new era of socialism (Goodwin, 2011). He set out and developed 
a self-glorifying dictatorship that lasted for over forty years, and employed mechanisms 
of fear, to perpetuate his rule. His rule is marked as the longest in the MENA region, as 
well as in the world (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).  
 
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was no different, utilising whatever means possible and 
necessary to maintain his power, as was seen by the use of chemical weapons against the 
minority Kurdish people (Dodge, 2012a). In Tunisia and Yemen, people suffered under 
lengthy dictatorships, exploitation, corruption, violation of human rights and repression 
(Dodge, 2012a). Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, inflicted intolerable suffering 
on his people, and still does not express any remorse for his atrocious violation of human 
rights (Jdey, 2012). The Gulf States, such as Bahrain and Oman, established hereditary 
fiefdoms, and have resorted to crushing any opposition with heavy machinery (Tiliouine 
& Meziane, 2017). 
 
Rule in the MENA regions, therefore, has been characterised, primarily, by dictatorships 
and autocratic regimes, and the region has generally exhibited a poor record of upholding 
human rights (Pargeter, 2012). In addition, the acquisition of power by dictators was often 
illegitimate and illegal (Dodge, 2012a). Muammar Gaddafi, for example, seized power 
illegally through a military coup in 1969; however, he is considered to have had one of 
the longest lasting rules on earth, whereas Bashar Al-Assad succeeded to power, inherited 
from his father Hafith al-Assad (Menaldo, 2012). This transition of power witnessed the 
fastest amendment to the constitution, ever, in no more than fifteen minutes. In Egypt and 
Yemen, Hosni Mubarak and Ali Abdullah Saleh, both intended to pass rule to their sons, 
Gamal and Ahmad, respectively (Jdey, 2012). However, the Arab Spring did not allow 
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their plans to come to fruition. The royal regimes of Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, were governed by absolute rule, which eventually led to the 
development of widespread demonstrations (Dodge, 2012a). These protests demanded a 
constitutive monarchy, as well as more liberties for its citizens.  
 
The critics are divided in their perceptions about the role of the Western superpowers, 
notably the United States and the Soviet Union, in supporting the authoritarian regimes 
in the MENA region. Bellin (2004: p. 148) asserts that,  
… authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa profited from the cold war, 
reaping patronage from eastern and western great powers (sometimes simultaneously) 
in return for the promise of reliable alliance in the fight for or against Communism. 
But in contrast to other regions the authoritarian states in the Middle East and North 
Africa did not see their sources of international patronage evaporate with the end of 
the cold war or with America's subsequent reanimation with democracy, because 
western interest in the region has been driven by multiple security concerns that 
survived the cold war.  
Despite the belief of the critics who believed that the Arab Spring was a conspiracy 
designed by the United States, or Zionist mechanisms, to redesign the map of MENA, for 
the people of the region, who suffered under abject living conditions, it was in fact, a 
desperate call for help. This call of help was initiated by a single Tunisian young man, 
who did not know that through his act of self-immolation, he would change the course of 
Arab history, forever (Prashad, 2012).  
 
3.4 The Arab Spring 
 Background 
Towards the end of the year 2010, and the start 2011, the Arab world witnessed a string 
of interrelated protests and demonstrations, which have become known as the Arab 
Spring (Ashley, 2011). Groundbreaking surges of demonstrations, which included both 
violent and non-violent protests, uprisings and eventually, civil wars, rippled across the 
Arab world (Aarts, Dijke, Kolman, Statema & Dahhan, 2012). According to Dabashi 
(2012), the term Arab Spring was coined in reference to the Revolutions of 1848, and the 
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Prague Spring in 1968, which was also referred to as the Springtime of Nations. The term 
was also used in reference to the aftermath of the Iraq War, in anticipation of a possible 
democratisation movement in the Arab world (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014). Massad 
was among the first to use the term, as an initial US strategy of directing the aims and 
goals of the movement towards a more westernised liberal interpretation of democracy 
(Anderson, 2011). The events that unfolded have also come to be known as the Islamist 
Spring or Islamist Winter (Anderson, 2011). The Arab Spring could be attributed to 
mounting political discontent of two rampant problems in the Arab region: a lack of 
freedom and extensive corruption. In the hope of removing these vices, the phrase, “the 
people want to bring down the regime”, became a prominent slogan among protestors 
and demonstrations in the Arab world (Abbott, Teti & Sapsford, 2017: p. 2). 
 
The initial wave started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, with the Tunisian revolution, 
and spread throughout the countries of the Arab League and its surroundings (Dabashi, 
2012). Syria, Yemen and Libya were among the first states to witness major insurrections. 
In addition, Egypt and Bahrain saw civil uprisings, followed by huge street 
demonstrations in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq and Oman (Eyadat & Schaefer, 
2013). Even Saudi Arabia could not escape the wave, and witnessed protests on a minor 
scale. These demonstrations were often met with violent attempts and responses from 
authorities to suppress them (Lynch, 2011). Conflicts between pro-government militias 
and counter-demonstrators, resulted in the further fragmentation of an already disjointed 
society (Dalacoura, 2012a). Matthiesen (2013) argues that, despite the variant aims and 
objectives of the Arab Spring in the different states, they were primarily fuelled by a need 
for state, social and economic reformation. This is especially true, in respect of the 
uprisings in Tunisia. The ousting of the then President Ali followed, which might have 
proven to be fortuitous, as it resulted in a transition from the former autocratic system of 
governance, to a version of a constitutional democratic governance (Matthiesen, 2013).  
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Map 2: Arab Spring states (File:BlankMap-World6.svg) 
 
Even though the initial surge of revolutions and demonstrations dulled towards the 
middle of 2012, the implications of the Arab Spring are far-reaching, and the continuance 
of large-scale discourse conflicts in the region, have proven to be challenging for the state 
reformation and the democratisation processes (Abbott, Teti & Sapsford, 2017). The most 
radical discourse from the Arab Spring is the current civil wars that occurred in Syria, as 
early as the second half of 2011.  
 
The Arab Spring affected six of the twenty-two Arab League members, namely, Syria, 
Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Matthiesen, 2013; Brynen, Moore, Salloukh 
& Zahar, 2012). These states witnessed full-blown upheavals, with multiple implications, 
such as, a) the unseating of dictatorial leaders; b) severe internal fragmentation and 
struggle, and; c) state fragmentation (Brynen et al., 2012).  
The first six countries to be involved in uprisings may not have experienced a genuinely 
democratic political system, automatically (see Table 1). Regarding the ousting of 
leaders, the popular insurrections in Egypt and Tunisia were successful in the ousting of 
Hosni Mubarak and Zaine El Abidine Ben Ali, respectively (see Table 1). 
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Table 2: List of Arab Spring states and related events 
Country Events  
Tunisia President Zaine El Abidine Ben Ali was ousted and his government overthrown. 
Egypt President Hosni Mubarak was ousted and his government overthrown. 
Libya 
Leader Muammar Gaddafi was killed, following a civil war that saw foreign military 
intervention, and his government overthrown. 
Yemen 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted and power handed over to a national unity 
government. 
Syria 
President Bashar al-Assad faces civil uprising against his rule that deteriorates into armed 
rebellion, and eventual full-scale civil war. 
Bahrain Civil uprising against the government crushed by authorities, and Saudi-led intervention. 
Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman Government changes implemented, in response to protests. 
Morocco and Jordan Constitutional reforms implemented, in response to protests. 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Mauritania Protests 
 
 
Scholars in various fields have tried to explain the causal factors of the Arab Spring, but 
the prominent reasons include, widespread corruption, economic stagnation and poor 
living conditions, along with repressive political conditions and security restrictions, as 
well as the lack of fair elections in most of the countries of the MENA region (Dodge, 
2012a; Hussain & Howard, 2012; Ismael, Ismael & Perry, 2015; Lesch & Haas, 2016).  
 Causes of the Arab Spring 
Many scholars have indicated that there are somewhat difficulties with providing a full 
explanation for the timing and immediate causes of the Arab Spring events (Anderson, 
2014; Aras, & Falk, 2015; Jamoul, 2012; Maddy-Weitzman, 2015). According to the 
researcher, this is partially due to the still unsettled dust status quo of the MENA region. 
However, it is possible to explain the driving factors behind the protest movement, and 
why some uprisings succeeded in toppling regimes, and others did not.  
 
Dictatorial regimes have not always been successful in the provision of a sustainable 
democracy for their people, and have often invested in state security, at the expense of 
human security (Gause III, 2011). The Arab Spring was motivated by a lack of effective 
democracy support (Moghadam, 2013). In addition, the impact of the downward spiral 
of international economics had considerable damaging effects on vulnerable groups in 
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society, as opposed to the ruling governments of these groups. It is precisely for this 
reason that Arab societies initiated political change (Aarts et al., 2012).  
3.4.2.1 Lack of effective governance 
According to Jamoul (2012), the Arab Spring started with the Tunisian Revolution, 
spurred on by the self-immolation of Mohamad Bouazizi, on 18 December 2010, 
initially, in response to police corruption and ill treatment. Generally, most Arab 
citizens suffer under severe economic strife and impossible social conditions 
(Lynch, 2011).  
 
Social issues such as widespread poverty, constant inflation, rising food prices, 
human rights violations and high unemployment rates, are some of the more 
pertinent challenges, faced by the Arab world, on a larger scale (Salih, 2013). In 
addition to the internal social challenges, the Arab world has been under scrutiny 
for its lack of state policy implementation, social freedom and its obvious display 
of corruption on all levels. This initial incident destabilised the foundations of Arab 
patriarchal regimes and leaders across the Arab states. 
3.4.2.2 Dictatorships and political inadequacies 
Political reasons that led to the Arab Spring may be considered the most pertinent 
and prominent of all. The dictatorial and autocratic system of governance, in most 
Arab states, was conducted in isolation, to the exclusion of the will of the masses, 
and could be considered the most obvious cause. A dictatorship is a “form of 
government where a country or a group of countries is ruled by one person or 
political entity, and exercised through various mechanisms to ensure that the 
entity's power remains strong” (Bellin, 2017).  
 
In an autocratic government, the president is considered almighty, and his word is 
final (Goodwin, 2011). Therefore, the legislative, executive and judicial powers 
were not separated in most Arab states, including Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. 
History has revealed that unlimited and unchecked power, in the hands of a single 
person or group, will ultimately result in the suppression of rights and powers of all 
others (Dodge, 2012b). Therefore, the separation of these powers is crucial, to 
prevent the abuse of power, to protect freedom for all, and is an essential element 
for successful, as well as efficient governance (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).  
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However, as these three organs of state were not separated in most Arab countries, 
no checks were in place to ensure that they interacted with each other in an equitable 
and balanced fashion (Menaldo, 2012). In addition, laws prohibiting freedom of 
political expression, rigged elections, corruption, banned formation of trade unions 
and political parties were the order of the day. Basic human rights, including the 
right to vote freely and fairly, were disallowed in most Arab countries, often 
resulting in the persecution and eventual imprisonment of the perpetrators 
(Menaldo, 2012). Such policies developed dissatisfaction with the government 
among the masses, which resulted in the weakening of the internal social fabric, 
and eventually, the dissipation of national unity. 
 
When people are under the rule of a dictator, the populace, generally, is unable to 
voice their feelings of dissatisfaction with the regime, for fear of attracting attention 
from the authorities (Dodge, 2012a). As a result, reporting any form of problem, 
such as crimes, or issues pertaining to social and health services are generally 
avoided. A dictatorship thrives on this sense of fear, and is one of the many tools 
used to retain the status quo. As a result, people suffer, and silently endure the 
shortages of life, under a hostile regime (Hamdy, 2012). In this manner, the 
population continue to live in a state of deprivation and misery, giving rise, 
eventually, to rebellion and war (Dodge, 2012a). This was one of the driving factors 
that prompted the demonstrations, leading up to the Arab Spring.  
3.4.2.3 Restriction of freedom and violation of human rights 
The assurance of human and political rights for all citizens, is one of the 
fundamentals on which any State and society is founded (Bellin, 2012). Arab states 
have grossly neglected their duty to provide their citizens with freedom of speech 
and free elections (Anderson, 2011). To this end, Hudson, Iskandar and Kirk (2016) 
view that the Arab region still suffers from bad political systems and a general 
deficit of free and fair electoral systems. Widespread corruption in government, 
corruption and state of emergency laws, coupled with restraints on freedom of 
speech, have to be addressed in order to prevent future uprisings in the region.  
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3.4.2.4 Social discontent  
Despite having earned in excess of three trillion dollars from oil revenues, over the 
last thirty years, economic despair and social dissatisfaction remain widespread in 
the MENA region. The people in the MENA region have expressed their 
dissatisfaction and awareness of the poor state of their countries, in the light of 
existing models, which they wished their states to simulate (Dodge, 2012b). Non-
participatory governments in the region have excluded public participation in the 
administrative system of their countries (Menaldo, 2012). The people, therefore, 
desired to regain their original role, which allowed for active participation in the 
management of their countries, including their countries’ wealth (Hamdy, 2012). 
 
This sense of dissatisfaction was fortified by a general sense of injustice, 
humiliation, marginalisation, and feelings of frustration towards the existing 
regimes, which fuelled the slogan, the people want to overthrow the regime 
(Menaldo, 2012). However, the Arab Spring was not exclusively powered by social 
dissatisfaction with the economic state, injustice, corruption and poor social 
conditions, which was not sufficient to initiate a revolution. Instead, it was 
accompanied by a general sense of injustice against the regime itself, because it is 
the sense that drives the people to change (Goodwin, 2011).  
 
In Egypt and Tunisia, it was exactly that sense of injustice, which led to the ultimate 
deposition of their dictators; however, this was not the case in Libya, Syria, Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia (Kuşcu, 2012).  
3.4.2.5 Security  
Security in the MENA region has always been extremely volatile, with multiple 
interlinking threats to the internal and external security, and is linked to economic 
and political legitimacy (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Simultaneously, MENA 
states have conflated regime security with national security, where the ruling elite 
families have pursued dangerous survival strategies, to retain and maintain control 
over state formation processes in the last century (Hamdy, 2012). External security 
alliances met internal needs, by reinforcing the security of the regimes, which, to a 
large extent, was to the prejudice of their own societies, as it was against 
neighbouring states (Dodge, 2012).  
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3.4.2.6 Demographic trends and structural imbalances  
In most MENA states, the current level of welfare expenditure and redistributive 
mechanisms are unsustainable in the long-term (Weyland, 2012). It will become 
necessary to reformulate the social contract, through the introduction of charges for 
services, such as water and electricity (Dodge, 2012). This is one of the factors that 
led to the Arab Spring, as well as social tensions (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). In 
addition, the rapid population growth and the lack of employment opportunities for 
the youth have resulted in major threats to long-term stability and security in the 
MENA region, which has one of the fastest growing populations in the world.  
 
During the pre-Arab Spring period, unemployment was a major long-term 
challenge faced by regimes, but grossly ignored and neglected by them. The MENA 
regimes failed to formulate operative strategies to address the structural foundation 
of the labour imbalance (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Therefore, employment to 
citizens entering the job market was not guaranteed, and the crucial insufficiencies 
in the educational systems, produced graduates, who lacked the qualifications to 
enter the private sector. 
3.4.2.7 Low economic growth 
Complex economic, social and political changes and transition resulted in the 
MENA region, not only because of the political reasons of the Arab Spring, but 
also because of the economic reasons from the global economic crisis (Malik & 
Awadallah, 2013). It is vital for the MENA region to develop an economic 
structure, in order to increase workable developments of the welfare of its society 
(Dodge, 2012). Osai (2013) asserts that, in reference to the Egyptian revolution, 
Egypt had suffered a plausible income gap under the leadership of Mubarak, which, 
according to him, was one of the main causes of the initial uprising. Arab citizens 
across most states, including Libya, live on less than two dollars a day, despite the 
rich natural resources, wealth and oil reserves of the country (Weyland, 2012). The 
second major cause of the Arab Spring, or possible factor, is the state of rampant 
unemployment in the Arab region. A large percentage of Arab youth, in most Arab 
states, are unemployed, reaching the twenty-four percent mark (Maghrabi & Salam, 
2013). 
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3.4.2.8 External causes of the Arab Spring 
It should be noted that many events clearly impacted on their ability to implement 
democracy and exercise political freedom. The 9/11 attack in the USA, and its 
continual war on terror campaign, was employed by the western super powers, to 
increase the violation of human rights and facilitate the role of the military court 
(Anderson, 2012). The so-called war on terror played an even bigger role in the 
later domino effect of the Arab Spring. The failure of the USA in its campaign 
against terror, specifically the USA-led Iraq One, was a mere strategy of supposed 
imported democracy. In addition, the conflicting political status quo of the 
Palestinian-Israel conflict, and the failure of the USA to effectively bring about 
peace in that region, might have been a tenable factor in the initial causes of the 
revolution (Hudson et al., 2016). 
 
The examination of the geographic positions of many Arab states, allows for a 
deeper insight into the root international causes of the Arab Spring. Firstly, Egypt 
is the largest Arab state, and the first state to sign a peace accord with Israel 
(Dalacoura, 2012a). This might have influenced and fuelled the uprisings of 
discontented civilians. Simultaneously, Mubarak maintained a firm alliance with 
the USA. In summary, all of these factors appear to have played a considerable role 
in triggering, as well as contributing to the uprisings across the region, and, despite 
the common motivations beneath the surface of the events, their outcomes varied 
from country to country, depending on a combination of factors.  
 
3.5 MENA states and the Arab Spring 
 The Tunisian revolution  
Tunisia’s revolution was also known as the “Jasmine Revolution” and the “Grass Alfa 
Revolution” (El-Khawas, 2012: p. 1). It was the first popular uprising to topple an 
established government in the MENA region, since the Iranian revolution of 1979, and 
unfolded in three phases (Goodwin, 2011). Firstly, the suicide of the young Tunisian 
street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, when he set himself alight on the 17 December 2010, 
in the city of Sidi Bouzid, to protest his treatment at the hands of the authorities 
(Pomerance, 2016). His attempted suicide was his reaction to his cart being confiscated 
by the local police. He eventually succumbed to the trauma of severe burn wounds on 
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Wednesday, 4 January 2011. His action of defiance and dissatisfaction with the 
oppressive regime, echoed the feelings of thousands of Tunisians, who took to the streets 
on 18 December 2010, in support of his ideals, and protest against the current state of 
affairs in Tunisia. Demonstrations erupted in his rural hometown, trailed by similar 
protests in other regions of the country, resulting in a brutal security crackdown on 
protesters by the regime, news of which rapidly spread throughout the country, via social 
media platforms (Jdey, 2012).  
 
Secondly, on reaching the capital, Tunis, the regime responded to protests with more 
brutality, leading to the arrest of many demonstrators, activists, and a complete shutdown 
of the internet (Pomerance, 2016). The Tunisian revolution was also rightfully entitled, 
the “Revolution for dignity”, a call to regain the human dignity of the Tunisian people, 
in the face of abject destitution, under the rule of its dictator, Zaine El Abidine (Goodwin, 
2011). Thousands of protestors expressed their dissatisfaction with the current conditions 
in the country, the absence of social justice, widespread corruption, and the lack of social 
justice in the ruling regime. Demonstrations rippled through the country, including 
several cities in Tunisia, causing injuries to numerous demonstrators, and leading to the 
death of many (Dodge, 2012). 
 
Although the protests that erupted in Sidi Bouzid were spontaneous, they were 
characterised by a level of organisation and sophistication. The Sidi Bouzid branch of the 
Tunisian General Labour Union (French: Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT) 
was engaged in the uprising from day one, and is considered a stronghold, as well as a 
major driving force behind the initial protests (Kuşcu, 2012). It was sparked by incidents 
in nearby towns of Menzel Bouziane and Regueb, when police killed protestors, causing 
regional protests to become a nationwide uprising (Pomerance, 2016). These protests led 
to the third stage of the revolution, forcing President Ben Ali to dismiss a number of 
ministers, including the Minister of Internal Affairs (Pomerance, 2016). He assumed that 
reshuffling his cabinet, and promising to create 300,000 jobs would pacify the masses, 
but it was too late, as protestors called for regime change and his removal from power. 
After addressing the nation, in an attempt to retain power, Ben Ali re-opened the blocked 
social media platforms, such as YouTube, after five years of blocking, and slightly 
reduced some food prices, but the revolution only intensified, until it reached the capital 
(Dodge, 2012b). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
72 
 
On 14 January 2011, Ben Ali and his family fled the country, taking refuge in Saudi 
Arabia, bringing an end to one of the Arab world’s most repressive regimes (Pomerance, 
2016). On the same day, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announced his temporary 
assumption of the presidency of the Republic, due to the deficiency of the President to 
perform his duties. A state of emergency and a curfew was declared, in accordance to 
Article 56 of the Constitution (Pomerance, 2016). However, on 15 December 2011, the 
Constitutional Council decided to resort to Article 57 of the Constitution, and declared 
the vacancy of the presidential post. Subsequently, on 16 January 2011, the Constitutional 
Council declared the temporary assumption of the Presidency by Fuad Al-Mubazah, 
pending the presidential elections (Goodwin, 2011). The Tunisian revolution is 
considered a victory for people power, and marks the first time that an Arab dictator was 
successfully removed by a revolution, rather than a coup d’état. 
 The Egyptian revolution 
The Egyptian revolution was also known as the ‘January 25th Revolution’, a date 
determined by various youth groups to correspond with the annual Egyptian ‘police day’, 
in protest against the increasing police brutality, witnessed in the last years of Mubarak’s 
presidency (Dodge, 2012a: p. 6). Throughout Egypt, the protests against police brutality, 
the state-of-emergency laws, fraudulent elections, corruption, political suppression, and 
rampant unemployment, escalating food prices, low-income rates, abject living 
conditions, and inadequate demographic structural factors, were reported (Pomerance, 
2016). The protests of 6 April 2011, particularly, were in response to the police brutality, 
as well as human rights violations by police officers, which were captured on several 
video recordings (Pomerance, 2016). 
 
Initially, the police force and central security violently reacted to the protesters, by using 
of live ammunition in the province of Suez. In these clashes, more than twenty young 
men were killed, causing the people of Suez to emerge in droves, in mass protests and 
demonstrations (Anderson, 2014). This was subsequently trailed by similar protests, 
which took on a transformative quality. Mass protests were no longer against police 
brutality, strictly, but against the dire living conditions, political repression, social 
inequity, and a corrupt regime under the presidency of Mubarak (Dodge, 2012a). 
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According to Abaza (2014), the Egyptian Revolution was considered a headless one that 
developed spontaneously and sporadically, perceived by some, as a domino effect of the 
Tunisian Revolution. Late in the afternoon, on 28 January 2011, armed forces appeared 
in the Square of Cairo, and by five-thirty, declared a curfew in the cities of Cairo, 
Alexandria and Suez (Abaza, 2014). In spite of this declaration, droves of protestors took 
to the streets in defiance, and were met by Mubarak’s army and security forces. The 
police forces became disjointed in front of the masses that stormed the prisons (Abaza, 
2014). The police forces refrained from targeting the protesters, who continued in Tahrir 
Square (Pomerance, 2016). The status quo continued, until the announcement of the 
Presidents Mubarak’s resignation, on 11 February 2011. His resignation was followed 
with a brief statement by Vice-President Omar Suleiman, announcing that the post will 
be assigned to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to manage the affairs of the 
country. 
 
The Supreme Council assumed the administrative responsibilities of Egypt for a period 
of eighteen months, witnessing demonstrations and strikes during its occupancy, until the 
election Muḥammad Muḥammad Mursī ‘Īsá al-‘Ayyāṭ, as the new president (Abaza, 
2014). The election of President Mursi was historic, as he was considered the first 
democratically elected head of state in the 5000 years of Egyptian history. The rule of 
President Mursi lasted for one year (June 2012 to July 2013), also witnessing a number 
of demonstrations, strikes and roadblocks. President Mursi delivered a temporary 
constitutional declaration in 2012 that effectively granted him unrestricted powers, 
including the power to legislate, free from judicial checks, or reviews of his acts 
(Pomerance, 2016). This developed into the hasty drafting of a new constitution by the 
Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly. It was presented to the president, scheduled 
for a referendum, before the Supreme Constitutional Court could rule on the 
constitutionality of the assembly, and was described by independent press agencies, as 
an “Islamist coup”, not aligned with the regime (Abaza, 2014: p. 168). These issues, in 
addition to the grievances highlighting the prosecutions of journalists, and attacks on non-
violent demonstrators, fuelled the 2012 Egyptian protests. To address these issues, Mursi 
withdrew the decrees, and amended the constitution, which was approved by 
approximately two thirds of the voters (Dodge, 2012b). 
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On 30 June 2013, demonstrations against President Mursi were met by those in support 
of him, and on 3 July 2013, a General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi unseated President Mursi from 
office by coup d’état, after the June 2013 Egyptian protests (Anderson, 2014). The event 
caused major divisions, internally in the country, and externally, in terms of international 
relations, and led to major protests and battles between the army and the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as their supporters (Abaza, 2014).  
 The Yemeni revolution  
Yemen suffers severe economic under-development, has a shifting political landscape, 
and a tribal society. Yemeni society is currently still very fragmented and under-
developed (Cole & McQuinn, 2015). The Yemeni revolutions were fuelled by the 
dissatisfaction of the Libyan youth, with their dire social conditions and poor living 
conditions to which they were subjected (Jdey, 2012). The protests were initially 
peaceful, and were influenced by the wave of demonstrations in the MENA region of 
2011. The revolution erupted on Friday, 11 February 2011, which later became known as 
the ‘Friday of Anger’, in reference to the fall of the Mubarak regime (Jdey, 2012: p. 70). 
 
The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions particularly influenced this revolution, after the 
deposition of Presidents Bin Ali and Mubarak, respectively. The revolution was headed 
by Yemeni youth, in addition to opposition parties, who demanded regime change, and 
the deposition of the President Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose despotic rule lasted for thirty-
three years (Krieg, 2017). They also demanded political, economic and social reform. 
The factors that influenced the organisation of demonstrations, as well as informing the 
masses, were the use of online social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter 
(Anderson, 2011). 
 
The March demonstrations are of particular significance to the Yemeni revolution, as 
they signalled the decision of many Islamic clergies, social personalities and tribal chiefs 
to join the cause of the revolution (Jdey, 2012). This was prompted by General Ali 
Muhsen al-Ahmar, who witnessed the martyrdom of fifty-two young peaceful protesters, 
on 21 March 2011, known as the massacre of Jumuah al-Karama in the square of Sana 
(Arjomand, 2015). In addition, seven hundred protesters were wounded by sniper fire, 
which was later alleged to have been under the command of the Republican Guard, and 
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the ruling party’s clique (Arjomand, 2015). The president denied this allegation, and 
claimed that the snipers were from the adjacent provinces. 
 
Despite the significant number of resignations of ministers that occurred subsequent to 
Ali Muhsen’s joining of the revolution, a slow siege of the republic palace by the youth, 
bought President Saleh enough time to re-arrange his documents (Cole & McQuinn, 
2015). In an attempt to address the situation, President Saleh hastily tried to set out a 
resolution for the government, by assigning more tasks to it, as he feared more 
resignations of his ministers. Proceedings continued between the opposition, who wanted 
change, and Saleh, eventually leading to armed clashes between regime loyalists and 
tribal militants (Arjomand, 2015). 
 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh left Yemen on 4 June 2011, and headed to Saudi Arabia for 
treatment, after the presidential palace was hit by a shell on 3 June 2011 (Arjomand, 
2015). President Saleh returned to Yemen in September 2011, and in November, later 
that year, signed the Gulf Initiative, wherein he delegated his powers to the deputy, 
Abderrabh Mansour Hadi, a former armed forces field-marshal. Subsequently, in January 
2012, he left Yemen, and headed to the United States for treatment (Cole & McQuinn, 
2015). 
 
Constitutional powers were assigned to Deputy Abderrabh Mansour Hadi until the 
election of a new president (Cole & McQuinn, 2015). The nomination of Abderrabh 
Mansour Hadi, as a compromise candidate, was announced for the presidential elections 
in Yemen. Hadi generally enjoyed the broader support of the Yemeni people before the 
elections, and was supported by other parties, tribesmen, religious scholars and youth of 
the Yemeni peaceful revolution (Arjomand, 2015). 
 The Syrian revolution 
The Syrian revolution was also known as ‘the free Syrian revolution’, and was considered 
a national revolt against the corruption and the repression of human rights, as well as 
freedom of the Syrian people (Khan, 2014: p. 3). A range of demonstrations and protests 
challenged the authority of President Bashar Al Assad, in an unprecedented manner for 
the Syrians (Khan, 2014). Syria was also affected by the wave of massive and widespread 
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demonstrations that had erupted throughout the Arab peninsula in 2011, and particularly 
so, by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions (Arjomand, 2015). 
 
These demonstrations were sparked when children from one of the Daraa districts, wrote 
slogans on the walls of schools, invoking political reform and freedom (Jdey, 2012). 
Their actions were met by Syrian security forces, who arrested and subjected them to 
torture. The parents of the arrested children demanded their release from the authorities; 
however, Brigadier Atef Nagib responded to the families’ pleas by dispatching troops to 
storm the Omariy Mosque, with helicopters and special-forces (Arjomand, 2015). The 
families were mercilessly massacred. 
 
This event marked the onset of the Syrian Revolution, and was mainly led by young 
Syrians, who called for political, economic and social reform and raised the slogan, 
freedom, freedom (Arjomand, 2015). Initially it was fuelled by a call for freedom, but 
transformed into a call to remove President Bashar al Assad from his position of authority 
(Arjomand, 2015). 
 
Demonstrations spread for the first time in dozens of Syrian cities, during March 2011, 
and included Damascus, Homs, Hama, Lattakia, Daraa, Banias, Qamishli and several 
other areas, under the slogan “topple the regime” (Anderson, 2014: p. 300). As a result, 
Syrian security forces and intelligence, faced demonstrators with live bullets, leaving 
behind many casualties and wounded civilians. The movement continually expanded in 
numbers, and after the violent suppression of the revolution by the forces, the Free Syrian 
Army was formed (Fawcett, 2016). 
 The Bahrain protests 
The Bahrain protests have also been referred to as the ‘Pearl’ and ‘Rose’ revolutions, 
inspired by youth, who wanted to adopt a peaceful approach to the protests (Ashour, 
2015: p. 5). Bahrain is an absolute monarchy, ruled by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, 
since 1999 (Matthiesen, 2013). In February and March of 2011, Bahrain experienced 
peaceful popular protests, followed by brutal government repression, which left over 
thirty demonstrators and innocent bystanders deceased (Jdey, 2012). The protests were 
again led by independent youth, alongside other opposition groups, including the liberal, 
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national and bathite groups, who all demanded freedom and democracy as a right granted 
by state and religion (Fawcett, 2016).  
 
In addition, the revolution demanded political reform, and was not led by a particular 
party, personality or entity, but by the people (Khan, 2014). Prominent opposition leaders 
were sentenced to lengthy jail terms, and over forty Shiite mosques, as well as other 
religious structures were demolished (Fawcett, 2016). The protesters called for political 
reform and equality for the majority Shia population of Bahrain, with many demanding 
the downfall of the ruling family. The revolution was characterised by many criticisms 
and doubts, but the international community stood by the political and government reform 
(Fawcett, 2016).  
 
The Bahraini government has since, tightened its grip on Bahrain, by deploying the 
island’s shield troops that were supposed to be reserved to resolve international disputes, 
and foreign attacks on one of the GCC countries. This has resulted in widespread, and 
bitter criticism of the Bahraini government (Cheibub et al., 2010). 
 
3.6 Outcomes of the Arab Spring 
 Clashes between opposition forces 
Disagreements have been observed among various forces, who previously, had 
been united under the common goal of opposing the existing repressive regimes, 
but are now disunited about the intended direction for the future of the country, or 
state (Khan, 2014). In addition, the principles and philosophies to be adopted, to 
reinforce the new institutions and practices, as well as who should yield power to 
whom, and the mechanisms involved in doing so, are issues that still remain highly 
contentious (Khan, 2014). These disputes are not limited to dialogue only, but 
sadly, have deteriorated into violent clashes among opposing forces (Menaldo, 
2012). Additionally, one of the most formidable challenges faced by the proponents 
of participatory and non-corrupt governments in the Arab World, are the numerous 
serious economic problems faced by the region, as a whole (Matthiesen, 2013). 
 
However, the outcome of the Arab Spring is not astonishing. The Arab World, as 
the rest of the world, cannot be transformed completely in a matter of a years, let 
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alone months. For the last five decades, the MENA region has been riddled with 
societal fractures and fault lines along economic, cultural, regional and ideological 
boundaries. Boundaries, division and sectarianism are deeply entrenched in Arab 
society, further exacerbated by ethnic, regional and sectarian divisions. These 
divisions may have been pre- or post- Arab Spring and range from regional, secular, 
sectarian to cultural (Matthiesen, 2013).  
 
In the next sections, the conflicts that arose, subsequent to the Arab Spring, are 
discussed. 
 Cultural divides and conflicts 
The cultural divide, found in the Arab world, is largely attributed to its stark 
economic divisions. In the Arab world, more religiously, or Islamically inclined 
citizens, generally, belong to an economically less-advantaged class, while the 
secularists enjoy economic and educational privileges. The cultural and class fault 
line in the Arab states is further demonstrated in the urban-rural divide, where the 
secular ideology is largely followed by the urban population (Khan, 2014). 
 
The cultural, political, and economic divides in the Arab world, in turn, reflect the 
experience of its people, with the notion of modernity, and the unfinished 
transitional form of state and government, alongside the consequences of these 
divides (Al Nahed, 2015). Therefore, the responses of the Arab World to the 
consequences of the Arab Spring, have also varied (Esposito, Sonn & Voll, 2015). 
It could also be argued that the current rise of Islamism post-Arab Spring, may well 
be reactionary, in part, to the effects of modernisation with its outcomes, as well as 
the effects of the Arab Spring, and may be simply another evolutionary step in the 
Arab world’s integration into modernisation (Bellin, 2012).  
 
These reactions may also be demonstrated in the rise of a new political Islam. The 
rise of political Islam post-Arab Spring was largely a consequence of the traditional 
and religious sectors of Arab society, who felt marginalised and inadequately 
compensated by the previous despotic regimes (Esposito et al., 2015). The merge 
of an Islamist intellectual and political activists approach, as well as the reaction to 
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the Arab Spring, is well demonstrated by the founder of Tunisia’s al-Nahda party, 
Rashid Ghannushi (Ayeb, 2011). 
 
Islamist forces in the MENA region are well restricted, with the exception of Iran, 
a non-Arab country that witnessed the success of the revolution, ultimately leading 
to the establishment of an Islamic government (Esposito et al., 2015). However, in 
most Arab countries, the Islamists represented the primary opposition to the 
existing regimes. Another form of division among various groups in the Arab 
world, since the Arab Spring, focuses on the actual and real primary ideational 
motivation of the Arab Spring. Various groups argue that the uprisings may not 
have been inspired by Islam, necessarily, but rather by the ideals of a western 
interpretation of democracy (Esposito et al., 2015). 
 
Currently, seven years after the eruption of the Arab Spring in the MENA region, 
as well as the fall of old regimes, these very forces that fought the regimes, are 
competing with secular opponents for the control of power to determine the future 
of their societies (Ajami, 2012). Despite the various divisions and disputes among 
these groups and forces, the demands and desires of all, remain fundamentally 
similar, namely, the achievement of fair political representation, the provision and 
protection of basic human rights, the preservation of human dignity and the 
development of an equitable socioeconomic structure (Ajami, 2012). Section A 
provided the historical background of the MENA region, as well as the 
characteristics that are unique and peculiar to these Arab states. It also included a 
summary of the causes, consequences and outcomes of the Arab Spring for the 
MENA region. The next chapter provides an overview of Libya, commencing with 
the historical, cultural, geographical, political and economic background.  
 The process of democratisation 
3.6.3.1  Democratisation in MENA 
The process of democratisation in the MENA regions have been widely studied in 
literature, and more specifically, the factors that have impeded it, or contributed to 
the resilience of its authoritarian states (Beresford, 2015). The Arab uprisings of 
2010 and 2011 have punctured the strength of the authoritarian regimes, witnessing 
the re-autocratisation of Egypt, complete regime collapse in Libya, Yemen and 
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Syria, and the flexibility of monarchical dictatorial governments of Jordan, 
Morocco, and the Gulf (El-Khawas, 2012). This brings to light the prospect for 
democratisation in the MENA regions, and if, in fact, the long-lived 
authoritarianism night, might be coming to an end (El-Khawas, 2012). 
 
The initial stages in the process of democratisation are generated by a need of the 
masses to be empowered with social and political freedom. In addition, people 
demand, and require, and will eventually acquire basic human rights, as well as 
civic freedoms that were absent in the previous regime (El-Khawas, 2012). 
Freedom of access to varying bases of information flourishes, and the formation of 
political parties are allowed for equal political competition, where later elections 
are held, and continue to be held, regularly and freely (Joab-Peterside et al., 2012). 
Winners are openly declared, and subsequently take up seats in parliament, or 
positions of executive office. This is followed by the drafting and revision of 
constitutions. If the process is successful, then the transformation of the regime 
results in its acquisition of a new status, by being admitted to the international club 
of real existing democracies (REDs) (El-Khawas, 2012). 
 
However, the abovementioned factors, especially parliamentary elections and 
political liberalisations, have ensured authoritarian stability in some countries, 
especially in the MENA region (El-Khawas, 2012). In the MENA regions, an 
authoritarian collapse was initiated in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, in the 
immediate reverberation of the Arab uprisings of 2011. Egypt and Tunisia, 
therefore, have appeared to be feasible for democratic transition, whereas while 
Libya, Yemen and Syria are riddled with civil war and political unrest (Dabashi, 
2012). 
 
The literature on politics in the Arab world has persistently emphasised the 
resilience of authoritarianism on various grounds. A number of factors have been 
considered responsible for the lack of democracy in the MENA region, as well as 
those impeding serious attempts at democratisation, or even abortive ones at 
liberalisation. They are presented in the following sections, under institutional, 
political, economic and geo-strategic perspectives (Dabashi, 2012). 
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3.6.3.2 Regime legitimacy and the authoritarian rule in the MENA regions 
The issue of regime legitimacy is a very sensitive one, especially in Middle Eastern 
societies, where rulers are not elected, based on competitive elections (Lynch, 
2011, p: 47). However, the Maghreb states, afterwards, possessed a good deal of 
legitimacy, in terms of freedom from colonial rule (Duignan & Gann, 2013).  
 
In Algeria, for example, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) made their 
successful revolutionary struggle central to their governing philosophy, but lost 
legitimacy at the end of the 1980s (Joab-Peterside et al., 2012). The regime, 
however, did survive the resultant civil discord, and as result, did not regain any 
real institutional legitimacy. The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia came to power in 
November 1987, and was essentially based on a palace coup (Duignan & Gann, 
2013). The regime, however, wasted its legitimacy by privatising the state for the 
benefit of close affiliated families and allies (Joab-Peterside et al., 2012). 
Subsequent to the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia has commenced with the long and 
difficult process of institutionalising a new, more genuinely legitimate government 
(El-Khawas, 2012). Morocco, as a monarchy, possesses a special measure of 
legitimacy, and the late King Hasan II sought to reinvent himself into a more 
benevolent ruler, and promoted political change, which included the involvement 
of traditionally opposition parties (El-Khawas, 2012). His son, Muhammad VI, 
tried to hasten the pace of reform, but the primary socio-economic problems still 
remain severe. 
 
In Libya, Gaddafi initially possessed revolutionary legitimacy, after having over-
thrown the Idrīs’s monarchy in 1969, in a military coup (Lynch, 2011.p: 46). 
However, he lost his legitimacy with the institution of brutal repression of his 
people (El-Khawas, 2012). The new Libyan order is evidently uncertain, where the 
interim government, known as the National Transitional Council, currently owns 
temporary legitimacy, due to its removal of the Gaddafi regime (Duignan & Gann, 
2013. In terms of realising real regime legitimacy, Libya has to build institutions 
that will address, contain, and integrate the various demands of different members 
of society.  
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Tribal identities remain very much central to Libyan life, and establishing a 
working system, regarded as legitimate by the majority of the society, and would 
require a form of power and wealth-sharing among the tribes. However, Libya is 
flooded with weapons, and control, over use of force, will be the most daunting task 
of the new authorities (El-Khawas, 2012). 
 
The MENA region countries are in different stages of the democratisation process, 
but there is no promise that this will result in a true democracy. In terms of the 
process, Tunisia is much more developed in opening the institutional fundamentals 
of democracy, whereas Libya is only in the initial stages (Duignan & Gann, 2013).  
 
Morocco, for example, has established political pluralism and supposed 
constitutional reform, even though the monarchy sustains pre-eminent power, 
ruling, as well as reigning (Joab-Peterside et al., 2012). Algeria also owns a degree 
of democratic reform, in the form of political parties and free press, but the 
liberalisation of political life has remained purely theoretical up to this point. 
3.6.3.3  The manipulation of political parties by the State  
In Arab states, the rule is authoritarian, implying that civil society and opposition 
political parties have been weakened, as a result of being subjected to state 
manipulation (Diamond, 2010). Manipulation was imposed on the electoral 
processes, through the construction of effective patron client relationships. In 
addition, the autocratic rule was liberalised, to include and co-opt opposition (Joab-
Peterside et al., 2012). 
3.6.3.4 Coercive mechanism of the Arab states 
The Arab world is known to employ coercive mechanisms and institutions, and 
have the capacity, as well as the will to repress democratic initiatives, originating 
from society (El-Khawas, 2012). Their military and security expenditures, when 
compared to similar sized states, is significantly higher. This implies that the 
military is afforded excessive indulgences, in order to maintain the status quo of 
the ruling party (Hamzawy & Ottaway, 2009). 
3.6.3.5  Financial independence 
The existence of rentier and semi-rentier states in the MENA region led to the 
financial independence of many Arab regimes, especially the Gulf States, from 
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societal pressures to conform to Western democracy (Hamzawy & Ottaway, 2009). 
Therefore, this financial independence allowed Arab states to cultivate and 
implement their own policies, free from public, or international opinion and 
interference. The rentier state system implies that rulers have no need to seek 
legitimacy for their policies through competitive political processes (Joab-Peterside 
et al., 2012). 
3.6.3.6 Civil and international war 
Most states in the MENA region have witnessed civil and external international 
wars, leading to a dependence on their respective militaries. This reliance on 
military, to enforce adherence, resulted in the systemic inclusion of the military 
wing into the internal politics, and the domestic economy. Elbadawi, Makdisi and 
Milante (2011) argue that the Arab world is different, with regard to the impact of 
conflicts on democracy; while conflicts have led, for whatever reasons, to a 
subsequent democratisation process in other regions, in the Arab world they have 
not (Elbadawi et al., 2011, p. 2). 
 
 
Chapter three provided a historical overview and background of the MENA region. The 
chapter also highlights the major causes of the Arab Spring in the MENA, commencing with 
the Tunisian revolution and concluding with all ensuing protests in neighbouring Arab states. 
A discussion of the major outcomes of the Arab Spring is also provided, highlighting 
resultant cultural divides and conflicts. Lastly, the researcher discussed the process of 
democratisation in the MENA, and factors preventing its development in the region. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion on the research methodology in relation to the methods used 
for the collection and interpretation of the empirical survey material. The researcher provides 
a rationale for the use of both a qualitative and quantitative methodological approach in this 
current study. The research setting, the study design, the rationale for the study, as well as the 
sampling techniques used to recruit the respondents/participants, are presented. The methods 
of data collection and data analysis are explained, and the ethical considerations, applied in this 
study, are detailed.  
 
4.2 Essence of research methodology 
The selected specific philosophy for any research is linked to the practical implications of the 
study (Glatthorn & Joyner, 2005). Quantitative studies have philosophical differences with 
qualitative studies. The former focuses on facts and numbers relationships, whereas the 
qualitative studies explore in-depth subjective analysis (Panneerselvam, 2014). In this current 
study, the positivist and interpretivist research philosophies were employed, using qualitative 
and quantitative methods and measures (Tuohy, Cooney, Dowling, Murphy, & Sixmith, 2013). 
Recently, the combination of both by many researchers, has resulted in the practice and 
popularity of the pragmatism philosophy. Pragmatism employs mixed and multiple data 
collection methods, thereby incorporating both the qualitative and quantitative methods 
(Panneerselvam, 2014). Positivism focuses on highly structured large samples, primarily using 
quantitative methods, but may also include qualitative ones. Interpretivism relies on smaller 
samples as data collection methods, with in-depth qualitative investigations (Tuohy et al., 
2013). 
4.3 Research philosophy 
This study has employed the subjectivist ontology, which infers that meaning is gained through 
understanding, based on social and experiential levels, and is illustrated in the agreement of 
different minds and consciences, on a particular set of meanings (Saunders et al., 2015). 
Subjectivist epistemology appreciates that people and the knowledge they carry are inseparable, 
and advocates the human connection of the researcher to the subject of research (Saunders et 
al., 2015). Therefore, the human element cannot be removed from the research process (Chan, 
Fung & Chien, 2013). In this current research study, the subjectivist view was adopted. 
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4.4 Research paradigms 
Research paradigms deal with the source, nature and development of knowledge, and can be 
categorised into pragmatism, positivism, realism and interpretivism paradigms (Mollick, 2014). 
 Pragmatism 
The pragmatic research paradigm accepts concepts to be relevant only if they support 
action (Rorty, 2013). Pragmatics “recognise that there are many different ways of 
interpreting the world and undertaking research and that no single point of view can 
present the entire picture in a world of multiple realities” (Collis & Hussey, 2014: p. 54). 
Pragmatism focuses exclusively on answering the research question, which is considered 
the most significant factor of this current research. The pragmatic research paradigm 
integrates more than one research approach and research strategy. Therefore, pragmatism 
uses a combination of methods necessary to address and answer the research question/s, 
and advances knowledge in a specific area of study in the best possible manner 
(Walliman, 2015).  
 Interpretivism 
The interpretivist approach is broadly based on a relativist ontology and subjectivist 
epistemology (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard & Snape, 2014). Positivism and interpretivism 
are two mutually exclusive paradigms, about the nature and sources of knowledge 
(Walliman, 2015). Interpretivism is also known as the interpretive philosophy, and 
includes elements of interpretation by the researcher (Aliyu, Bello, Kasim & Martin, 
2014). Interpretive research is based on the assumption that reality may be accessed 
through social constructs such as “language, consciousness, shared meanings and 
instruments” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2013: p. 43). Interpretivism is critically 
juxtaposed to positivism in social sciences, and draws its bases from the philosophical 
position of idealism that seeks to collect diverse approaches, such as phenomenology, 
social constructivism and hermeneutics (Moon & Blackman, 2014). Therefore, 
interpretivism incorporates human interest and conscious element into the study 
(Schwartz-Shea et al., 2013).  
4.4.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of interpretivism 
In the interpretive approach, the researcher appreciates variant perspectives from 
different people, while meaning is derived and extracted, dependent on human 
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consciousness (Moon & Blackman, 2014). Therefore, this current study follows an 
interpretivist approach, focused on the extraction of meaning from the population 
sample that reflects different aspects of the subject matter. This current research 
follows a naturalistic approach of data collection, where the development of 
meanings occur towards the end of the research process (Ormston et al., 2014). 
This study adopts the interpretivist paradigm, which relies on data collection 
methods, such as small samples, in depth investigations, and qualitative data 
(Schwartz-Shea et al., 2013). 
 Positivism 
Positivism is a philosophy that is “in accordance with the empiricist view that knowledge 
stems from human experience. It has an atomistic, ontological view of the world as 
comprising discrete, observable elements and events that interact in an observable, 
determined and regular manner” (Collins, 2010: p. 38). The Positivism philosophy is 
founded on the idea that science and numbers are the only way to arrive at the truth 
(Ormston et al., 2014). Therefore, it advocates that factual and valid knowledge is 
obtained through measurement and observation (Robson & McCartan, 2016).  
 
The role of the researcher is limited and confined to an objective interpretation of the 
research findings, as well as data collection, only because findings are normally 
quantifiable and observable. Therefore, the quantifiable observations would result in 
statistical analysis (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015). The researcher, therefore, is separate 
and independent from the study, with a specific emphasis on the lack of human influence, 
and human interest within the study. Generally, positivist studies adopt a deductive 
approach, as opposed to the inductive approach of the interpretivist philosophy (Robson 
et al., 2016). Inductive reasoning should be used to develop statements (hypotheses), to 
be tested during the research process, where the observer remains independent. The 
positivist approach relies on explanations that should show causality between variables 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015). Human interests should be irrelevant, and generalisations 
are developed through statistical probability (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls & Ormston, 2013).  
4.4.3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of positivism 
Because positivism has a highly structured research design that enforces pre-set 
boundaries and limits to the research, it is not very useful when attempting to 
explain the why behind a particular phenomenon (Eriksson et al., 2015). The second 
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disadvantage of positivism is that it assumes the objectivity of the researcher. 
However, a positivist-based study cannot assume to be totally objective, as the 
values and interests of the researcher will ultimately impact the approach to the 
study, such as the choice of questions (Robson et al., 2016). Thirdly, it is 
challenging to present the multifaceted relationships between phenomena within a 
single measure, and a large sample would be necessary in order to make 
generalisations from generated findings (Ritchie et al., 2013). Lastly, positivism 
also heavily relies on the fact that experience is a valid source of knowledge and 
does not take into consideration additional influential components, such as time, 
cause and space (Ritchie et al., 2013).  
 
These components are not intrinsically part of experience, but externally impact the 
processes considerably (Eriksson et al., 2015). In addition, positivism accepts that 
any process can be professed as a definite discrepancy of actions of relationships, 
or individuals, or between individuals. Therefore, research findings in positivism 
studies are only descriptive, and cannot provide deeper insights to in-depth issues 
(Ritchie et al., 2013). In this current study, the researcher used the interpretivism 
approach for the individual interviews and the positivism approach for the 
questionnaires. 
 
4.5 Research approach 
 Inductive approach and reasoning 
According to Grant and Quiggin (2013), the inductive approach draws its insights from 
observations, and only proposes theories towards the end of the research process. 
Inductive research “involves the search for pattern from observation and the development 
of explanations for those patterns through series of hypotheses.” (Grant & Quiggin, 2013: 
p. 718). Hypotheses and theories are not applied at the onset of inductive studies, allowing 
the researcher freedom, in terms of developing or altering the direction of the study 
(Bryman, 2015). However, inductive research is not void of theories when formulating 
its objectives and research questions (Bryman, 2015).  
 
The inductive approach is founded on the development and generation of meanings from 
the collected data, in order to identify patterns and relationships for the construction of 
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either a new theory, or an already existing one (Mollick, 2014). The emergent theory can 
be used to address the research question, identify emerging patterns, resemblances and 
regularities in the data, in order to reach a conclusion (Bryman, 2015).  
 
This current study adopts the inductive approach to gain deeper insights into the causes 
of the Arab Spring in Libya, the impact of the Arab Spring on the democratisation process 
in Libya, according to the opinions of students and academics (lecturers), as well as how 
the Libyan government was able to achieve democracy. As illustrated in the Figure 10, 
the study utilises the bottom up approach, where theory is developed at the end (Ormston 
et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Inductive Approach (Ormston et al., 2014) 
 
4.6 Research Design 
 Descriptive research 
Descriptive research is not strictly qualified as either quantitative or qualitative research 
methodologies, but instead it employs elements of both, and often within the same study 
(Pickard, 2013). The term descriptive research refers to the type of research question, 
design, and data analysis that will be applied to a given topic, and may be either 
quantitative or qualitative, or both. This current study adopts the descriptive research 
approach, which involves gathering data that describe events, and, subsequently, 
organises, tabulates, depicts, and describes the data collection (Pickard, 2013). Survey 
research is commonly included in this type of measurement, but often goes beyond the 
descriptive statistics, in order to draw inferences. The researcher aims to determine, 
describe, or identify what is, while the analytical research attempts to establish why it is 
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that way or how it came to be. Descriptive research is aimed at casting light on current 
issues or problems, through a process of data collection that enables them to describe the 
situation more completely (Denscombe, 2014), in this case the democratisation of Libya 
after the Arab Spring. 
4.6.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics is used to describe the basic features of the data in a study 
(Meeker & Escobar, 2014). They provide simple summaries about the sample and 
the measures. Descriptive statistics form the basis of virtually every quantitative 
analysis of data, and varies from inferential statistics.  
 
4.7 Research Strategy 
A research strategy refers to the method that guides the researcher to investigate the research 
issue, a general design that aids the researcher to address and answer the research questions in 
a methodical way. It stipulates why a certain research strategy has been selected (Denscombe, 
2014). The research strategy guides the study, in terms of collecting relevant background 
information, and using appropriate data analysis techniques, in order to arrive at a conclusion. 
Research strategies include, literature review analysis, interviews, case study analysis, 
experiments and surveys (Denscombe, 2014). 
 
In this current study, two research strategies are followed, namely: a) a qualitative survey, the 
interviews and questionnaires, as the primary strategies and; b) a literature review as a 
secondary one. A qualitative survey strategy using interviews was used for the collection of 
qualitative data and information, whereas the questionnaire was used for the collection of 
statistical information. The interviews and questionnaires simultaneously enable the collection 
of reliable and valid data, required to achieve the objectives and aims of this current study. 
4.8 Research setting 
Data was collected on the premises of the universities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha, from the 
beginning of April 2017 until mid-June 2017, from one hundred and fifty students, registered 
at the Department of Economics and Political Science, as well as forty-five lecturers.  
4.9 Population  
A population is a set of entities, in which all the measurements of interest to the practitioner or 
researcher are presented (Denscombe, 2014). A sample is defined “as a subset of the 
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population” and must be representative of the population being studied, in terms of size and 
bias (Aminullah, Apriliaswati & Arifin, 2015: p. 5). In this current study, the researcher 
declared fifteen staff members (lecturers) of the Department of Economics and Political 
Science, at each of the three universities, as the first population for the study in the face-to-face 
interviews. The population for the questionnaire was limited to one hundred and fifty students 
registered at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three universities. The 
researcher argues that students and lecturers would be the best group to represent the 
understanding of how the democratisation process is developing in Libya. Although Libyan 
society comprises many groups, such as labourers, members of unions, the military, 
businessmen and traders, the researcher argues that although the perspectives of these groups 
of people are valuable and useful, the opinions of those who already have an understanding of 
the concept of democracy, would be much more suitable to this current study. In as much as 
their opinions may not be completely bias-free, they would be able to provide some insight into 
the development of democracy in the country. The selected sample would form part of an 
academic group, which, the researcher argues/assumes, would be less prone to over-
exaggeration and biases in their opinions.  
 
For these reasons, the researcher selected students and lecturers as the population for the study. 
The researcher argues that the expertise and knowledge of lecturers, their exposure to the 
political atmosphere, and first-hand experience of demonstrations, would generate thicker and 
richer insights and information, regarding the impacts and implications of the Arab Spring on 
the process of democratisation. Lecturers with a background in political studies would be able 
to provide additional insights into the current process, or conditions of democracy in the 
country. In addition, both populations were easily accessible and co-operated to participate in 
the study, ensuring a high rate of response. 
 
These reasons motivated the selection of students as the second population, which was guided 
by the fact they would provide deeper insights into the current political state of the country, 
based on their understanding of political studies. The last reason for selecting academics was 
related to the current instability of the country, and the tense political atmosphere. Due to the 
sensitivity of the subject matter, the researcher presumed to be exposed to danger during data 
the collection procedures; therefore, the data collection was conducted on the premises of the 
universities.  
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
91 
4.10 Sampling 
Sampling refers to the process of selecting a representation of a population, from which to 
collect data (Levy & Lemeshow, 2013). There are two types of sampling methods; probability 
sampling and non-probability sampling (Fraley & Hudson, 2014). Probability sampling refers 
to the selection of a list, containing the names of everyone in the population that the researcher 
is interested in (Lowry, 2014). Non-probability sampling is used mainly for large scale social 
surveys, due to the lack of probability sample lists (Levy & Lemeshow, 2013). Non-Probability 
sampling was employed by the researcher in this current study. 
 
 Judgmental sampling 
Judgmental sampling is a non-probability sampling technique, also referred to as 
purposive and authoritative sampling (Fellows & Liu, 2015). The advantage of purposive 
sampling is that a more representative sample can be selected to elicit more accurate 
results, than any other probability sampling technique (Palinkas, Horwitz, Green, 
Wisdom, Duan & Hoagwood, 2015). The implication of using a non-probability sampling 
is in the limitation of the generalisability of the study (Palinkas et al., 2015). However 
non-probability sampling allows the researcher to target people with the required 
information, as well as collect relevant data. The process involves the selection of specific 
individuals from the population based on their knowledge and judgment of the subject 
matter (Allison, O’Sullivan, Hilton, Owen & Rothwell, 2016). 
 
 Unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis was the opinions and perspectives of the lecturers and students, in 
the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three aforementioned 
universities, about the democracy and the relationship between the Arab Spring 
revolution and the democracy, as well as their views on the causes of the Arab Spring in 
Libya, and how it influenced the process of democratisation. 
 
 Unit of observation 
Unit of observation were forty-five (45) lecturers and one hundred and fifty (150) 
students registered at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three 
universities under scrutiny. 
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4.11 Data collection 
The data collection instruments consisted of a questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The 
questionnaire was selected as the primary data collection instrument, and the interview as the 
secondary one.  
 Questionnaire construct 
Questionnaires are a type of self-report method of data collection, which consists of a set 
of questions, usually in a highly structured written form, and may contain both open-
ended questions and close-ended questions, to which participants record their own 
answers (Moser & Kalton, 2017). The questionnaire developed for this current study was 
identified as both quantitative and qualitative, as it contained closed-ended questions with 
multiple choice options, in addition to open-ended ones and matched the research 
objectives. These questions were analysed, using quantitative methods involving pie-
charts, bar-charts and percentages, whereas the open-ended questions were analysed 
using qualitative methods, involving discussions and critical analyses.  
 
The questionnaires were manually distributed by the researcher to the 150 students on the 
premises of the three universities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha. The objectives of the 
study were explained to all respondents, before distributing the questionnaires, which 
were completed in the presence of the researcher, who personally collected the completed 
questionnaires. Data were collected from the beginning of April 2017 to mid-June 2017 
in Libya. 
 
The researcher did not encounter any difficulties in the data collection process and the 
respondents willingly completed the questionnaires. The atmosphere around the campus 
was relatively secure and safe; therefore, the students did not feel threatened to respond 
in a particular manner. The response rate was one hundred percent (Appendix K and 
Appendix L). 
 
In this current study, the questionnaire represented the primary data collection instrument 
and comprised three sections. The first section established the demographical information 
of students. The second section consisted of questions focused on the following themes;  
a) The economic, social and political conditions before the revolution;  
b) Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the previous regime;  
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c) Thoughts about the necessity of regime change and the Arab Spring,  
d) The connection between democracy and revolution, between democracy and 
protests and the feasibility of achieving democracy and sustaining it;  
e) The impact of foreign intervention on Libya’s current status and;  
f) The impact of the Arab Spring on the economic conditions, socioeconomic and 
political conditions of the country.  
The third section comprised open-ended questions and highlighted the following themes:  
a) The impact of foreign intervention on Libya’s democratisation process;  
b) Opinions concerning the nature of the previous government,  
c) Challenges of the democratisation process; and  
d) Challenges faced by the people after the revolution. 
4.11.2. Individual interview construct 
One of the most common methods of data collection in the qualitative method is the face-
to-face individual interview (Richards, 2014). This type of interview allows the 
participant to speak freely, without the pre-allocation of responses by the researcher. This 
method of data collection is flexible and interactive rather than rigid, and involves a 
repetitive process of gathering information, analysis and testing (Robson & MacCartan, 
2016). 
 
The interview for this current study was based on a semi-structured style, and followed 
specific questions that were designed for this research. A semi-structured interview were 
favoured over a structured interview, which allowed the researcher to request and extract 
more information from the participants (Richards, 2014). The interviews were conducted 
in Arabic, and were recorded by Smartphone, and, subsequently, transcribed in Arabic. 
The Arabic interviews were then translated from Arabic to English by reliable translators. 
A thematic analysis was applied to the interviews, which is discussed under data analysis. 
 
The interview was based on twenty-five open-ended questions and the length of each 
interview did not exceed twenty minutes. All interviews were audio recorded by Smart 
cell phone, and transcribed by linguists. The interviews outlined the following themes: 
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a) Popular participation in the revolution and reasons underlying that participation;  
b) Social, political and economic conditions prior to the Arab Spring;  
c) Reasons for the Arab Spring;  
d) Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the previous regime;  
e) Outcomes and impacts and challenges of the Arab Spring and the revolution for 
Libya;  
f) The feasibility and sustainability of democracy in Libya;  
g) The relationship between democracy, social satisfaction and revolution;  
h) Impact of the Arab Spring on the economic and political state of Libya and;  
i) Impact of the Arab Spring on the process of democratisation in Libya (Appendix I 
and Appendix J). 
All interviews were conducted by the researcher on the premises at the three respective 
universities under scrutiny. The researcher did not experience any difficulties during the 
data collection process.  
4.12 Data analysis 
The purpose of data analysis is to derive meaning from the data, which is achieved by coding, 
summarising and using appropriate data analysis tools (Creswell, 2009). It involves the 
conversion of collected data into a form that is useful for the deriving of meaningful results, 
including conclusions, tables and graphs. A mixed methodology was selected for this current 
study, as the combination of both methods would produce richer data. By using a combination 
of methods, at various points in the research process, the researcher could build on the strength 
of each, and minimise the weaknesses of a single method approach (Creswell, 2009). Therefore, 
the mixed method approach increases both the validity and the reliability of the data (Creswell, 
2009).  
 
The aim of qualitative research is to investigate and analyse specific problems, by describing 
scenes, gathering data through interviews, or analysing the meaning of documents (Creswell, 
2009). Therefore, the emphasis is placed on words and not quantification, in the collection and 
analysis of data (Myers, 2013).  
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 Quantitative data analysis  
Quantitative data analysis is presented in numeric form and allows researchers to apply 
statistical tests to formulate statements about the data. Descriptive statistics, such as the 
mean, median, and standard deviation, as well as inferential statistics and multiple 
regression correlations (MRC) are also included. The derivation of significant facts about 
the research data is made possible through statistical analysis.  
 
The greatest advantage of quantitative data is the provision of descriptive information, 
which assists researchers to uncover the real facts of the subject (Moon & Blackman, 
2014). However, this method is not able to answer the why of a subject. In quantitative 
data analysis, raw numbers are converted into meaningful data through the application of 
rational and critical thinking. It is of utmost importance to apply fair and careful 
judgment, as data sets are open to different interpretations. Therefore, data findings 
should be critically analysed, and objectively interpreted, via literature review findings 
conducted at the earlier stages of the research process, in order to reflect the viewpoints 
of other authors in similar researches. The findings from this research are referred to the 
literature review, using the critical and rational reasoning skills of the researcher. There 
are a few analytical software sets that could be used for the analysis of quantitative data 
(Grant & Quiggin, 2013). The three most popular quantitative data analysis software 
packages include, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, and Statistical Program for Social 
Science (SPSS). Quantitative data in this current study was analysed by means of 
descriptive and inferential statistical tests, using the SPSS system.  
 
Descriptive statistics were used to present the results. In order to determine the 
relationships and predictions, the researcher adopted inferential statistics, such as 
correlations and regression analyses. The researcher organised data, generated categories, 
themes and patterns, tested emergent hypotheses against the data, and searched for an 
alternative explanation of the data and write a report (Grant & Quiggin, 2013). The data 
are presented in quotations, texts, tables, pie charts and histograms. 
 Qualitative data analysis  
Qualitative data analysis (Thematic analysis) was employed in this current study using 
three stages (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The first stage comprises the development and 
application of codes. Coding is defined as the organisation of data, where a code refers 
to a short phrase, or word that represents a particular idea, or theme, after which 
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meaningful titles are ascribed to each code (Richards, 2014). The second stage explores 
the identification of themes, patterns and relationships (Richards, 2014). Qualitative data 
analysis relies on the analytical and critical thinking skills of the researcher; therefore, 
the generated results of a qualitative study cannot be repeated to produce the same results 
(Robson & McCartan, 2016). Effective methods of qualitative data interpretation, include 
analysis of word and phrase repetitions. Primary and secondary data comparisons may 
also be conducted, by comparing the findings of the interviews against the literature 
review, and finding similarities and dissimilarities (Richards, 2014). The last stage deals 
with searching for missing information, and examining issues not addressed in the 
findings. Subsequently, the summarisation of the data follows, where the researcher 
endeavours to link the findings to the aims and objectives of the research (Smith, 2015). 
Quotations from the transcript will be used to highlight major themes that emerged in the 
findings, as well as contradictions and similarities with other similar studies (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 4: Schematic representation of Thematic Analysis 
 
4.13 Data collection procedure 
The researcher accessed the students via the administrative office of the three universities under 
scrutiny and met with the Heads of Departments before the commencing the data collection 
process. Only final year students were selected, because of their background knowledge. 
Appointments were scheduled telephonically and via email with the lecturers, in order to 
establish a suitable time and date for data collection. Before commencing the data collection 
process, the respondents and interviewees were provided with a brief introduction and basic 
overview of the research (Appendix G and Appendix H). 
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Apart from the written consent of each respondent to participate in the study, the researcher 
obtained the verbal consent from the respondents, prior to data collection. All the respondents 
were also informed that participation in this current study was voluntary. In addition, they were 
assured of anonymity and confidentially, and informed of their right to withdraw from the study 
at any time. The researcher distributed consent letters to respondents, seeking their permission 
to participate in the research (Appendix E and Appendix F). All instructions and questions were 
clarified in the questionnaire (Appendix K and Appendix L), in order to avoid confusion. The 
data collection period lasted from April 2017 to mid-June 2017.  
 Data collection procedure for the questionnaire 
Questionnaires were manually administered to the respondents on the university 
premises, on different days. Before commencement of the data collection, the researcher 
directly informed all respondents about the aims of the study, in order to promote a fairly 
good understanding of the study, in general, as well as the aims of the study. On 
completion, all questionnaires were personally collected by the researcher. The original 
copies of the questionnaires were stored by the researcher in a file, accessible only to the 
researcher. 
 Data collection procedure for the individual interview 
Before the commencement of the interviews, the participants were asked to sign a 
confidentiality document regarding their participation, in order to assure the above-
mentioned principles. The interview sessions were concluded when the questions were 
completed. The responses were recorded by Smartphone and then transcribed in Arabic. 
Thereafter, the transcripts were translated from Arabic to English by reliable translators 
and stored in a Microsoft document.  
 Absence of external assistance 
The researcher did not use the services of any assistants, to gain the confidence of the 
respondents. The subject of the study, and some of the questions involved, required 
sensitive answers that could possibly expose, or implicate the respondents. Libya is still 
a very unsettled country and suspicions are rife among its people. The researcher was of 
the opinion that, due to the political instability in the country, the respondents would feel 
safer in the presence of the official researcher only. In this manner, the researcher ensured 
that the responses were completed in a safe and non-threatening environment. 
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4.14 Translation 
The questionnaires and interviews were originally developed in English, and subsequently 
translated into Arabic, as Arabic is the national language of the Libyan people. To ensure the 
validity of the data collection instruments, two linguistic professionals translated both the 
instruments from English to Arabic, and, on completion of data collection, again from Arabic 
to English. Transcripts were re-checked by a legal translator, in order to ensure that the data 
were true and correctly translated (See Appendix D). 
  
4.15 Reliability, validity and trustworthiness of data 
Validity and reliability are two of the most important criteria by which the adequacy of 
quantitative instruments is evaluated (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014). Validity refers to the 
extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Larson, 2014). The questionnaire is a self-administered tool; therefore, the researcher relied on 
the respondents to complete it to the best of their ability and with honesty. Credibility was 
assured by allowing all the respondents to answer questions freely. The respondents were not 
influenced in any way, regarding their responses, were informed that there was no right or 
wrong answer. Through the questionnaire, numerical data were collected, and was considered 
objective and reliable, because it was properly structured, efficiently administered and 
validated. The findings were reliable because the selection criteria for the respondents, as well 
as the analysis process adhered to statistical principles. In addition, the questionnaire was 
intentionally designed, according to theoretical knowledge, and the research questions, specific 
to this current research, and therefore, only collected pertinent and relevant information. 
 
The aim of trustworthiness in a qualitative inquiry is to support the argument of the inquiry’s 
findings (Leung, 2015). Reliability is referred to as the ability of the instrument to produce 
consistent results, when the measurement is repeated on more than one occasion 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 2014).  
 
To ensure that the captured qualitative data of the interviews were trustworthy, the recordings 
were transcribed verbatim in Arabic. The transcriptions were then translated by legal translators 
from Arabic to English. The translated transcripts were checked again by a legal translator, to 
ensure no errors were made in the transcription and translation processes. All data collected 
were only accessible to the researcher and stored safely on a Flash disk in a code-locked folder.  
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4.16 Ethical considerations 
As recommended by Daymon and Holloway (2011), a high ethical standard must be ensured 
in a research project, and as such, ethical issues were considered in the data collection procedure 
of this study. Ethics considerations are achieved by following a number of ethical principles, 
some of which are integrity, professionalism, right and dignity of others, non-discrimination 
and the welfare of others (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). The consent and confidentiality of 
respondents/participants are important considerations in a research project. After the 
respondents/participants confirmed voluntary participation, they were invited to sign a consent 
letter (Appendices E and F) that was issued to them before the questionnaire (Appendices K 
and L) was administered and the interviews conducted. The respondents/participants, therefore, 
agreed to participate in this current study, without any form of coercion. In addition, the study 
obtained an acceptance letter from the Libyan government, granting permission for the research 
to be conducted (Appendices B and C). 
 
The integrity of the research was preserved by ensuring that no explicit and implicit promises 
were made by the researcher to individuals, societies, funding bodies, or any other bodies, or 
any other actor in the study. The researcher did not disclose reports on the research to any 
interested parties, or allowed the review of the transcripts by other parties, thereby ensuring 
that the reported facts are correct, and the professional standard of the study was not 
compromised. 
 
4.17 Ethics Statement 
Researchers need to practice care that the rights of individuals and institutions are preserved 
when conducting research (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). For this current research study, the 
respondents/participants were recruited via the administrative offices of the three selected 
universities in the Libyan cities of Benghazi, Tripoli and Sabha. The aims and objectives of the 
study were explained in great detail to all the respondents/participants, who volunteered to 
participate in the study. They were also provided with the Information Sheet to ensure a full 
understanding of the purpose of the study, as well as voluntary participation (Appendices G 
and H). Participants were also asked to sign a Consent Form, when they agreed to participate 
in the study (Appendices E and F). 
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Anonymity was ensured as no names were indicated on the questionnaires, and only codes were 
used. Confidentiality was ensured, as respondents/participants were anonymous, prohibiting 
the researcher from relating certain answers to particular respondents/participants. Beneficence 
was ensured by informing the respondents/participants that they would not be harmed at any 
stage during the study. The respondents/participants were assured that they would be referred 
to a professional counsellor for assistance, should need such a service, due to involvement in 
the study. In addition, the respondents/participants were assured that all relevant research 
documents would be stored, carefully, for a period of five years, accessible to the researcher 
and supervisors only. The respondents/participants would also be given full access to the 
reported findings of the research, should they want to know the outcomes.  
 
The research instruments, the questionnaire and in-depth interviews, used in this current 
research received approval from the ethics committee of the University of the Western Cape 
(UWC), Western Cape South Africa (Appendix A). The thesis was also submitted to a language 
editor (Appendix M). 
 
In this chapter, the researcher provided a broad overview of the research methods adopted, and 
included the research philosophy, research approach, research strategy, data collection 
techniques and data analysis methods used in this current study. For this study, interpretivist, 
positivist and pragmatic philosophies were adopted, as there are multiple ways of exploring the 
phenomena under investigation. An inductive approach was adopted and a multiple-case study 
was used, based on judgmental sampling. A total of forty-five (45) staff members (lecturers) of 
the Department of Economics and Political Science at each of the three universities were 
declared as the first population for the study for the face-to-face interviews. The population for 
the questionnaire was limited to one hundred and fifty students registered at the Department of 
Economics and Political Science at the three universities.   
 
Prior to the data collection process, permission was obtained from the administration offices of 
the three research sites (universities). The unit of analysis was opinions and perspectives of the 
lecturers and students at the Department of Economics and Political Science at the three 
aforementioned universities. A mixed methodology was selected as the combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods produce richer data. Descriptive statistics were used to 
present the results generated from the data, categorised into themes and patterns. Quantitative 
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data are presented in texts and tables in the next chapter. Qualitative data were subjected to 
thematic analysis, to extract meaning from the data. 
 
The chapter was concluded with a discussion on ethics, considered from the beginning to the 
end of the research process. All participants were ensured of their anonymity, and that their 
responses were confidential. They were also assured of their right to withdraw from the study, 
at any point, without prejudice. 
 
The following chapter comprises the results and analysis of the data gathered from the 
interviews conducted, as well as the questionnaires administered, during the research process, 
with the resultant findings and themes, based on the analysis of the data. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: INTERPRETING THE OPINIONS OF 
LECTURERS AND STUDENTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The researcher provided an overview of the diverse people and ethnic groups of MENA and 
Libya, as well as the causes of the Arab Spring, in the previous chapters. In Africa, more so 
than any other continent, native people were placed together in a single political economy by 
imperialistic European forces. This has undoubtedly brought about serious challenges to the 
political leadership, especially in the MENA region, which until today, suffers from an acute 
leadership deficit. Literature confirms that most of the MENA leaders are, and have been, 
driven by an excessive quest for power, and the politics of exclusion have remained prevalent 
in most parts of the MENA region, and in Africa as a whole (Wright, 2012). To remedy the 
situation, marginalised, dissatisfied masses and groups tried to remove hegemony through coup 
plots, as accomplished under the leadership of Gaddafi. However, they were not always 
successful in bringing about a true democratic system of rule and merely replaced one form of 
dictatorship with another one, under the guise of a democracy.  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the main aims of the study was to understand 
how the relationship between the revolution and democracy was perceived by the study sample. 
The data collection instruments were developed to match the aims and objectives of the study. 
For ease of reference the objectives are mentioned again below: 
• To analyse the relationship that exists between the Arab Spring revolution and a need 
for democracy; and 
• To understand the challenges to the process of democratisation in Libya after the Arab 
Spring. 
Similarly, for ease of reference the main arguments that the study sought to advance are listed 
below. The findings are compared to the original arguments.  
• Argument 1: The revolution was necessary for political reform in Libya and to start the 
process of democratisation; 
• Argument 2: Economic and social reform is a major motivation of revolution; and 
• Argument 3: Tribalism is not necessarily a barrier to the process of democratisation. 
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5.2 Data analysis arrangement 
The quantitative and qualitative data were combined and categorised according to the 
objectives and arguments of the study. In terms of the underlying reasons for how and why 
revolutions erupted, theoretical frameworks are presented, from which the study draws its 
insights. The social movement theories that are aligned to explain the causes of the revolution 
include, the framing processes, relative deprivation, political opportunity structure (POS), and 
resource mobilisation theories  
 The Framing Processes Theory  
The Framing Processes Theory is grounded on the requisite of consciousness 
transformation, and aims to transform grievances into protest and eventual claim-making 
(Borah, 2011). The Arab Spring was fuelled by a conscious need of the people of the 
MENA region to transform their poor living conditions through mass protests. Borah 
(2011) argues that framing processes aids both Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and 
Resource Mobilisation, by providing an insider perspective. This theory attempts to 
explain the reasons why social movements mobilise from the social movements 
themselves. While there is a danger that such construction and meaning-making by 
members of a social movement might be subjective, it is important to understand how a 
movement defines itself and understands its moral standings to a given problem (Lopes, 
2014). This is especially important, because, apart from identifying, perceiving, labelling 
and locating phenomena that directly affect social actors, as well as those they are 
concerned about, they also make sense of such occurrences (Dickovick, 2012). One 
crucial aspect of framing in social movements and with protesters, is that it forges a 
collective identity, achieved through shared values, identity and status. This creates a sort 
of solidarity among members, which is an important factor in mobilising and sustaining 
social movements (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). 
 
Social movements’ actions and their interpretive work are used tactfully. For one, social 
movement adherents assign and interpret phenomena in such a way, as to mobilise and 
garner support from prospective adherents, on the one hand, and to neutralise and 
demobilise antagonists on the other hand (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). To this end, social 
movements, not only identify problems, but also identify who is to be blamed for the 
problem, and advance solutions that will help realise the desired change (Bellin, 2012). 
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In order to ensure the longevity of social movements, this tactful interpretive work is 
conducted continually. It is important to note that framing perspectives explain how 
social movement actors do the double work of producing and maintaining meaning to 
different groups, such as protagonists [those who are active supporters of a movement], 
bystanders [those who are not interested or who are neutral], and antagonists [those 
strongly opposed to views, values and arguments of a movement] (Dickovick, 2012). 
Clearly, once produced, meanings must be maintained and have to be continuously 
redefined, in order to include experiences and phenomena (Moaddel, 2012). 
 The Relative Deprivation Theory 
Social satisfaction is a major reason for a revolution, and is the opposite of relative 
deprivation, which is regarded by many scholars as the core variable in the clarification 
of social movements; consequently, often the main motive behind protests and 
demonstrations (Borah, 2011). Relative Deprivation Theory refers to the notion that a 
population and society experience feelings of discontent and deprivation (Dickovick, 
2012). This theory explains the quest for social change, which inspires social movements, 
as well as that they develop from communal feelings of relative deprivation in relation to 
economic and socio-political problems (Olson, 2014). Popular discontent develops and 
arises when the status of the entire group is compared to a referent group, who find 
themselves in a relatively better position (Borah, 2011).  Relative deprivation may be 
sub-divided into fraternal deprivation, which may have impacted on the formation of a 
collective identity. In addition, Comunello and Anzera (2012) purport that relative 
deprivation theory is used to explain the root causes of social movements and revolutions. 
Therefore, a sense of deprivation, or inequality, compels masses into social movements, 
born out of feelings of deprivation, inequality and frustration. This is evident, particularly 
in relation to others, or with respect to their expectations. 
 
As with many of the states in the MENA region, the Arab Spring was fuelled by 
undercurrent feelings of powerlessness, hopelessness, lack of economic resources, lack 
of freedom, inefficient state organs, and a general lack of basic human rights, such as 
freedom of speech and political expression. These factors created a desire within the 
masses to change the current state of affairs, and compelled participants to unite with 
those of similar sentiments, and voice their discontent to those in authority. Therefore, 
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the participants in the protests felt compelled to rebel, when a consistently improving 
situation, such as an improving economy, becomes stagnated and destabilised. As a 
result, people will join social movements because their expectations will have outgrown 
their actual material situation. 
 The Political Opportunity Structure Theory 
According to social movement scholars, there are many primary theoretical avenues to 
be considered, in order to understand social movements, and more specifically, protests, 
as well as how and why they develop (Tarrow, 2011). The Political Opportunity Structure 
Theory focuses on the significance of political factors that, either force, or expedite, the 
rise and advance of protests, and concerns itself with the context, in which movements 
may, or may not emerge (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Undoubtedly, social movements 
affect the course of history, yet it is worth noting that they do so within the circumstances 
they find themselves in, implying that they do not choose the contexts (Della Porta, 2013). 
This approach focuses on the political conditions that exist outside the social movement, 
as well as how it influences the movement’s mobilisation, and is based on political 
mechanisms, such as constitutions, policies, institutions, and legislation, including 
historical opportunities at which coalitions are challenged (Tarrow, 2011). Therefore, 
POS are extensions that offer incentives for people to engage in collective action, by 
projected chances for either success or failure (Tarrow, 2011). Certain opportunities, such 
as regime change, and political, social and economic instability, may proffer avenues for 
the mobilisation of social movements. Therefore, it is important to note that the political 
dimensions in Libya, invariably, affect social expectations for failure or success.  
 The Resource Mobilisation Theory 
The resource mobilisation approach emphasises the importance of protest organisation, 
via the establishment of networks (social and digital), as well as links between sections 
of the population (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011). Resource mobilisation is a social movement 
theory that draws its basis from the ability of a movement's members to, firstly, acquire 
resources, and secondly, mobilise people towards accomplishing those goals set out by 
the social movement, through the use of those resources. The theory explains how social 
movements mobilise internal and external resources, in order to reach goals (Jenkins, 
1983). Resource mobilisation theory is grounded on the idea that the success, or failure, 
of social movements is only realised through the effective and efficient mobilisation of 
resources, in addition to the development of political opportunities for members. 
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Resources include both the material and non-material. The former comprises resources 
such as, money, organisations, manpower, information and communication technology, 
and mass media. Non-material resources include intangible support, such as authority, 
loyalty, legitimacy, networks, social relationships and personal connections, moral 
commitment, public attention and solidarity (Vanhanen, 2006). 
 
The use of social media as a resource in explaining social movements, as well as their 
impact on the Arab Spring, is of particular interest to this current study. It is argued that 
social media played a contributory, if not integral role in the successful co-ordination of 
the anti-regime demonstrations and protests. The effective use of this particular resource 
led to the mobilisation of masses, spread of information, transmission of events to the 
world as they occurred, and eventually, the resignation, ousting and assassination of 
presidents. The Arab Spring successfully incorporated social media platforms and digital 
technologies, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Whatsapp and YouTube, as 
important resources for collective action. Collective mass action in the Arab Spring 
included, organising action and implementing of social movements in the MENA regions 
(Vanhanen, 2006). 
 
These theories, therefore, provide clarity as to why the Arab Spring erupted in the manner 
that it did, as well as why it transferred from one country to the next, in such a rapid manner. 
These approaches and theoretical avenues provide insights as to why the revolution was 
necessary. The political opportunity structure theory focused on political conditions 
existing outside social movements. The political conditions within Libya such as a 
dictatorship and tribal sensitivities were not receptive to the development of a democracy. 
Furthermore, the inherent Islamic and Arab identity of the Libyan people has to be 
considered as further social conditions. The interpretation of the collected data is directly 
linked to these political conditions, and guided the researcher to the conclusion that a hybrid 
democracy, which marries Islam and the unique tribal identity, is necessary and may be the 
solution to the current political state of Libya. A detailed discussion of this hybrid form of 
democracy is provided in the next chapter.  
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The results of the quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires included the 
demographic information of the student sample only. The quantitative data are presented in 
the form of tables, followed by a brief summary of the data. The qualitative data are 
presented in direct quotes from the sample, followed by a brief summary. Thematic analysis 
was employed for the development of themes in the qualitative data. The findings are 
presented, referencing the theoretical frameworks that the study draws on, and are organised 
according to the objectives and arguments of the research. The following is a list of findings 
from the integrated data analysis: 
• Finding 1: There was no reason, it was not rationally motivated. 
• Finding 2: Desire for change economic and social conditions. 
• Finding 3: Mass media, as well as close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt was the cause 
of the Arab Spring. 
• Finding 4: The economic conditions were good before the revolution. 
• Finding 5: The economic conditions were bad after the revolution. 
• Finding 6: The economic conditions did not improve after the Arab Spring. 
• Finding 7: Unemployment rates have escalated since the Arab Spring. 
• Finding 8: Economic instability was a consequence of the revolution. 
• Finding 9: Living conditions were better prior to the revolution.  
• Finding 10: Social conditions were bad after the revolution. 
• Finding 11: Lack of improvement since revolution.  
• Finding 12: The revolution caused social fragmentation.  
• Finding 13: The revolution resulted in a lack of safety and security. 
• Finding 14: General dissatisfaction with the political state before the revolution. 
• Finding 15: The revolution caused political instability.  
• Finding 16: Meanings of democracy.  
• Finding 17: The Libyan revolution was not necessary. 
• Finding 18: Revolution is violent and a democracy is peaceful. 
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• Finding 19: Revolution is not a condition for democracy. 
• Finding 20: There is no specified relationship. 
• Finding 21: Revolution has negative impacts on the process of democracy. 
• Finding 22: Revolution is not necessary to achieve democracy. 
• Finding 23: Democracy is not achieved through revolution. 
• Finding 24: Protests are not needed to achieve democracy. 
• Finding 25: The revolution was/was not necessary to start the process of democracy. 
• Finding 26: The Arab Spring brought about democracy in Libya. 
• Finding 27: The process of democracy causes problems. 
• Finding 28: Democracy may/may not be possible in Libya. 
• Finding 29: The democratic government is not the solution. 
• Finding 30: The revolution has negative impacts. 
• Finding 31: Democracy is not possible in Libya. 
• Finding 32: General dissatisfaction and disappointment about the revolution. 
• Finding 33: Safety and security. 
• Finding 34: Lack of democratic culture. 
• Finding 35: Tribal, political and military divisions. 
• Finding 36: Poor infrastructure and health services. 
• Finding 37: Inflation and lack of employment. 
• Finding 38: The current government does not address the challenges. 
• Finding 39: Social satisfaction achievable by addressing current political and economic 
challenges. 
• Finding 40: Recommendations to achieve democracy. 
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5.3 Demographic information of the student study sample 
Most students confirmed their participation in the demonstrations across Libya, and felt free 
and safe to complete the questionnaires. This current study focused on the three major regions, 
or provinces of Libya, namely, Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Sabha, and each province was equally 
represented in the questionnaire, as fifty students were selected from each research site for the 
questionnaire, as well as fifteen lecturers from each university for the interviews. 
Table 2: Student sample demographic information 
SUMMARY N PERCENT 
City 
Tripoli 50 33,3% 
Cyrenaica 50 33,3% 
Sabha 50 33,3% 
Gender 
Male 104 69,3% 
Female 46 30,7% 
Age group 
Group A - Under 20 years   8 5,3% 
Group B - 21-30 years 82 54,7% 
Group C - 31-40 years 60 40,0% 
Language Arabic 150 100,0% 
Summary 
The demographic information of the 150 respondents are displayed in Table 2, and their 
age groups are divided into three groups, namely, Groups A, students under the age of 
twenty years; Group B, students between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, 
representing more than half (54.7%) of the sample; and Group C, the older respondents 
between the ages of thirty-one and forty years of age. The three regions are equally 
represented in the data, with fifty respondents recruited from each site. The majority of 
respondents were male (69.3%), and less than a third (30.3%) were female. This could 
be attributed to the fact that Libya is still a very conservative, Islamic country, and 
women might feel insecure about completing a questionnaire, or participating in a 
research study. Besides, the three universities generally enrolled more male than female 
students. More than half of respondents (54.7%) represented the (21-30 years) age group, 
whereas the slightly older population (31-40 years) were represented by forty per cent. 
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This population was selected, as many students and techno-savvy youth participated in 
the demonstrations during the Arab Spring. In addition, students enjoyed a larger degree 
of freedom of expression, as opposed to an older generation, who had been subjected to 
Gaddafi’s regime for a longer period. The official language in Libya is Arabic, which is 
spoken by the majority; however, English is understood by many Libyans, as well. The 
respondents did not encounter any difficulties in completing the questionnaires, which 
were produced in Arabic. The remainder of the results focussed on the opinions, feelings 
and perceptions of students across the three regions. The tables were arranged according 
to the major headings that are linked to the main objectives and arguments of this current 
study. 
 
5.4 Objective 1: To describe the causes/reasons of the Arab Spring 
revolution in MENA and Libya 
This section comprises the views of the study sample about the reasons for the eruption of the 
Arab Spring. In this section, the Political Opportunity Theory provides useful insight as to why 
the Arab Spring erupted in the MENA region, and in Libya, specifically. 
• Finding 1: There was no reason, it was not rationally motivated 
Probing question: What are your reasons for supporting/not supporting the revolution?  
“I didn’t participate, because I am not convinced about what really 
happened…” 
“… revolution was emotionally moved without rationality… ” 
“No I did not participate, because I am not convinced… ” 
“… non-support due to lack of appropriate conditions for a revolution… 
because it wasn’t a revolution with its scientific meaning...”  
“…reasons of non-support are that the required conditions of revolution 
were not available.” 
“I did not support, I am not convinced that it was necessary.”  
Summary: This question solicited two major responses, and most of the participants 
were unconvinced that the revolution was necessary in their country, as the conditions 
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for a revolution were not met. Some responses indicated that participation in the 
demonstrations was, in fact, against God’s law, and the forced removal of leaders and 
governors was expressly prohibited in Islam. 
• Finding 2: Desire for change economic and social conditions 
History had witnessed countless examples of revolutions, namely, the Iranian revolution 
to the French revolution. People were simply frustrated with the status quo and felt 
compelled to air their frustrations in a more public and often violent manner (Olson, 
2014). The second major reason that emerged from the findings was that people wanted 
change. This need for change was fuelled by feelings of deprivation. The Relative 
Deprivation Theory provides better insight as to how and why social movements erupt, 
and is followed by the findings of the qualitative data. 
Probing question: What do you think is the main reason people participated in the 
revolution? 
“Will to improve economic situation…. [T]hrough understanding citizens 
and real participation to improve society …developing society in Libya.”  
“The desire to want change for the better, for the development of the country 
…” 
“Desire to change for the better“ 
“ … Participation of people was for desire of change and living better 
future.” 
“Desire of change to the best.” 
“The main reason of the revolution is the will of people in changing their 
lives to the better…“… and eliminating negativity in different 
administrations…” 
“… many of them thought that change will be better…”  
The main reason of the revolution is the will of change and improves economy 
…” 
“…to change economic and living conditions of the people…” 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
112 
“…reasons include poor health services and infrastructure, despite Libya's 
massive economic potential, in addition to the mismanagement, 
administrative corruption, mediation and nepotism to be found in the Libyan 
health and education sector.” 
Summary: Most responses confirmed that the major reason for participation in the 
revolution was the desire and need to change the poor economic and political conditions 
of Libya for the better. Some responses highlighted the brutal treatment of protesters at 
the hands of the previous regime. Other motivation factors for participation were the 
need for economic improvement, development in the country and political expression. 
Some responses highlighted the corruption at governmental and administrative levels, 
and that many people participated in the revolution in anticipation of removing these 
vices. Poor health systems and inadequate education were also highlighted as some of 
the reasons for the eruption of the revolution.  
• Finding 3: Mass media, as well as close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt 
was the cause of the Arab Spring 
The Resource Mobilisation Theory approach, with reference to the use of social media in 
the Arab Spring facilitated the discussion of related data. 
Probing question: Why do you think the Arab Spring erupted in your country? 
“…media is the main reason that led citizens to demonstrate…”  
“The power of the conspiracy and its media tools and in the other side 
weakness of media management …” 
“Libya is between Tunisia and Egypt; the winds of changes are inevitable…” 
“…considering the consequences of neighboring countries…”  
“When the Tunisian revolution and its victory happened and the Egyptian 
revolution and the removal of Hosni Mubarak, the demands of the Libyans 
hit the roof and the Libyan youth demanded changes along the lines of the 
Tunisians and Egyptians.” 
Summary: Mass media emerged as the prominent theme. Most responses indicate 
that mass media played a major role in the transferral of the Arab Spring to Libya, 
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followed by close proximity to Tunisia and Egypt. Libyans were of the opinion that 
the youth demanded “…changes along the lines of the Tunisians and the 
Egyptians,” as a result of being closely connected to, and affected by those 
countries. Many respondents also viewed that the eruption of the Arab Spring in 
Libya was largely influenced by social media, and the manner in which news about 
the Arab Spring was disseminated. Technologically-savvy youth, therefore, were 
inspired to participate, based on shared sentiments of deprivation and helplessness 
regarding their living conditions on social media platforms, such as Facebook, 
WhatsApp and YouTube. The close proximity of Libya to Egypt and Tunisia 
influenced the spread of the Libyan revolution.  
Sub-theme: The revolution was opportunistic 
The responses indicated that “…Libyans were thus waiting for the opportunity to express 
their legitimate demands…” (Interview 8). These responses could infer that the Libyan 
revolution may not have erupted independently, and was largely motivated by the 
consequences of Tunisia and Egypt. Consequently, it may be inferred that the Libyan 
revolution was largely reactionary, as confirmed by previous statements, and the 
revolution was not rationally motivated, because that many respondents still felt 
unconvinced about its necessity. The views of the participants reflected that a “need for 
change” during the Gaddafi era was a major motivation for participation in the 
revolution. The poor socio-economic and political conditions of Libya also surfaced as a 
reason for the eruption of the revolution, followed by a lack of political freedom, and 
corruption at governmental and administrative levels. In terms of seeking social reform, 
the participants expressed that poor health and education structures were also reasons for 
the eruption of the revolution. Many Libyans participated in the revolution in the hope of 
removing these vices. 
 
5.5 Objective 2: To describe the political, economic, and social 
implications of the Arab Spring on the democratisation process 
One of the aims of this current study was to gain an understanding of students’ perception of 
the Arab Spring in Libya, as well as how they considered that it influenced the political, social 
and economic conditions and the democratisation process in Libya. The following set of results 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
114 
demonstrates the previous and current political and economic conditions of Libya, according 
to students’ perceptions regarding the development of an effective democracy in Libya. 
• Finding 4: The economic conditions were good before the revolution 
Table 3: Economic conditions before the revolution 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The economic 
conditions of 
your city before 
the revolution? 
Good 
Obs 27 9 42 78 
% 54,0% 18,0% 84,0% 52,0% 
Neutral 
Obs 2 2 0 4 
% 4,0% 4,0% 0,0% 2,7% 
Poor 
Obs 21 39 8 68 
% 42,0% 78,0% 16,0% 45,3% 
Total 
Obs 50 50 50 150 
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: The results in Table 3 indicate the views of the respondents regarding the 
economic conditions of their respective cities after the revolution. The majority of 
respondents (84.0%) from Sabha acknowledged that the economic conditions were good 
prior to the revolution, whereas the majority of Cyrenaica (78.0%) indicated the opposite. 
Interestingly, Cyrenaica had always been historically and economically marginalised 
during the Gaddafi era, as opposed to Sabha that was considered Gaddafi’s last-standing 
stronghold during the revolution. More than half (54.0%) of the respondents from Tripoli 
indicated good economic conditions prior to the revolution, which was a significantly 
higher percentage than Cyrenaica, where only (18.0%) indicated good conditions. Forty-
two per cent of the Tripoli respondents indicated poor conditions, whereas a significant 
difference was noted between Sabha (16.0%) and Cyrenaica (78.0%). The results 
revealed that the most polarised and significant views were illustrated by Sabha and 
Cyrenaica, whereas Tripoli appeared to be straddling ‘good’ and ‘poor’ conditions. The 
overall results revealed that more than half (52.0%) of all the respondents agreed that the 
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conditions were good prior to the revolution, and less than half (45.3%) indicated ‘poor’. 
The results from Tripoli at (54.0%) and (42.0%) for poor conditions, indicated that Tripoli 
still had some loyal tendencies towards the Gaddafi regime, whereas the majority of 
Cyrenaica (78.0%), the birthplace of revolts against Gaddafi, indicated poor conditions.  
• Finding 5: The economic conditions were bad after the revolution 
Table 4: Economic conditions after the revolution 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The economic 
conditions of your city 
after the revolution? 
Good 
Count 9 8 7 24 
% within City 18,0% 16,0% 14,0% 16,0% 
Neutral 
Count 2 3 3 8 
% within City 4,0% 6,0% 6,0% 5,3% 
Bad 
Count 39 39 40 118 
% within City 78,0% 78,0% 80,0% 78,7% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: The results of the respondents’ views about the economic conditions after the 
revolution are displayed in Table 4. The overall majority (78.7%) of the three sites agreed 
that the economic conditions of their respective cities were bad after the revolution, 
whereas sixteen per cent indicated otherwise. The results in Table 3 indicate that (52,0%) 
of all respondents agreed that the conditions were good prior to the revolution, which is 
significantly higher than results in Table 4, which reveals that only (16.0%) believed that 
the economic conditions were good after the revolution. This implies that the economic 
conditions of these cities deteriorated after the revolution, instead of improving, which 
was one of the many motives for the revolution: the improvement of economic conditions.  
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• Finding 6: The economic conditions did not improve after the Arab 
Spring 
Table 5: The economic conditions of the country 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I feel that economic 
conditions of Libya 
have improved since 
the Libyan Arab 
Spring 
Agree 
Count 2 1 1 4 
% within City 4,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,7% 
Neutral 
Count 5 5 5 15 
% within City 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 
Disagree 
Count 43 44 44 131 
% within City 86,0% 88,0% 88,0% 87,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
The views of the respondents regarding the improvement of economic conditions since 
the Libyan Arab Spring, are indicated in Table 5, and reveals that the majority (87.3%) 
of the respondents were of the opinion that the economic conditions had not improved. 
In addition, the results revealed that the majority from all regions concurred; Cyrenaica 
(80.0%), Sabha (80.0%) and Tripoli (86.0%). The overall minority (2.7%) maintained 
that the economic conditions had improved after the Arab Spring. However, the results 
indicated that Libyans were adamant that the economic conditions had deteriorated. 
• Finding 7: Unemployment rates have escalated since the Arab Spring 
Table 6: Escalation of unemployment since the Arab spring 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I do not feel that 
unemployment has 
escalated since the 
Libyan Arab spring 
Agree 
Count 11 14 15 40 
% within City 22,0% 28,0% 30,0% 26,7% 
Neutral 
Count 15 12 12 39 
% within City 30,0% 24,0% 24,0% 26,0% 
Disagree 
Count 24 24 23 71 
% within City 48,0% 48,0% 46,0% 47,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Summary: In Table 6, the views of respondents regarding the escalation of 
unemployment after the Arab Spring are clearly presented. The majority of the 
respondents from Tripoli (48.0%), Cyrenaica (48.0%) and Sabha (46.0%) maintained that 
the unemployment rates had escalated since the Arab Spring. The overall results revealed 
that just less than half of all the respondents (47.3%) concurred, which outweighed the 
minority (26.7%), who viewed that unemployment rates had not escalated since the Arab 
Spring. 
• Finding 8: Economic instability was a consequence of the revolution 
Probing question: Describe the social and economic state of your city before and after 
the revolution? 
“...The economic situation is very bad as the living conditions, in terms of the high living 
costs and inflation...[T]he Libyan currency has depreciated in value.“  
“…lack of economic potentials and resources, deterioration of health 
situation, facilities, security and full fall down in all economic activities.” 
“Scary economic situation...”  
“Social and economic status after the revolution is worse than before…” 
“Results of the revolution: transforming the country to a jungle, reaching 
bankruptcy and loaning…and after it became fragile, unstable and 
overlapping.” 
“… economic status after the revolution is worse than before.” 
“…escape of capitalists and high prices…” 
“… after the revolution it is very bad…” 
“Increase of inflation, absence of capitalists, state role absence…” 
“…Economic situation is worst after the war due to consequent wars in the 
city and spread of chaos and weapons…” 
“…economic: total collapse of the sector, administrative: total collapse.” 
“…economic pressure and high prices…” 
Summary: A destabilised economy appeared to be a major theme, according to the 
respondents. Most of them confirmed that the economic condition of the country had 
worsened since the revolution, and cited the lack of employment opportunities, resources 
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and general infrastructure, as an economic consequence of the revolution. A secondary 
theme that emerged was that of financial bankruptcy and the inflation of prices. 
Generally, the results revealed that the overall economic state of Libya had not improved 
after the revolution, despite it being the major motive for participation in the 
demonstrations. 
 Social implications of the Arab Spring 
The following set of data explores the social implications of the Arab Spring, such as 
living conditions, unemployment and overall improvements.  
• Finding 9: Living conditions were better prior to the revolution  
Table 7: Living conditions before the revolution 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
Living conditions 
before the 
revolution? 
Good 
Obs 35 25 37 97 
% 70,0% 50,0% 74,0% 64,7% 
Neutral 
Obs 2 3 1 6 
% 4,0% 6,0% 2,0% 4,0% 
Bad 
Obs 13 22 12 47 
% 26,0% 44,0% 24,0% 31,3% 
Total 
Obs 50 50 50 150 
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 7 contains the views of the respondents concerning their living 
conditions before the revolution and reveals that half of Cyrenaica (50.0%) 
considered their living conditions to be good before the revolution, as did seventy 
per cent of Tripoli and seventy-four per cent of Sabha. The overall majority (64.7%) 
of respondents concurred that living conditions were better prior to the revolution, 
while more than thirty-one per cent disagreed. This is a significant difference. The 
results revealed that only half of Cyrenaica viewed the conditions as good prior to 
the revolution, while forty-four per cent reported bad living conditions. The 
difference between the two percentages is only six per cent of respondents, who 
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selected the neutral option. The results also revealed that Cyrenaica appeared to be 
more disadvantaged before the revolution, than Tripoli and Sabha were.  
• Finding 10: Social conditions were bad after the revolution 
Table 8: Social conditions after the revolution 
The social conditions of your 
country after the revolution?  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The social 
conditions of 
your country 
after the 
revolution? 
Good 
Count 12 23 9 44 
% within City 24,0% 46,0% 18,0% 29,3% 
Neutral 
Count 3 2 1 6 
% within City 6,0% 4,0% 2,0% 4,0% 
Bad 
Count 35 25 40 100 
% within City 70,0% 50,0% 80,0% 66,7% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 8 contains the views of the respondents regarding the social 
conditions after the revolution. The majority (80.0%) of the respondents from 
Sabha indicated bad social conditions after the revolution, followed by Tripoli at 
seventy percent; however, only half of Cyrenaica indicated bad social conditions. 
The table shows that two-thirds (66.7%) of the overall respondents agreed that the 
social conditions were bad after to the revolution, while (29.3%) indicated that they 
were good. Table 7 indicates that the majority (64.7%) agreed that living conditions 
were good before the revolution; however, Table 8 indicates that the majority 
(66.7%) viewed their social conditions as worse, after the revolution.  
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• Finding 11: Lack of improvement since revolution  
Table 9: General improvement since the revolution 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I feel that the 
country has 
not improved 
since the 
revolution 
Agree 
Count 42 43 42 127 
% within City 84,0% 86,0% 84,0% 84,7% 
Neutral 
Count 6 6 6 18 
% within City 12,0% 12,0% 12,0% 12,0% 
Disagree Count 2 1 2 5 
v % within City 4,0% 2,0% 4,0% 3,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: As viewed in Table 9, the overall majority (84.7%) of all three regions 
maintained that the country had not improved since the revolution, as opposed to 
the minority (3.3%), who believed that it did. The results from each region also 
revealed that the respondents were adamant that the country had not improved, with 
the Tripoli and Sabha percentages each at eighty-four per cent, respectively, and 
Cyrenaica with the highest percentage (86.0%). 
• Finding 12: The revolution caused social fragmentation  
Probing question: Describe the social and economic state of your city before and 
after the revolution?  
“Social disintegration and tearing apart the social fabric…”  
“…social division, chaos… tearing social fabric…”  
“…weakness of social tissue.” 
“Before revolution it was stable, conjoined and homogeneous…” 
“Social and economic situation before revolution were good…” 
“… tearing social fabric.”  
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“…before the revolution, the city was stable – socially…” 
“Social … status after the revolution is worse than before...”  
“Social status before war was better.” 
“Before revolution there was not a total satisfaction due to 
recession...” 
“After war, catastrophic and pathetic situation, there is social rupture 
inside the family, dissociation of the one home, friends, neighbours …” 
“After the revolution: society is divided, lack of social connections and 
the rejection of revolution by people…” 
“…[F]ragmentation…” 
Summary: Most responses indicated that the social fabric of the Libyan people 
was torn and fragmented after the revolution, and that it was much more 
homogenous prior to it. Many participants were also of the opinion that the situation 
had worsened and that the social fragmentation had infiltrated familial and tribal 
bonds. 
• Finding 13: The revolution resulted in a lack of safety and security 
Probing question: Describe the social and economic state of your city before and 
after the revolution? 
“...Lack of security is the most important challenges…”  
“…lack of security…” 
“Security disorder … illegal immigration because it is a passage 
area…”  
“Catastrophic in all levels: security: through lack of security…” 
“…Before the revolution, the city was stable…economically and 
security…” 
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“After the revolution, different political views contributed to problems 
that further escalated into familial and tribal issues. These then 
developed into armed clashes between members within a city, between 
cities between tribes leading to a large rupture in the lining of the 
Libyan the social fabric...“  
“…security collapse…”  
“Destruction.” 
“…conditions, insecurity, kidnapping for ransom, robbery under 
coercion, tension with neighbouring countries...“ 
“Safe and stable city…[b]ut after the war it is unsafe city controlled by 
dark militias…”  
“Spread of camps controlled by outlaw militias…”  
“…lack of security…”  
“…Religious and extremist religious groups, proliferation of weapons, 
threat to local security poor economic...“ 
Summary: Most of the participants confirmed that a lack of security is a major 
consequence of the revolution and a source of major concern for them. This lack of 
security has been mainly attributed to the spread of various militia groups in Libya, 
in addition to the spread of weapons. Furthermore, some responses indicate that 
clashes have infiltrated familial and tribal levels, which have also developed into 
armed confrontations, thus creating an internal security threat. The source of an 
external security threat is mainly posed by the militia groups who according to the 
responses, resort to “kidnapping” for ransom. Secondary themes that have emerged 
from the data include the growing tension between neighbouring countries as a 
result of the internal security threat posed by extremist groups.  
 Political implications of the Arab Spring 
The following set of data present the views of the study sample about the political 
implications of the Arab Spring.  
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• Finding 14: General dissatisfaction with the political state before the 
revolution 
Table 10: Political conditions before the revolution 
The political conditions of your 
country before the revolution  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The political 
conditions of 
your country 
before the 
revolution 
Good 
Count 6 5 6 17 
% within City 12,0% 10,0% 12,0% 11,3% 
Neutral 
Count 1 2 2 5 
% within City 2,0% 4,0% 4,0% 3,3% 
Bad 
Count 43 43 42 128 
% within City 86,0% 86,0% 84,0% 85,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: The results of the respondents’ views about the political conditions of 
the country before the revolution, are presented in Table 10. An overwhelming 
majority (85.3%) agreed that the political conditions of the country were bad before 
the revolution. This percentage is significantly higher than the overall minority 
(11.3%), who indicated the opposite. Interestingly, the majority of the three regions 
agreed that the political conditions were bad prior to the revolution. The results 
from Tripoli and Cyrenaica are similar at eighty-six per cent, followed closely by 
Sabha at eighty-four per cent. These results indicated the general dissatisfaction of 
the respondents with the political state of the country before the revolution. 
• Finding 15: The revolution caused political instability  
Probing question: Describe the political state of your city before and after the 
revolution? 
“…before the revolution, it was stable and then became a jungle…”  
“…after the revolution, the situation became chaotic as militias that 
espoused the Takfiri ideology spread to criminalise political action. “  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
124 
...Assassinations were rife and civil acts seized for a short period of 
time. 
“… the political status … after the revolution it suffers division and 
chaos, and the lack of stability…” 
“… after the revolution it is very bad…”  
“…catastrophic, political conflicts, chaos…” 
“…Spread of corruption and steeling public funds…”  
“Political hysteria and who has weapons controls.” 
“…militias, the proliferation of weapons and the weakness of the state 
apparatus…“ 
„..Political status … [A]after the revolution it suffers division and 
chaos, and the lack of stability...” 
Summary: Major themes that emerged from the data indicated political instability 
and chaos after the revolution. Sub-themes that emerged from the data focussed on 
the proliferation of weapons, and the spread of various militia groups throughout 
the country, as well as the spread of corruption. The general theme seemed to 
indicate that the political state of the country deteriorated after the revolution. The 
sub-themes that emerged were, the lack of political freedom before and after the 
revolution, as per the following excerpt: 
“The Libyan regime criminalised political parties but after the 
revolution it is very bad…but after the revolution, and it is divided 
without freedom of expression and opinion differentiation.”  
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5.6 Objective 3: To describe the relationship that exists between the Arab 
Spring revolution and a need for democracy 
The following section highlights the opinions of the study sample about democracy. The 
questions were designed to explore their views on the following issues, relating to democracy: 
1. What democracy means; 
2. The necessity of the revolution for Libya; 
3. The relationship that exists between the revolution and democracy; 
4. The possibility of a democracy in Libya;  
5. The positive and negative impacts of a revolution; and  
6. The impact of the revolution on the process of democratisation. 
Findings from the questions provided an insider perspective into how the study sample viewed 
democracy and its relationship with the revolution. 
 What democracy means 
• Finding 16: Meanings of democracy  
Probing question: What does democracy mean to you? 
“Democracy is transforming countries to refugees’ camps…”  
“Democracy is appropriate lies that should be in the right place...”  
“There is no clear meaning for democracy just as there is no real 
existence of it. It is merely a concept; a ‘named thing’. It is but chaos 
that came to the green and dry land, resulting in the loss of the unity, 
stability and freedom of the country.” 
 “Peaceful transfer of power by a mechanism and rules agreed by 
politicians and all society…” 
“Democracy is developing human and granting him the freedom for 
progress, creation and innovation.”  
“Democracy…is developing the country and the citizen in the road of 
progress, development and prosperity...”  
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“A true democracy (in our view) is one that does not conflict with or 
oppose Islam; one in which a human enjoys complete human and civil 
rights. This is what our government has failed to achieve.” 
“The democracy is a goal not a tool.”  
“Security and safety for a society as the Libyan society…”  
Summary: Most respondents view that democracy is synonymous with 
‘development’ and ‘progress’. Other major themes that have emerged is the idea 
that democracy is coined with the enjoyment of human and civil rights, freedom, 
social prosperity, progress, and safety and security for all and should be a peaceful 
process. Some responses indicate that the negative consequences of democracy and 
the process of achieving it far outweigh the positive results. Some responses 
indicate that the notion of democracy results in disunity and instability in the 
country. 
 The necessity of the revolution for Libya 
• Finding 17: The Libyan revolution was not necessary 
Table 11: Results for need of regime change 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I do feel the 
need for 
regime 
change 
Agree 
Count 24 34 38 96 
% within City 48,0% 68,0% 76,0% 64,0% 
Neutral 
Count 5 5 3 13 
% within City 10,0% 10,0% 6,0% 8,7% 
Disagree 
Count 21 11 9 41 
% within City 42,0% 22,0% 18,0% 27,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: In Table 11, the majority of the respondents, who agreed with the need 
for regime change were from Sabha (76.0%), followed by Cyrenaica (68.0%), and 
forty-eight per cent from Tripoli agreed that regime change was necessary, while 
less than half (42.0%), disagreed. These percentages were very close, with Tripoli 
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straddling between the need for it or not. Only 18.0% of Sabha and 22.0% of 
Cyrenaica disagreed with the need for regime change. The overall results indicated 
that the majority (64.0%) agreed on the need for regime change. 
 
 
Table 12: The need for the Arab Spring in Libya 
 
 
Summary: In Table 12, most of the respondents from all the regions disagreed on 
the necessity of the Arab Spring in Libya. The majority of the respondents from 
Tripoli (64.0%) and Sabha (64.0%) disagreed, followed closely by Cyrenaica 
(60.0%). The cities appeared to concur that the Arab Spring was not necessary in 
Libya, with an overall percentage of 62.7%. Only 22.7% of the respondents agreed 
to the necessity of the Arab Spring. 
 The relationship that exists between the revolution and democracy 
This section highlights what the study sample perceived as the relationship between the 
revolution and democracy. 
• Finding 18: Revolution is violent and a democracy is peaceful 
Probing question: What do you think is the relationship between the revolution and 
democracy? 
“Relation between the revolution and democracy is the same relation 
between wolf and sheep…” 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I think that 
the Arab 
Spring was 
necessary in 
Libya 
Agree 
Count 10 13 11 34 
% within City 20,0% 26,0% 22,0% 22,7% 
Neutral 
Count 8 7 7 22 
% within City 16,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,7% 
Disagree 
Count 32 30 32 94 
% within City 64,0% 60,0% 64,0% 62,7% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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“… Revolution depends on violence, but democracy depends on 
peaceful accord.” 
“Revolution and democracy… [t]he former… is an aggressive 
uprooting that cannot be achieved except by the ‘corpse’ of the former 
regime... revolution" adopts violence and the second adopts the 
language of peaceful understanding… the principle reason for any 
revolution is the pursuit of democracy…”  
Summary: The above data indicate that a revolution is built on violence, while 
democracy is built on a language of peace. 
• Finding 19: Revolution is not a condition for democracy 
“The revolution is not a condition of the presence of democracy...” 
“Democracy does not require a revolution sometimes…” 
 “Democracy is not in need of violence, but ostracises and condemns it 
whereas a revolution adopts and demands it…” 
“A revolution may the catalyst for the emergence of a democracy, but 
it not necessarily yields a true democracy.” 
“…if there is revolution there will be no democracy”.  
Summary: The achievement of a democracy is not reliant on the eruption of a 
revolution. 
 
• Finding 20: There is no specified relationship 
“There is no specified relation…” 
 “There is no relation.” 
Summary: The responses indicated that the revolution was not necessary to 
achieve a democracy. 
“…if there is revolution there will be no democracy”.  
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Some responses indicated that there is no relationship between democracy and 
revolution, and that they are mutually exclusive, and not dependent on one another. 
Some responses indicated that democracy is based on the language of 
“understanding” and “peace”, whereas revolution is characterised by “violence”, 
and that the two are completely separate entities. The main emerging theme was 
that democracy was not being achieved through revolution, and that, although a 
revolution might intend to bring about a democracy, a true democracy will not be 
achieved in this manner. 
• Finding 21: Revolution has negative impacts on the process of democracy 
Probing question: How do you think the revolution has impacted on the process of 
democratisation? 
“The revolution killed democracy clinically in my country…”  
“In the beginning of 2012, there is a partial impact in the positive 
direction…” 
“Negative impact…”  
“Who is not with us, and then he is with terrorism…” 
“Negative.”  
“Negative.”  
Summary: Most respondents indicated that the revolution had negatively impacted 
the process of democratisation, and that the prospects of a democracy were good at 
the beginning of the revolution. 
• Finding 22: Revolution is not necessary to achieve democracy 
Probing question: Is revolution necessary to achieve democracy?  
“Not necessary – without explanation.”  
“Not necessary and the reason is that fast and surprising change 
results will be negative”.  
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“Not necessary – the shepherd protects the sheep from the wolf, but 
how come the wolf be the shepherd?” 
“Arabic spring is not necessary as long as there is progressive reform 
from the top of the pyramid to the bottom…”  
“After the bad situation that our country has reached, I think it was not 
necessary at all”.  
“…not by a revolution in the Libya case, it should not be by using 
weapons...” 
“Not necessary…” 
“Not necessary…”  
“No, sometimes results chaos as in Libya...”  
“No, it is not necessary, because there are countries that have 
witnessed a peaceful transition of power, such as South Africa and 
other states...” 
“No.”  
Summary: Many respondents indicated that the revolution was not necessary, and 
have used the current state of affairs of the Libyan state, as proof for their responses. 
However, some responses indicated that the revolution was necessary and have 
cited many reasons, with the removal of the Gaddafi regime, as the most prominent. 
Some responses indicated that the change was necessary, although a peaceful 
process would have been better, “…change is necessary, Better to change the 
situation peacefully through accepting all sides as the Tunisian case”. Others noted 
the need for foreign intervention “…open the gate for direct and indirect foreign 
intervention.” However, the overall sentiment that emerged was that the Arab 
Spring was not necessary in Libya, despite the many maladies of the previous 
Gaddafi regime. According to the results, there appeared to be no connection 
between revolution and democracy, for the Libyan people at least. The majority 
indicated that the Arab Spring was not necessary to achieve democracy. 
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• Finding 23: Democracy is not achieved through revolution 
Table 13: Democracy is not achieved through revolution 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
Democracy is 
achieved 
through 
revolution 
Agree 
Count 18 25 9 52 
% within City 36,0% 50,0% 18,0% 34,7% 
Neutral 
Count 7 12 4 23 
% within City 14,0% 24,0% 8,0% 15,3% 
Disagree 
Count 25 13 37 75 
% within City 50,0% 26,0% 74,0% 50,0% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: The overall results in Table 13 indicate that the majority of the regions disagreed 
that democracy was achieved through revolution, while over a third (34.7%) agreed that it was. 
More than fifteen per cent indicated the neutral option. Half of the respondents from Cyrenaica 
(50.0%) agreed that democracy is achieved through revolution, and represented the majority 
of the votes for Cyrenaica. Over a quarter of the respondents from Cyrenaica (26.0%) 
disagreed, while the majority of the respondents from Sabha (74.0%) shared the same view. 
The most significant difference was noted between Sabha (74.0%) and Cyrenaica (26.0%). Half 
of the respondents from Tripoli (50.0%) also disagreed that revolution is a means to achieve 
democracy, and only thirty-six per cent agreed. 
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• Finding 24: Protests are not needed to achieve democracy 
Table 14: Protests and demonstrations are not necessary for democracy 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
Protests and 
demonstrations 
are not necessary 
for democracy 
Agree 
Count 28 16 43 87 
% within City 56,0% 32,0% 86,0% 58,0% 
Neutral 
Count 8 11 4 23 
% within City 16,0% 22,0% 8,0% 15,3% 
Disagree 
Count 14 23 3 40 
% within City 28,0% 46,0% 6,0% 26,7% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: The results displayed in Table 14 shows that the majority of the 
respondents from Sabha (86.0%) agreed that protests were not necessary to achieve 
democracy, while more than half of Tripoli (56.0%) shared this same sentiment. In 
addition, the results reveal that Cyrenaica represented the minority, in terms of 
agreement (32.0%), but represented the majority (46.0%), in terms of disagreement. 
The overall results indicate that over half of the respondents from all the regions 
(58.0%) agreed that protests were not necessary for a democracy, while only 
twenty-six per cent disagreed. Over fifteen per cent of the respondents remained 
neutral. 
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• Finding 25: The revolution was/was not necessary to start the process of 
democracy 
Table 15: The revolution as integral to start the process of democracy 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I feel that the 
revolution was 
necessary to 
start the 
process of 
democracy 
Agree 
Count 16 21 6 43 
% within City 32,0% 42,0% 12,0% 28,7% 
Neutral 
Count 9 12 5 26 
% within City 18,0% 24,0% 10,0% 17,3% 
Disagree 
Count 25 17 39 81 
% within City 50,0% 34,0% 78,0% 54,0% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 15 displays that more than half (54.0%) of all the respondents 
from the different regions, believed that the revolution was not necessary to initiate 
the process of democracy, as opposed to less than a third (28.7%), who viewed the 
opposite. Cyrenaica (42.0%) represented the majority, who believe that the 
revolution was necessary to initiate this process, closely followed by Tripoli 
(32.0%). The majority of the respondents who disagreed were from Sabha (78.0%), 
followed by Tripoli (50.0%) and Cyrenaica (34.0%). 
• Finding 26: The Arab Spring brought about democracy in Libya 
Table 16: The Arab Spring and democracy in Libya 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The Arab 
Spring has 
brought about 
democracy in 
Libya 
Agree 
Count 48 47 47 142 
% within City 96,0% 94,0% 94,0% 94,7% 
Disagree 
Count 2 3 3 8 
% within City 4,0% 6,0% 6,0% 5,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Summary: Table 16 shows that the overwhelming majority (94.7%) of respondents 
indicated that the Arab Spring brought about democracy in Libya. The results were 
consistent across all regions. 
 The impacts of democracy 
• Finding 27: The process of democracy causes problems 
Table 17: Consequences of the process of democracy 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The process of 
democracy has 
caused more 
problems or 
my country 
Agree 
Count 31 29 36 96 
% within City 62,0% 58,0% 72,0% 64,0% 
Neutral 
Count 10 8 7 25 
% within City 20,0% 16,0% 14,0% 16,7% 
Disagree 
Count 9 13 7 29 
% within City 18,0% 26,0% 14,0% 19,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 17 comprises the views of the respondents regarding the process 
of democracy, and whether they perceived it to have negative consequences. The 
results reveal that the overall majority (64.0%) of the respondents believed that the 
process of democracy had caused more problems in Libya. The majority of the 
respondents from Sabha (72.0%) agreed that the democratic process had caused 
more problems in their city, and was closely followed by Tripoli (60.0%). More 
than half of the respondents from Cyrenaica agreed with this statement. Cyrenaica 
presented the majority (26.0%), in terms of disagreeing with the negative impacts 
of the Arab Spring on their city, and was followed closely by Tripoli (18.0%). The 
overall results indicated that the majority (64.0%) agreed that the Arab Spring had 
caused more problems in their respective regions. 
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 The possibility of democracy in Libya 
• Finding 28: Democracy may/may not be possible in Libya 
Table 18: The possibility of a democracy in Libya 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I do not think 
that a 
democracy is 
possible in 
Libya 
Agree 
Count 16 22 23 61 
% within City 32,0% 44,0% 46,0% 40,7% 
Neutral 
Count 12 11 11 34 
% within City 24,0% 22,0% 22,0% 22,7% 
Disagree 
Count 22 17 16 55 
% within City 44,0% 34,0% 32,0% 36,7% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 18 represents the views of the respondents on the possibility of a 
democracy in Libya. The overall results indicate that less than half (40.7%) agreed 
that the prospect of democracy was not possible, closely followed by more than a 
third (36.7%) who agreed that it was. A further 22.7% of the responses were neutral. 
Tripoli represented the majority (44.0%), in terms of disagreeing that democracy 
was not possible, closely followed by Cyrenaica (34.0%).  
• Finding 29: The democratic government is not the solution 
Table 19: Democratic government is not the solution 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I do not think 
that a 
democratic 
government is 
the solution to 
our problems 
Agree 
Count 45 44 43 132 
% within City 90,0% 88,0% 86,0% 88,0% 
Neutral 
Count 5 5 5 15 
% within City 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 10,0% 
Disagree 
Count 0 1 2 3 
% within City 0,0% 2,0% 4,0% 2,0% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Summary: Table 19 indicates the sentiments of the respondents about the idea of 
a democratic government, as a solution to their current problems. The overall 
results indicated that the majority (88.0%) were of the opinion that a democratic 
government was not the solution and far outweighs the minority (3.0%). The results 
were significantly different. In terms of the different regions, Tripoli (90.0%) 
represented the highest numbers of those who agree with the statement, followed 
by Cyrenaica (88.0%), and Sabha (86.4%). 
 The positive and negative impacts of a revolution 
• Finding 30: The revolution has negative impacts  
Table 20: The negative impacts of the Arab Spring 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I think that the 
Arab spring 
affected my 
city negatively 
Agree 
Count 29 29 30 88 
% within City 58,0% 58,0% 60,0% 58,7% 
Neutral 
Count 12 11 11 34 
% within City 24,0% 22,0% 22,0% 22,7% 
Disagree 
Count 9 10 9 28 
% within City 18,0% 20,0% 18,0% 18,7% 
Total  
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 20 presents the views of the respondents regarding the negative 
impacts of the Arab Spring. Both Tripoli (58.0%) and Cyrenaica (58.0%) agreed 
that the Arab Spring had negatively impacted their cities, while Sabha (60.0%) 
represented the majority in this regard. The overall results indicated that more than 
half of the respondents (58.7%) from all the regions indicated their agreement that 
the Arab Spring had negatively impacted their regions, while the overall minority 
disagreed (18.0%).  
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Table 21: The Arab Spring has not brought about positive changes 
 
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
I feel that the 
Arab Spring 
brought about 
positive 
changes 
Agree 
Count 5 6 6 17 
% within City 10,0% 12,0% 12,0% 11,3% 
Neutral 
Count 8 7 7 22 
% within City 16,0% 14,0% 14,0% 14,7% 
Disagree 
Count 37 37 37 111 
% within City 74,0% 74,0% 74,0% 74,0% 
Total  
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 21 comprises the views of the respondents regarding the impacts 
of the Arab Spring. The majority of all the regions (74.0%) concluded that the Arab 
Spring did not bring about positive changes, and the minority (11.3%) believed that 
it did. The results indicated that most of the respondents were of the opinion that 
the Arab Spring had not impacted their lives, positively.  
 The impact of the revolution on the process of democratisation 
• Finding 31: Democracy is not possible in Libya 
Probing question: Do you think the development of a democracy is possible in 
Libya?  
“It is not possible, due to the lack of social awareness and 
Institutional construction.  
“No, it is not possible with the presence of… culture…” 
“Libyan society is not prepared to enter into the foreign democracy…” 
“Refusal of (one) side to be controlled by the other side...”  
“No - developing democracy requires a long time inside Libya due to 
the tribal nature of the Libyan society and the cultural heritage. And 
this requires a cultural revolution first”.  
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“No -- due to the social and political accumulations…”  
“In the meantime, I think it is difficult due to the suffering of the country 
as a result of its nature as a tribal society, also cultural heritage that 
prevents its development, therefore it will take a long time.” 
“Currently, no. Democracy requires security and economic stability, 
and a real understanding of the political process and the peaceful 
transfer of power. Libya currently exists in complete chaos -- from the 
proliferation of weapons, to insecurity and other problems.” 
Summary: The overwhelming majority of the respondents perceived that 
democracy was not possible in Libya, and have cited many reasons for this fact. 
Some responses indicated that the social, cultural and tribal state of Libya was not 
predisposed to the idea of democracy, and that a “cultural revolution” was 
necessary, in order to achieve democracy. Others indicated that the lack of security, 
as well as economic instability were barriers to the process of democratisation, 
which was likely to extend over a long period. 
• Finding 32: General dissatisfaction and disappointment about the revolution 
Probing question: How do you think people feel about the revolution? 
“Dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction.” 
 “Big disappointment…”  
“Negative.” 
“Not satisfied because they were expecting better results.  
“Most people feel frustrated by the country's fragmentation…sorry and 
regretful for what has occurred…”  
Summary: Most responses revealed overall dissatisfaction with the current 
conditions in the country. Some respondents refused to respond. 
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5.7 Objective 4: To describe the challenges to the process of 
democratisation after the Arab Spring. 
The following section presents the views of the sample about the challenges faced, after the 
revolution, and the government’s ability to address them. The section concludes with a set of 
recommendations by the sample for democratic transformation of Libya. The set of 
recommendations are listed in the List of Appendices (Appendix N). The major challenges that 
were highlighted by the sample were: 
1. Safety and security 
2. Lack of democratic culture 
3. Tribal, political and military divisions 
4. Poor infrastructure and health services  
5. Inflation and lack of employment 
• Finding 33: Safety and security 
Probing question: What are the challenges Libya will encounter in order to achieve 
democracy? 
“…other extremist terrorist groups emerged as a result of this division 
decreased the possibility of successful democratic transition…” 
“..Many challenges, political, security…” 
“…proliferation of arms and weapons has given another dimension to this 
phenomenon, as some of the differences between tribes have taken on a 
language of arms, posing a threat to public safety, security and social 
stability... 
“…presence and emergence of armed battalions who operate within the 
framework of religious-political ideology...“ 
 “…The extremist groups, like the Daesh and Al-Qaeda, they are causing a 
lot of problems for us here...” 
“Different organisations and groups are crossing the borders illegally like 
terrorist groups…” 
 “The militia groups enforce their power on the people ….” 
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“Benghazi has a lot of armed terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda and the Daesh, 
and even many more other groups. They have run a lot of operations and 
caused explosions, before the army could get hold of them…” 
“…the militias and terrorist groups are coming from the South…” 
“…Illegal immigration of people coming over the borders and human 
trafficking…” 
“The biggest challenge for this is intervention, foreign and national 
intervention, and financing the different militia and terrorist groups with 
money and weapons…” 
“…the lack of safety and security prevents us from starting the process…” 
“The biggest challenge we have is kidnappings, no safety, theft…” 
“…and we are constantly faced with kidnappings and theft…” 
“…there is no safety, and they are kidnapping and stealing, because there 
are no job opportunities…” 
Summary: The findings indicated that safety and security issues presented major 
challenges, specifically, the terrorist groups, militias and illegal immigration that poses a 
threat to that security. In addition, the respondents emphasised that kidnappings for 
ransom and theft are real security and safety concerns, while internal security threats 
hinder the initiation of the democratic process. Safety and security issues emerged as a 
major challenge for the Libyan government, especially the armed clashes between tribes 
and extremist groups. Some responses indicated that the extremist groups act as obstacles 
to the process of democratisation. 
• Finding 34: Lack of democratic culture 
“…Social awareness…”  
“Social, economic and cultural challenges…” 
“Many challenges, political, security, economic social and cultural 
challenges...”  
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“Most important challenges are decrease of democracy culture level, no 
democracy without democratic culture...”  
“Lack of democratic culture…”  
“Institutional building… national constitution...”  
“Inappropriate persons in higher positions...” 
Summary: The findings also indicated that the process of state building, as well as the 
development of a democratic culture, may pose significant challenges to the Libyan 
government. Additional challenges include social, political and economic challenges. 
This section presents the challenges that Libya is currently facing, in terms of the 
democratic process after the Arab Spring, according to the opinions of the students at the 
three universities. 
• Finding 35: Tribal, political and military divisions 
“…I think the tribe is a challenge, because loyalty to the tribe overtakes and 
is more powerful than loyalty to the state, because people have lost faith in 
the state, so there is division now…” 
 “The state does not have the ability to exercise its power and authority on 
its institutions because it is fragmented…” 
“There is political and military division, this is all contributing to the 
current status and blocks the democratic process, preventing it from 
starting…” 
“The country is split up, and there are a lot of divisions, like there are two 
parliaments, two central banks and two governments…” 
 “The tribal confrontations and the wars between cities, using weapons to 
overcome different militia groups, these all stand in the way of starting the 
democratic process. The country is divided…” 
Summary: Most respondents felt that the country was divided and that tribal loyalties 
played a significant role in this phenomenon. 
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• Finding 36: Poor infrastructure and health services 
“…the health sector was collapsing and most Libyans got their medical 
treatment in other countries…”  
“We do not have basic necessities like electricity and health services…” 
“…right now we need to work on the health sector, there is no medical for 
us,  
“…There is no health system and safety and security…” 
“…electricity is a major problem here…” 
“The state is weak, the health sector is deteriorating, and inflation is getting 
higher and higher…” 
“…health services are a big problem and the lack of power and electricity…” 
“…we need better health services and safety, the militias are fighting with 
each other…” 
 “… No electricity and we don’t have an income…” 
Summary: Health services appear to be of major theme for the Libyan people, which is 
perceived as a major challenge to the current government, in addition to the poor 
infrastructure. 
• Finding 37: Inflation and lack of employment 
“We are paying too much money for our daily needs, everything has gone up 
and the prices are too high…” 
“There is inflation of prices and the safety.”  
“The prices are very high and the dinar has lost a lot of its value…” 
“Lack of job opportunities is a big problem…” 
“There are no jobs and no health services…” 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
143 
Summary: Lack of employment opportunities, in conjunction with inflation, represent 
major problems to the Libyan government. 
• Finding 38: The current government does not address the challenges 
Probing question: How has the current government addressed the challenges after the 
revolution? 
 “… stealing public funds and fraud on people…” 
“…the most important reason is that the power became in the hands of 
incapable persons…” 
“… [c]urrent government is powerless…”  
“…Denouncing, disapproval and censure.  
 “The government must impose state prestige and build its establishments…” 
“The government is unable to do anything as it is subjected to the influence 
of militia groups in Libya. Neither the transitional government nor the 
succeeding government was able to address or remedy the problem of the 
fighting factions, which poses a considerable threat to stability and civil 
peace…” 
“They (factions) possess heavy weapons comprising rockets that target 
governmental centres and embassies… so the Libyan government is not really 
capable of doing anything…” 
Summary: One of the prominent themes that emerged from the data was that the 
government was powerless to provide safety and security to the population of the state. 
In addition, failure to deal with the in-fighting appeared to emerge. Some respondents 
expressed that the state needed to focus on building the state, as a major priority, to deal 
with the current challenges. Some responses from the sample referred to the 
government’s lack of confidence to address challenges 
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Table 22: The government and the current challenges 
  
City 
Total 
Tripoli Cyrenaica Sabha 
The current 
government is 
dealing with the 
challenges after the 
revolution 
Agree 
Count 15 21 21 57 
% within City 30,0% 42,0% 42,0% 38,0% 
Neutral 
Count 14 9 8 31 
% within City 28,0% 18,0% 16,0% 20,7% 
Disagree 
Count 21 20 21 62 
% within City 42,0% 40,0% 42,0% 41,3% 
Total 
Count 50 50 50 150 
% within City 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Summary: Table 22 indicates that the overall majority of the respondents (41.3%) 
disagree that the government is dealing with the current challenges, whereas more than a 
third (38.0%) agreed. The difference between those who agree and disagree, is not 
significant.  
• Potential recommendations to stimulate the process of democratic 
transformation 
The following findings explore avenues that would enable government to achieve social 
satisfaction, and offers recommendations to achieve democracy, based on the suggestions 
of the sample. 
• Finding 39: Social satisfaction achievable by addressing current political 
and economic challenges 
Probing question: How do you think the current government is able to achieve 
social satisfaction? 
“With a realistic look, achieving social satisfaction comes as a result 
of economic and financial situation improvement, also security 
improvement…” 
“Social satisfaction is inflexible matter…”  
“…Who is looser of something, and then he cannot give it…” 
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“The society does not accept the results of the revolution…”  
“It cannot…”  
“Incapable and has no power in the reality to achieve social 
satisfaction…” 
“Through…national reconciliation between the tribes, supporters and 
opponents…”  
“…redress the damage and return the displaced into their cities, and 
also activate the courts and enact transitional justice laws…” 
Summary: According to the respondents, social satisfaction could be achieved by 
addressing the current economic and political challenges. In addition, the social 
fabric of Libya has to be repaired, and organs of the state have to be reinstated.  
• Finding 40: Recommendations to achieve democracy 
Probing question: How do you think the Libyan government is able to achieve 
democracy? 
“…Imposing prestige of the state first, and then building state 
establishments...”  
“There was not a real government to improve deteriorated conditions, 
and face challenges through real strategy to settle all problems caused 
by popular demonstrations…” 
“…the weapons must be removed from the militia groups and the 
security forces have to be strengthened and the militias should not be 
funded…” 
“…that the wealth generated from the oil reserves, should be enough 
to oversee the country and should be distributed amongst the citizens, 
by looking at the geographical and tribal positions. The government 
should also use a large portion of the returns from the oil reserves 
and invest it in the education and health sectors, and we should try to 
get rid of the extremist culture…”  
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“We should look at national reconciliation between all the different 
groups in the country and the different factions, and we should make 
sure that each side is guaranteed safety. This is important for the 
peaceful transition in to the democratic process.” 
“We have to get the judicial system going again, and we have to get 
rid of the idea of a politics of revenge and should resort to the law 
and use the law when there are confrontations…”  
“.. There is in-fighting. The government must get rid of all the 
fighting….” 
Summary: The above responses indicate a range of recommendations, according 
to the respondents. Issues covered include better state building, initiation of the 
judicial system, national reconciliation, and re-distribution of wealth, creation of 
job opportunities, removal of safety and security threats and development of 
infrastructure and the economy. The list of recommendations has been added to the 
list of Appendices (Appendix N). 
 
In this chapter, the researcher highlighted the four social movement theories, as well as how 
they may have played a role in the Arab Spring revolution. The findings relating to the need 
for democracy revealed that the respondents regarded the revolution as unnecessary for the 
achievement of democracy. In addition, the findings reflected that the respondents shared a 
negative view of the revolution, and that conditions prior to it, were considered better. The 
data indicates that the views of democracy and how it will improve the country were popular 
before and during the revolution. 
 
In addition, the need for change, the influence of social media, and the proximity to other Arab 
Spring countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, were considered the primary reasons for the 
eruption of the Libyan revolution. The results also revealed a sense of dissatisfaction with the 
previous regime, as well as the current government/s, because of its inability to address the 
poor economic conditions in the country. Furthermore, the expectations and the aspirations of 
the people on the ground come up particularly among the youth and the revolutionary 
intelligentsia, who mobilised the masses on the basis of the ideas and desires for a better life 
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under a democratic dispensation. Much of this was highly populist in nature as it was driven by 
the anticipation of the demise of the dictatorship, without any concrete and material evidence 
of how these new conditions were to be attained, post-revolution. The revolutionary 
intelligentsia, with the support of the mass media, succeeded in maintaining the revolutionary 
fervour among the masses, driven by populist slogans and the reinforcement of the promise of 
the current dictatorship being replaced by a democratic dispensation. Despite the absence of 
coherent post-revolution structures and plans, the momentum of the populist upsurge among 
the Libyan masses, continued to fuel the desires, aspirations, hopes and expectations of the 
people for a better life. However, the negative impacts of the revolution such as the 
deterioration of social and economic conditions as well as political instability, have directly 
impacted on respondents’ opinions of the revolution. Most respondents have expressed general 
disappointment and despondency about the revolution, because their social conditions have 
worsened during the post-revolution era. In addition, the pre-revolutionary expectations and 
hopes that were inspired by the populist ideals of a transformed and democratised Libya had 
amounted to despondency, despair and ultimate rejection of any further support and 
participation in any further post-revolutionary activities. Regarding their sentiments about the 
socio-economic consequences of the revolution, many respondents reported poor health 
services and fragile infrastructures that have left them in dire circumstances. Additionally, the 
presence of militia, as well as the illegal entry of masses into the country, posed threats to 
internal and external security, according to most respondents. The overall sentiments about the 
revolution, as well as the effects thereof, appear unenthusiastic, while the prospects and 
possibility of achieving a democracy in Libya, seem bleak. Regarding the major obstacles and 
challenges to the process of democratisation, finding 35 identified them as the lack of a 
democratic culture and tribal loyalties. Additionally, the major challenges for the government 
were the unchecked entry of militia groups, and the proliferation of arms into Libya. The 
following chapter will explore these findings in-depth, as well as how they are aligned, or 
misaligned, to the aims and main arguments of this current study. 
 
The findings of this current study revealed that most respondents have very little faith in the 
current government, and do not necessarily believe that a democracy is the solution to the 
problems they face. The challenges of the government/s are inter-linked with the political, 
economic and social implications of the Arab Spring in Libya, which, according to the 
researcher are barriers to the process of democratisation. Although the interim government/s 
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have made attempts at political reform, through the establishment of multi-party elections, 
and free voting, the current economic challenges of Libyans, after the revolution, have been 
grossly neglected. These political and economic challenges present barriers to the 
democratisation process, and have to be remedied, if the Libyan government hopes to win the 
confidence of its people. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the researcher discussed the results of the data analysis, in 
relation to the research objectives and main arguments, in light of four social movement 
theories. In this chapter, the researcher provides a discussion of the central question that 
emerges in the data, relating to the relationship between democracy and revolution. 
Democracy and revolution are contrasted in history, and have been considered unrelated, 
and occasionally hostile practices (Axford, 2011). Although all revolutionary struggles 
may not claim democratic legitimacy, some revolutions are not underpinned by 
democratic ambitions, but are born out of a need for democracy, or at least, democratic 
processes. The “democratic revolutions”, as witnessed in the MENA region, did not 
resemble the traditional Arab coup d’état, which merely substituted one elite group, or 
leader/s, with another, but instead, aimed to achieve a more democratic form of 
government, and supported democratic principles, such as population participation, as 
well as freedom of expression. Understanding the relationship between democracy and 
revolution, and what it meant to the respondents, was one of the objectives of this current 
study.  
The respondents reported that the revolution had many negative connotations, and that 
the two concepts were completely opposite, and pursued different outcomes. Besides, the 
political, economic and social implications, prompted many respondents to associate 
feelings of dissatisfaction and hopelessness, with the concept of democracy. Although 
some views associated democracy with growth and development, for many Libyans, 
democracy responsible for the current state of affairs in the country. Many definitions of 
democracy exist; however, some views assert that elections and freedom of speech are 
the major elements of a democratic system of government. 
In terms of how democracy is perceived, as well as its relationship to the revolution and 
protests, one particular sentiment is clear, the revolution was not necessary for the 
achievement of democracy in Libya, and the prospect of achieving a democracy in Libya, 
is low (Findings 28-32). In addition, the findings concur with literature, indicating that 
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democratic systems of government have not necessarily, and reliably, emerged from 
revolutions, but have emerged, when ruling elites reached a compromise, based on 
democratic tones, founded on liberalising elements. In this regard, the MENA region, and 
Libya, more specifically, may have to prepare itself for a hybrid democracy, one that is 
compatible and recognisable to the west as a democracy, and simultaneously, merged 
with ideas of Islam, while maintaining its unique cultural Arab identity. 
The major argument advanced in this current study was that the Arab Spring revolution 
was necessary to initiate the process of democracy, or change in Libya. This argument 
finds its basis in previous literature, confirming that many previous revolutions initiated 
new forms of government. Although the revolutions did not bring about a true democracy 
for the people, the system of governance was removed, at least, or changed. Libya’s case 
is no different in this regard, and although the views of the respondents reflected that the 
revolution was not necessary to achieve democracy, the researcher is of the opinion that 
these sentiments could have been motivated by the current state of Libya. It is submitted 
further that the current state of Libya, even though in the aftermath of the revolution, 
cannot be exclusively attributed to the revolution, but is a product of years of 
underdevelopment, as well as the remnants of colonial legacies and previous regimes. 
Therefore, in this regard, the Arab Spring revolution merely uncovered the existing 
unbalances within the structures of Libya. 
The findings 22 and 23 highlighted that the revolution was not necessary to achieve 
democracy. In addition, many respondents perceived no actual connection between the 
revolution and the achievement of democracy. For many, the two concepts were separate, 
with the former relying on acts of violence, and the latter founded on a language of peace 
and development. In addition, the sample asserted that the revolution had negatively 
impacted the political, economic and social state of the country, and many were nostalgic 
about a bygone era. On the other hand, some (Finding 26) implied that the Arab Spring 
brought democracy to Libya. These views, however, were those of the study sample only, 
and not a reflection of Libyan society, as a whole. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the revolution might have been the catalyst for political, 
economic and social destabilisation in Libya; however, it was not the cause of it. It should 
be highlighted that the political state of Libya was already well on its way to 
destabilisation, during the Gaddafi era. This may be the reason that the views of the 
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respondents reflected a negative opinion of democracy, and why it may not be possible 
in Libya (Findings 27 - 31).  
The researcher is of the opinion that the revolution could have been necessary to tip the 
scales in favour of initiating the democratisation process. To this end, most of the 
respondents agreed that, although the revolution did not bring about positive changes in 
their country, it was necessary for the initiation of the democratisation process, at least.  
Although these were the views of the respondents, it appeared that the people of Libya 
did not understand the nature of revolutions, which could be costly and ugly, in the very 
least. Its consequences are sometimes catastrophic, and, as witnessed by history, often 
results in the complete destabilisation of the social, economic and political structures of 
the state. This form of destabilisation would invariably lead to political, economic and 
social challenges for the survivors of that revolution.  
According to the respondents, one of the major motivations behind the revolution was 
the need for economic change, while the lack of job opportunities for the youth, motivated 
many young people to take to the streets. Firstly, many Libyans were not happy with the 
political status quo in the country and called for regime change. The findings indicated 
that the lack of economic opportunities for the people was the main reason for 
participation in the revolution. On closer inspection of the economic conditions in the 
country, prior to the revolution, it is surprising to note that the economic, political and 
social conditions were cited as much better, prior to the revolution, and that the overall 
conditions of the country worsened, after the revolution. Although the views of the 
sample also reflected that the economic conditions worsened after the revolution, the lack 
of job opportunities, and the escalation of unemployment, were cited as the major reasons 
for the revolution. Secondly, the mass media played a major role in encouraging the 
people of Libya to protest against the ruling regime; however, this was not the sole cause. 
Social media platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp, allowed thousands 
of Libyan youth to share their stories and events with the rest of the world, as they 
unfolded. In addition, the youth gained support from protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, to 
overthrow their ruling regimes. In this manner, the mass media, as well as the close 
proximity to Tunisia and Egypt, played major roles during the Arab Spring in Libya. 
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It is submitted that, although poor economic conditions were cited as one of the impacts 
of the revolution, the Arab Spring revolution was not the cause of the economic instability 
that Libya is currently undergoing, but merely uncovered existing imbalances and 
weaknesses in the economic infrastructures of the country. To further support this view, 
it is submitted that unliberalised politics and economics of Libya, prior to the revolution, 
were the main reasons for the existing weaknesses in the economic system of Libya. 
Politics in the MENA countries have always shaped its markets, and economic privileges 
were granted to loyalists of the countries’ rulers and their regimes. As a result, those firms 
and tribes in Libya, who were favoured, were able to acquire virtual monopolies over 
entire liberalised economic sectors. However, this system yielded minimal growth and 
only proved that political loyalty did not translate into economic efficiency. In addition, 
the loyalists of the autocratic leaders, consistently failed to build competitive world-class 
corporations, which resulted in a lacuna of jobs in the economic sector (Robson, 2012). 
The few decent jobs were reserved for the loyalists to the regime, whereas the growing 
pool of educated young workers, faced lower-quality jobs in the informal sector.  
 
Despite concerted efforts to promote state building, risks for private investors and low 
investment opportunities in the MENA states, still remained very high, after the Arab 
Spring revolution. Libya and some of the MENA states attempted to liberalise their 
economies, but failed to liberalise their politics, as was the case with Mubarak and 
Abidine in Egypt and Tunisia, respectively. These ruling regimes were supported by 
western powers, and on removal, caused the collapse of supporting structures in the 
country. This is one of the many factors that caused the current circumstances in Libya. 
The Gaddafi regime enforced a number of regulations that stunted the development and 
growth of the private sector, and favours were extended to tribes loyal to the regime, by 
uplifting their economic positions (Wright, 2012). The emergence of independent 
businesses and entrepreneurs was stunted, and opportunities for independent businesses 
to grow in the Libyan economy, were meagre. Similar to his Egyptian and Tunisian 
counterparts, Gaddafi feared that allowing the growth of small businesses would 
challenge his autocratic control and rule over the country. 
 
In the aftermath of the revolution, Libya’s economy suffers lethargic economic growth 
and overall economic contraction. The economy was subjected to a range of shifts in the 
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political landscape, such as, being governed by different parties and regions. Currently, 
Haftar (LNA) and al-Sarraj (GNA) are seated in the eastern and western provinces, 
respectively, causing further instability to an already divided country. Both these 
governments have failed to stabilise the country politically, economically and socially. 
Since the Arab Spring in Libya, as well as the MENA region, as a whole, Jordan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia have achieved somewhat reasonable levels of political stability. 
According to the International Monetary Fund, their economic growth and pace still 
remains sluggish, and is expected not to exceed 1.5% per capita this year. Therefore, in 
support of the view that the Arab Spring was not the cause of political and economic 
instability, the researcher argues that the current state of Libya is attributed to years of 
underdevelopment by previous regimes, and the failure, as well as inability of the of the 
current governments to recognise and address this, effectively.  
 
Consequently, it is important to discuss the inefficient subsidy system instated by Gaddafi 
during his rule. Subsidies for health, education, and housing were provided to the Libyan 
people, but strict controls were also exercised over many basic food products and fuel 
(Robson, 2012). As a result, government expenditures were focused primarily on wages, 
as well as subsidies, and expenditures for development, therefore, received lower priority. 
When the revolution erupted in Libya, under these economic conditions, the country 
collapsed into an economic free-fall. The civil war that resulted, caused a severe cuts in 
oil production, in addition to the UN-sanctioned freezing of Libya’s foreign assets. This 
oil production, the country’s main product and source of revenue, led to a decline in the 
Nominal GDP of 2011, from $75 billion in 2010 to $35 billion, a disastrous collapse, by 
any standard. 
 
Although Libya’s performance was satisfactory, and on par with other oil-exporting 
countries, it had structural problems on the economic level, which spilled over into the 
new state of Libya. The governments of the day, could not begin to change the economy 
of the country, without first addressing these structural imbalances. It is crucial for 
Libyans to realise that the economic circumstances of Libya were deteriorating before 
the Arab Spring, and major economic reform would take many years to implement 
(Robson, 2012).  
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Additionally, in order to address the findings that reveal the escalation of unemployment 
rates, since the revolution, which was, and still is, a major concern to the current 
government, it is important to consider certain factors before the lack of employment 
opportunities in Libya could be attributed to the revolution only. Firstly, the official 
unemployment rate of Libya was 13.5 per cent, and youth unemployment was estimated 
at 25-30 per cent, prior to the revolution, which is attributed to the state-dominated 
economy (Khan & Milbert, 2012). Secondly, the public sector employed eighty-five 
percent of the labour force, a mismatch between the skills demanded by the private sector, 
and the skills of Libyan workers. In addition, high and low-skilled jobs were occupied by 
foreign nationals, leaving Libyans to work for the public sector (Khan & Milbert, 2012). 
However, after the eruption of the Arab Spring revolution in Libya, many foreign 
nationals fled, leaving in their wake, a lacuna of job opportunities, which could not be 
filled by under-skilled Libyans. These factors are submitted as reasons for the study 
sample’s responses that the current rate of unemployment was higher after the revolution, 
as opposed to before it. 
While this post-Arab-Spring-period has provided Libya with an opportunity to 
reconstruct a new unified state, Libya finds itself exposed to the threat of disintegration 
into national and regional division. The most crucial representation of this disunity has 
been the emergence of two separate conflicting parliaments and governments; Benghazi 
in the East, and Tripoli in the West. The disintegration of Libyan unity has been 
transferred to the security institutions and structures, resulting in two parallel police, army 
and security forces. Libyans fear the real possibility of a country split in two and have 
expressed a lack of real political change on the ground. Marginalisation of some groups 
and regions, in addition to a weak central authority, have driven many Libyans to demand 
for the return to a federal political system of government.  
 
As Libya has always been divided along regional divisions, and finds itself polarised in 
different directions, it may be beneficial, in the interim, or at least until it reaches some 
form of political stability, to return to federalism. This is because the central 
government/s may not, as yet, carry enough power and authority to dominate the 
periphery, namely the three regions, and the periphery is not powerful enough to break 
away from the centre. In this regard, a federal system would be based on democratic 
principles, wherein power is shared between the regional and national provinces, or 
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states. The concept of democracy and how it is perceived by the people of Libya is a 
central to this study. Therefore, the following section provides a detailed discussion of 
democracy. 
 
6.2 Reflections on democracy 
The era of Gaddafi had subjected Libyans to economic and political slavery, and although 
the prospects of a democracy promised freedom from both, many Libyans still maintain 
that their conditions were better before, and had deteriorated after the revolution. In order 
to understand what democracy means to the people of Libya, the researcher provides a 
discussion on democracy, as well as the foundations of liberal democracy, with a special 
focus on the contrasting views of the scholars on liberal democracies. The researcher also 
highlights the development of liberal democracy in Africa and related issues. In addition, 
a discussion of the major waves of protest in Africa is also presented, followed by the 
process and approaches to democratisation in Africa. Thereafter, the process of 
democratisation in MENA is discussed, as well as the structural imbalances in the region.  
 Democracy 
The definition of democracy is varied and has multiplicities, uniquely characterised in 
the fields of social, economic and political science. The term has been applied freely for 
decades, and has been considered as one of the great western legacies of the world, as 
well as the golden standard by which humans should be governed (Ake, 2000). In as 
much as democracy is an ideal system of governance, its origins are not completely rooted 
in a Eurocentric narrative. The origins and history of democracy, as an ancient practice 
that predates the Greeks, have not really been highlighted (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). 
Therefore, it appears that the world has been indoctrinated with the Eurocentric 
interpretation of democracy.  
 
According to Wolf (1947), democracy refers to a state of social organisation, in which 
the mass of the people possess the whole sovereignty, implying a society wherein every 
free person, without distinction of fortune or class, is entitled to an equal share in the 
entire life. It should not be argued, or assumed that democracies, as they are practiced 
currently in the modern world, are the only ones in the true democratic form, even though 
the republican representative form of the US government would like to believe so (Aras 
& Falk, 2015). Democracy has many variations, and in order to understand these 
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variations, as well as find its application in the present world, it is important to highlight 
its actual foundation. The definition and history of democracy has been influenced by a 
predominantly western interpretation and perspective. However, history shows that the 
ancient world, and more so, the great civilisations of the Middle East, were already 
practicing the principles of democracy (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). 
 
For many scholars, the term democracy refers to “government by the people in which the 
supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected 
agents under a free electoral system” (Olatunji, 2014: p. 19), and has been summed up by 
Abraham Lincoln as a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” 
(Cheibub, Gandhi &Vreeland, 2010, p. 69). Democracy, according to this definition, at 
least encompasses a set of principles and ideals about freedom, including practices and 
procedures developed throughout western political history (Moghadam, 2013). Bünte 
(2011) argues that democracy is the institutionalisation of freedom, and that the 
fundamentals of constitutional government, human rights, and equality before the law, 
has to be properly tested, before any society can be properly called democratic. In 
summary, the principles of democracy have been outlined as follows: sovereignty of the 
people; government based upon consent of the governed; majority rule; minority rights; 
guarantee of basic human rights; free and fair elections; equality before the law; due 
process of law; constitutional limits on government; social, economic, and political 
pluralism; and values of tolerance, pragmatism, cooperation, and compromise (Dahlberg 
& Holmberg, 2014). 
 Origins of democracy 
The Eurocentric narrative dictates that democracy is reported to have reached its peak in 
the Athenian times, which apparently “dissipated” with the fall of their empire, and was 
followed by the Christian Middle Ages that was based on a faith hierarchy (Keane, 2009). 
Europe was faced with the necessity of political order, which eventually led to the French 
revolution, heralding in the new age of modern politics, in a modern world (Keane, 2009). 
Scholars, who rely on the Eurocentric foundation of democracy, claim that the French 
revolution introduced ideologies such as universal citizenship, and human rights, in an 
attempt to revive the Athenian ideal of popular power (Fukuyama, 2011). However, the 
ideals of human rights and equality was not born, or revived by the west, and the assertion 
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that the classical Greeks were the sole democrats of the ancient world, in the researcher’s 
view, is untrue.  
 
In this regard, Isakhan and Stockwell (2011: p. 3) state that the surviving texts, dating to 
Athenian times, do not provide actual details of the procedures and principles of the so 
called “Athenian democracy” and that “most of them are decidedly anti-democratic”. The 
proposed alternative models of governance found in such texts were merely just that ‒ 
proposals by elite idealists. Isakhan and Stockwell (2011) also argue that, while the 
Athenian Revolution heralded in the age of democracy for the west, the east had its fair 
share of democratic systems and ideals, embedded in texts, such as the Epic of 
Gilgamesh, the Laws of Hammurabi, and the Declaration of Cyrus. According to the 
researcher, it is quite possible that the worldview of democracy and its origins have been 
based on a Eurocentric foundation for years, and the democratic systems in the east have 
remained hidden and undiscovered because of language or cultural barriers. Schemeil 
(2000) asserts that there is evidence of assemblies being held in the great empires of the 
ancient Middle East, such as Ashur, the Assyrian capital. According to these texts, the 
assemblies were allowed to congregate, and were supported by the more senior, 
influential members of the community, once an agreement was reached. These assemblies 
were often called for, when a consensus could not be reached. Schemeil (2000: p. 104) 
writes, “…historical documents describe assemblies of citizens deliberating for 
days...[where] majority votes were often sought and reached...[and] it was always 
possible that minority views would raise the problem again if its legal solution was a 
failure”.  
 
The great merchant families appear to have convened in a building, commonly known as 
the “city house”, where they “made decisions on commercial policy, fixed the rates of 
export tax...acted as a diplomatic body...and controlled relations with Anatolian rulers on 
whose cooperation and protection the caravans and resident merchants relied” (Leick, 
2009: p. 203). In Wolf’s (1947: p. 98) Traces of primitive democracy in ancient Israel, 
similar assemblies are reported among the ancient Israelites, as follows, “In the Old 
Testament certain terms and relationships appear which suggest that democracy, in the 
broadest definition of the term...was prevalent in the earliest times and that vestiges of 
democratic procedures may be discerned in both political and religious concepts 
throughout the later periods of Israelite history”. Therefore, the researcher is of the 
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opinion that, to believe that the West is the founder of democracy, is completely untrue, 
and merely serves to further the colonial project for the world. The researcher adds that, 
in light of this information, it may be argued that the Middle East may not be in need of 
a Western Democracy, but an Eastern one, embedded in their ancient history. 
 Categories of democracy 
Democracies are categorised into direct and representative (Zajac, 2014). In a direct 
democracy, all citizens, excluding the intermediary of elected or appointed officials, are 
able to participate in public decision-making (Altman, 2013). However, the practicality 
of such a system is limited (almost impossible), and only effective within small numbers 
of people, such as a community organisation, or a tribal council. In such a setting, issues 
are discussed, and a decision is reached, based on the consensus, or a majority vote 
(Altman, 2013). Therefore, the key word “majority” would outweigh the minority. 
 
It is reported that ancient Athens practiced some form of direct democracy, with an 
assembly reaching 5,000 to 6,000 members (Ober, 2009). However, modern society is 
not really suited to this kind of direct democracy, with its size and complexity. Therefore, 
the idea of a representative democracy was developed, in which citizens elected officials 
to make political decisions, frame laws and govern programmes for, what they considered 
to be, the good of the public (Alonso, Keane & Merkel, 2011). Such appointed officials 
are granted the power to deliberate on intricate public issues, in an attentive and 
systematic manner, which is often unfeasible for the majority of private citizens (Alonso 
et al., 2011).  
 The foundations of democracy 
Ake (2000), on the other side of the democracy spectrum, reduces the notion and ideal of 
democracy to a method that facilitates the peaceful co-existence of the world. Ake (2000: 
p. 7) writes, “Democracy has become a unifying discourse which is supposed to time 
national and international politics and to foster peaceful coexistence in a world”. This 
author maintains that the idea of democracy has been trivialised in the world, and has 
been developed to keep the masses at bay, by giving them a sense of fair representation. 
To this author, democracy is a tool of the elite, because it does not pose a threat to the 
political elite of the world (Ake, 2000). The ruling elite are able to enjoy the “democratic 
legitimacy” according to the rest of the world, without being subjected to the attached 
democratic practices (Altman, 2013: p. 742). However, the foundational principles of an 
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Islamic democracy although granting citizens a degree of freedom; all citizens are 
charged with social and personal responsibility and accountability. In the Islamic 
democratic system, the elite are not exempted from democratic practices.  
 
Therefore, it is a theoretical interpretation of democracy that is presently practiced and 
not a practical one, in the true sense. Democracy in this day and age, is a far cry from that 
which was practiced by the ancient cultures of the Middle East, who instituted practical 
political arrangements. They made it very clear that the final decision belonged to the 
masses, and strictly applied the rule of equality in decision-making and before the law 
(Ober, 2009). The French revolution introduced new ideologies, such as universal 
citizenship and human rights, and essentially tried to revive the so called “Athenian ideal” 
of popular power (Fukuyama, 2011). However, the ideal of popular sovereignty, coupled 
with political participation, was not welcomed by the European bourgeoisie, who feared 
the implications of granting absolute power to the masses, which could pose a threat to 
their enjoyed privileges and property, as well as social and economic status (Maier, 2015). 
 The birth of liberal democracy 
Liberal democracy, also known as western democracy, is founded on a liberal political 
ideology, and based on government, in which a representative democracy functions under 
the codes of classical liberalism (Bell, 2009). Classical liberalism may be best understood 
as a political ideology that advocates equality and liberty, supports civil rights, 
democracy, secularism, gender equality, internationalism and the freedoms of speech, the 
press, religion and markets (Fukuyama, 2012). A liberal democracy is typically 
characterised by the separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule 
of law, free and fair elections between several diverse political parties, political freedoms, 
and the preservation and protection of civil and human rights, as well as civil liberties for 
all people (Fukuyama, 2012). In practice, it draws its authority from a constitution that 
delineates the powers of government, in order to preserve the social contract. It has, over 
the last century, become the principal political system in the world. The rule of law, or 
what has been decided to be law, is one of the defining features of a liberal democracy 
(Fukuyama, 2012).  
 
The evolution of democracy, since its ancient origins, has been well-documented, and its 
variants have occupied political philosophers, especially regarding its manifestations in 
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western societies (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). This gave birth to the idea of a liberal 
democracy, which, although it appears closely affiliated to its ancestor, is founded on the 
notion of government by the consent of the governed, formal political equality, human 
rights (including the right of political participation), and accountability of power to the 
governed, as well as the rule of law (Ake, 2000). Therefore, liberal government replaces 
the ideal of government by the people, with “government by the consent of people” and 
emphasises the sovereignty of the law over the sovereignty of people (Fukuyama, 2012). 
 
Although many have advocated that liberal democracy is the world’s number one 
preference, there are those who declare that liberal democracies are self-imploding and 
unsustainable (Fukuyama, 2012). Maier (2015) views that state nations have employed 
liberal democracy, produced failing institutions and maintains that people have generally 
lost hope in that system of democracy. Ake (2000) discusses how the western social 
sciences’ constant clarification of the meaning of democracy, has ended in redefining it 
to the detriment of its democratic values. Ake (2000) for example expands on the 
protective theory of democracy: the people are protected from the state, through a vibrant 
civil society and that political stability is dependent on people surrendering participation, 
and political apathy is interpreted as a sign of people being content with rulers. 
 
By contrast, Fukuyama (2012: p. 60) argues that liberal democracy should be tied to a 
market economy, and that the collapse of the Soviet Empire marked the beginning of the 
“American-style liberal democracy”. This author’s argument is rooted in the idea that a 
new modern liberal democracy cannot be established, without the prior establishment of 
a well-armed and functional territorial state, with an independent judiciary, responsible 
for overseeing the rule of law, which a robust state power then makes possible. According 
to Fukuyama (2012), a liberal democracy, centred on free elections, remains the world’s 
political preference. Although Fukuyama (2012) admits that democracy has its share of 
problems, he believes that they are remediable (though he does not provide the solution), 
and that it is a much more sustainable way of government, owing to its long-term 
evolutionary characteristics. He also argues that the modern territorial state, such as 
America, is the epitome of political order, and that order will only be realised, if there is 
a rule of law. Therefore, if there is no rule of law, there will be no state, and no liberal 
democracy. The researcher is inclined to agree with Fukuyama (2012) in this respect, in 
terms of the necessity of a rule of law in order to establish a state and liberal democracy, 
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but disagrees as to whether America can be considered the `’epitome of political order`’. 
Although it appears to be a sustainable form of governance, minority groups are still 
marginalised and cultural sensitivities are not always taken into consideration. America 
currently, or rather the current administration has grossly neglected basic rights of ethnic 
minority groups such as the Mexican immigrants. 
 
However, according to Pieterse (1993), Fukuyama’s liberal democracy relates to three 
problem issues, with the main weakness of his argument being that liberal democracy is 
divorced from social actors, and is conceived in a nation-state framework. Pieterse (1993) 
highlights the three problem issues as: liberalism and its exclusions; liberalism and 
democracy; as well as liberalism and imperialism. Fukuyama (2012) argues that the rule 
of law outlines how the state is able to exercise power, and that democracy, as the tool of 
elections, allows the state to best represent the interest of as many people as possible, and 
not only that of the ruling elites. Although this is the basis of his argument for liberal 
democracy, Fukuyama (2012) does admit that it has its shortcomings, as he admits that 
globalisation did not benefit all people equally, and the notion of democracy has been 
taken for granted. This author argues that, though many nation states have endeavoured 
to become liberal democracies, people are still dissatisfied with how the state institutions 
are managed. Fukuyama (2012: p. 11) concludes of by stating, with reference to the 
sustainability of a liberal democracy, “…it's going to be a test. I think we're all in for an 
interesting test of the stability of our democratic institutions, how legitimate they are, 
whether they can actually self-correct”. 
 
In contrast to Fukuyama, Ake (2000) argues that a liberal democracy is not essentially 
democratic, as it only gives power to a few (the elite). Ultimately, it is not relevant, or 
sensitive to the socio-economic, cultural and historical legacies and circumstances, as 
well as the collective aspirations of the people, especially, the African people. Ake (2000: 
p. 75) states, “the feasibility of democracy in Africa will depend crucially on how it 
relates to the social experience of Africans and how far it serves their social needs”. The 
researcher strongly supports the view of Ake in this regard, as the tribal, cultural and 
social sensitivities of the native people have to be considered in order to reach a true 
democracy. A further discussion of this is provided in the concluding chapter. 
Additionally, Ake (2000) is a proponent for social democracy, which is characterised by 
policies that focus on addressing social issues, such as inequality, oppression of 
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underprivileged groups and poverty. Besides, social democracy focuses on policies that 
support access to public services such as education, health care, child care, and care for 
the elderly and workers’ compensation. According to Ake (2000), the inability of the 
African democracies to deal with such social issues, is one of the greatest challenges to 
the process of democratisation, as social development and political development are 
interlinked, and cannot be separated. In addition, he asserts that the solution to Africa’s 
problems is not the Western based democracy, but a uniquely African grounded one, as 
“the absence of enabling conditions for democratic participation at the grassroots is the 
greatest obstacle to democracy in Africa, just as the transformation of society for the 
empowerment of ordinary people is the greatest challenge of democratisation” (Ake 
1993: p. 11). 
 
As previously mentioned, the researcher is also in agreement with Ake (1993) who argues 
against the copying of a Western liberal democracy, as a solution for the problems of 
Africa. A uniquely African democracy would be grounded in a process of remedying 
social issues, than just political ones. While Fukuyama (2012) proposes the neo-liberal 
democracy, as the way forward, and favours transformation from the top-down, Ake 
(1993) argues that transformation should start at grassroots, and supports the bottom-up 
approach. For Ake (2000), democracy should be launched from the social base of society, 
in order to ensure its longevity. Ake (2000) avers that, whereas a popular form of 
democracy would empower the people, a liberal democracy would disempower them. In 
his view, some of the qualities for a popular democracy would include its transformation, 
to ensure that everyone participates as part of an interconnected whole, to promote the 
common good (Ake, 2000: p. 184). His notion of participation does not rest on 
individuality, but on the “social nature of human beings” and “taking part in sharing the 
burdens and the rewards of community membership” From a practical perspective, he 
advocated that democracy had to be relevant to the African people, as well as 
developmental, alongside the democratisation of the state (Ake, 2000). 
 
Ake (1993), in a radical manner, addresses the challenge of democratisation as the 
solution to Africa’s crisis of underdevelopment, the violent nature of politics, and 
debilitating cycle of violent conflicts, such as communal conflicts, civil wars, and 
regional wars, which breed insecurity, and undermine progress on the continent. 
However, it is important to note, that ultimately, he considers democracy in Africa a 
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highly contested and complex terrain. His contribution was to re-connect democratisation 
with the historical struggles of Africans for power, freedom and development (Ake, 
1993). 
 
Many scholars have argued about democracies, as well as the types of democracies that 
will be feasible for different nations, whether it be state nations or tribal ones, as is the 
case of Africa (Ake, 1993; Zakaria, 1997; Willis, 2015). However, during the Cold War, 
the different variations of what was deemed a democracy, was brought to the fore, and 
though loosely used and defined, it is now evident that not all democracies are alike (Ake, 
1993). Larry Diamond (1997) and Fareed Zakaria (1997) drew further distinctions 
between the Western liberal democracies and the limited ones that emerged from second 
and third world countries, such as Russia and Africa. Other democracies included popular 
and delegative democracies. It appears that democracy has become a term that is less easy 
to define, and cannot be confined to mere electoral procedures that have been sharply-
defined as a process of democracy (Gause III, 2011). Though “free competition for a free 
vote” had always been the base of a direct democracy, it appears that mere elections are 
not enough to ensure fair representation, as power is still held in the hands of the few elite 
(Hashemi, 2009). In this regard, Fareed Zakaria (1997: p. 23) states, “elections are an 
important virtue of government, but they are not the only virtue.” Instead, many theorists 
have shifted from focusing on the centrality of the popular vote, in favour of more 
reasoned decision-making within institutional pluralism (Zakaria, 1997). The definitions 
of democracy, specifically liberal democracy, are not necessarily guarantors for 
legitimacy and efficacy (Hashemi, 2009). According to the researcher, the development 
of a new social democracy may be necessary, rooted in the social base of society, with 
structures and powers that allow for decisions to be made, independent of the people, but, 
for the protection of the people. Ake (2000: p. 130), who leans towards a social 
democracy, admits, “…even at its best, liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of the 
people having effective decision-making power. The essence of liberal democracy is 
precisely the abolition of popular power and the replacement of popular sovereignty with 
the rule of law.” 
 
Gwatkin (1980) considers that some systems of governance have yielded some success, 
and created stability in African communities. This system is characterised by a sense of 
social cohesion that allows people to come together, in order to ensure the survival of 
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each member (Gwatkin, 1980), and is based on what is deemed Ubuntu, wherein the 
individual is intertwined with the collective. 
 The assumptions of a liberal democracy 
It should be noted here that the ideal of liberal democracy was born out of a panicked 
need of the ruling elites to protect their individual property, against the will of the 
majority (Fukuyama, 2012). Currently, even the most advanced democratic governments, 
such as the United States of America, are reduced to multi-party electoral competition, 
and is merely an ideological representation of democracy. Democracies are supposed to 
be systems, in which citizens freely make political decisions by majority rule, and do so 
under the rule of the majority. However, these systems are not necessarily truly 
democratic (Fukuyama, 2012). A truly democratic society advocates that majority rule is 
only executed, when coupled with a guarantee of individual human rights, which include 
the ethnic, religious and political ones (Fukuyama, 2012). The rights of minorities are 
independent, and not eliminated by majority vote, because of the basic institutionalised 
rights of all humans (Lijphart, 2012). 
 
Alonso et al. (2011) argue that a representative democracy operates in accordance with a 
constitution, which limits the powers of the government, and guarantees fundamental 
rights to all citizens. This form of government is a constitutional democracy (Alonso et 
al., 2011). In such a society, the majority rules, and the rights of minorities are protected 
by law, and through the institutionalisation of law. These elements clearly define the 
fundamental elements of all modern democracies, irrespective of history, culture and 
economy (Alonso et al., 2011). These essential elements of constitutional government, 
which is majority rule, coupled with individual and minority rights, with the rule of law, 
are applied in Canada to Costa Rica, France and Botswana, Japan and India (Alonso et 
al., 2011). The question arises as to whether they are really sustainable in the long run. 
 
Foa and Mounk (2016) argue that the success and stability of liberal democracy, is 
premised on three assumptions about social life. First, the population shares a moderately 
similar worldview, influenced by mainstream media, such as broadcast news, 
newspapers, radio. As a result, a similar worldview is shared by diverse communities, as 
they are all part of the same conversation, and share the same facts. The second 
assumption is the broadly-shared economic growth and relative economic equality. For 
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most of the history of the world, there was basically no economic growth. The researcher 
is of the view that a liberal democracy according to Foa and Mounk (2016) cannot be 
sustained, as populations are diverse and thus have diverse worldviews, and secondly do 
not share relative economic equality. 
 
Mounk (2014) argues that eras of stable liberal democracies around the world have 
largely been dependent on, and characterised by, fairly homogeneous populations. 
However, liberal democracy has come under severe stress, and is unravelling under the 
weight of these assumptions (Mounk, 2014). The impact of social media in the 
dissemination of information, facts and opinions, has exploded over the last decade. Any 
individual can now become a broadcaster, allowing for free-er expression of opinion, 
which has, in turn, fuelled the development of fringe ideas and conspiracy theories. In 
terms of economic growth, it has been relatively stagnant, and more people believe that 
their futures may not be financially secured (Axford, 2011).  
 
Lastly, to address the assumption of a relatively homogenous population, in order to 
achieve a liberal democracy, successfully, it should be noted that the rate of immigration 
has increased rapidly since the mid-twentieth century, leading to a particular and rapid 
increase in diversity (Mounk, 2014). These assumptions -- on which a liberal democracy 
is premised -- have come under severe stress and further confirms that a new form of 
democracy or governance is desperately needed by the masses (Foa & Mounk, 2016). In 
an authoritarian society, virtually all such organisations would be controlled, licensed, 
watched, or otherwise accountable to the government (Maier, 2015). In a democracy, the 
powers of the government are, by law, clearly defined and sharply limited. As a result, 
private organisations are free of government control. Other groups, concerned with the 
arts, the practice of religious faith, scholarly research, or other interests, may choose to 
have little, or no contact with the government at all (Altman, 2013). 
 Islam and the democracy 
Islam is a religion of peace that advocates equality of all humans, not only in the eyes of 
God, but before the state (Moghadam, 2013). However, there are groups with deviated 
extremist ideologies in Libya, and the Islamic world, who declare the idea of democracy 
as un-Islamic (Hassan, 2015). Most of the adherents of such ideologies resort to violence 
and terrorism as a means of imposing their discourse on others, for example, the rise of 
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ISIS in Libya (Hassan, 2015). Clearly, no contradiction exists between Islam and 
democracy, as evidenced by some of the largest Muslim countries in the world, namely, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Elbadawi, Makdisi & Milante, 2011). These countries have 
flourished under democratic rule, and yielded higher levels of development and 
prosperity, while preserving and maintaining their Islamic identity, values and culture 
(Meijer, 2014). However, the majority of the MENA countries, Saudi Arabia especially, 
have grossly violated human rights such as freedom of speech and fair electoral systems. 
Although most Arab countries claim to follow Islamic Law, their interpretation and 
application of it is clearly neglected and are primarily identified as dictatorships rather 
than democracies. 
 Theoretical foundations of liberal democracy 
The classical theory of liberal democracy was developed by social contact theorists, 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (Machpherson, 1962). Hobbes, who was disturbed by 
the fear of civil strife and political turmoil, developed the idea of liberal democracy, as a 
foundation for sound political order (Machpherson, 1962). He maintained that society, as 
well as human nature demand, and have to function within order. In addition, he asserted 
that any order is better than disorder. Human nature, according to Hobbes, in essence, 
seeks gratification, where humans are laws unto themselves (Maier, 2015). Therefore, the 
very nature of humans requires order, and in the absence of such order, certain chaos and 
lawlessness will prevail (Hashemi, 2009). This would be the alternative to political order 
making, and may only be avoided with the institution of order, to achieve harmonious 
interaction between humans (Tuck, 1990). This political order is founded on the 
Leviathon, or the sovereign (Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014). 
 
The sovereign does not expect people to relinquish their human natures and natural rights, 
nor does it impose any obligation to those who have surrendered their right of nature to 
the governing body (Bell, 2009). Bell (2009) maintains that there is no limit on the 
obligation of the subject to the sovereign, and is dependent on the idea of self-
preservation. When the ideal of self-preservation becomes threatened, the obligation of 
the subject to the sovereign will be removed (Bell, 2009). This theory of political order 
is based on the idea that the consent of the subject is given under chaotic and anarchic 
conditions, such as fear of imminent death (Ake, 2000). Evidently, the consent borders 
on compulsion, removing the notion of choice from the subject.  
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Hobbes theory has been relied upon as the theory of liberal democracy, due to the 
characteristic of limited government (Ake, 2000). Even though it has advocated political 
absolutism, which is based on absolute sovereignty and central authority, it is supported 
by the European bourgeoisie, who feared democracy and the democratic radicalism of 
the French Revolution (Macpherson, 2010). His theory maintains that the existence of 
governments is necessary for the preservation of human life, and for the prevention of 
complete annihilation, emphasising the idea of laissez-faire, where things are left to their 
own course. His doctrine is also founded on the following ideal; the government that 
governs least, governs best (Alonso et al., 2011). 
 
According to Hashemi (2009), it is clear that the framework of a liberal democracy has 
little to do with democracy, as a whole. While the Athenian precepts of democracy 
advocated the governing of the people, by the people, Hobbes focused on the preservation 
of people from each other, due to their egotistical natures (Macpherson, 2010). Liberal 
democracy is a system of rule that offers the subject protection and preservation of life, 
as the central point, whereas democracy, in the Athenian sense, is the realisation and 
empowerment of human potentialities, through dynamic contribution in ruler-ship 
(Lijphart, 2012). 
 
John Locke is definitively at variance with the theory of Hobbes. Instead of a state of war 
advocated by Hobbes, he maintains that life, as well as the state of nature, is in a state of 
peace, yet not without governance (Hashemi, 2009). He is of the view that nature, 
quintessentially, is ruled by God, which is to be understood by humans through the gift 
of reason (Tuck, 1990). The harmonious laws of nature allow for the preservation of 
human rights and life preservation. In addition, it enjoins obligations on its subjects, 
especially the obligation to enforce the laws of nature (Lijphart, 2012). Human beings are 
essentially governed by laws, and are bound to fulfil the obligations arising from these 
laws. Locke asserts, “…the state of nature is lawful and reasonably peaceful” (Tuck, 
1990: p. 158). 
 
Locke (2014) advocates that the law of nature will also pose definite problems, as 
everyone would be enforcing their own law, resulting in a loss of objectivity, ensuing 
conflicts and injustices. Therefore, the outcome is the same, and people would, therefore, 
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be required to leave this state of nature, to form a political society (Locke, 2014). Once 
this society is formed, they would contract to set up a government, relinquishing their 
right to enforce the law of nature, to the government.  
 
According to Ake (2000), the theory of Locke posits some serious implications for the 
subjects, such as the nature of the consent, as well as how it is given or withheld in such 
a society. Locke (2014) presupposes that consent is limited to implicit consent, based on 
any attachment to government. Therefore, the use and enjoyment of any services, such as 
roads, or hospitals, provided by the government, is considered a form of implicit consent, 
according to Locke (2014). In this case, it is almost impossible to be completely alienated 
from any link to government, making the actuality of non-consent nearly impossible, and 
limited to acts of active revolt only. 
 
These theories, although considered the founding stones of liberal democracy, replace the 
idea of government by the people, with that of consent of the governed (Alonso et al., 
2011). These authors do not elaborate on the Athenian concept of active political 
participation, but focus on the minimisation of inconveniences and conflicts, prevention 
of disorder and harm, without seeking to implement good. It is a theory based on the 
pervasive need to maintain social order, and protect humans from self-annihilation 
(Alonso et al., 2011).  
 The development of liberal democracy in Africa 
The pursuit of democracy in Africa by the Africans and external countries has not yielded 
any long-term success, and instead of promoting unification and harmony, it led to the 
generation of ethnic favouritism and divisions (Hilsum, 2012). Social equality is a noble 
goal of African states, but has been replaced with corruption and injustices, where 
economic development has been exchanged for material stagnation and economic decline 
(Hilsum, 2012). The so-called political orders of the colonialists, and the subsequent 
dictatorships that followed, inspired an array of military coups, civil wars and more 
recently, the Arab Spring in the MENA region (Anderson, 2011). 
 
The absence of democracy in Africa is so perceptible that the accountability of African 
politics can no longer be defendable on moral grounds (Lijphart, 2012). Therefore, it 
could be argued that the initiation of democratic mechanisms, such as accountability of 
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government and representation, are essential to arrest Africa’s descent into squalor. The 
current state of Africa is attributed to the emergence of modern authoritarianism, resulting 
from a contradictory colonial legacy, the Hobbesian process of class formation, and the 
severe economic and political crisis (Hashemi, 2009). 
 
Even though most countries claim to be democratic, the question of democracy is still a 
crisis all over the world (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). This is especially evident in Africa, 
where the prospects of successful democracy are still in question (Dodge, 2012a). The 
Middle East and North African regions have undergone considerable toil and suffering 
under colonialist powers, tribal rule and dictatorships, and are still in the developing 
stages of democracy and a democratisation process (Hoffman & Jamal, 2014). The 
following section provides a discussion on the characteristics of the current state of 
democracy, as well as the factors impacting on its implementation, in the MENA regions. 
In addition, the weight of tribalism, ethnicity, culture, history, the struggle for wealth and 
privilege, and the variations of poverty and insufficiency, led to the generation of 
dictatorial forms of rule (Hashemi, 2009). These autocratic forms of rule, as evidenced 
in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, are difficult to sustain, and will eventually lead to political 
vulnerability (Anderson, 2011). More accountable and representative methods of 
governance are required, and appear to be the first step in the process of democratisation 
(Bruns, Highfield & Burgess, 2013). Libya has witnessed this collapse of authoritarian 
power, leading to a war of all, against all battlefield, where every person seeks to secure 
his safety and property, leading to civil strife and confrontations (Vandewalle, 2012). 
 The rise of western democracy in Africa 
The condition of the democracy in the MENA regions is traced back to the colonial era 
(Bruns, Highfield & Burgess, 2013). The researcher, therefore, provides a brief 
discussion of the state of Africa under colonial rule, and how it impacted on the 
development of new ruler-ship, and more specifically, dictatorship.  
 
The colonial states of Africa were all imposing, and all powerful, where little 
consideration was given to transformation of domination and hegemony, to harmony and 
democratic representation of the people (Herbst, 2014). The colonial state was an 
arbitrary power, which could not engender legitimacy, and its subjects were not granted 
any fair chance of political competition. Instead, politics became a forceful battle for two 
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respective claims to ruler-ship (Herbst, 2014). When independence was granted, or taken 
by the African states, its character remained much as it was during the colonial era. 
Instead of replacing the old authoritarian mode of rule, such states, namely Libya, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, continued to be totalitarian in nature, and often presented 
themselves to their subjects as mechanisms of violence, used to enforce order (Herbst, 
2014). Compliance under coercion and fear was relied on, instead of willing adherence 
to legitimate authority (Duignan & Gann, 2013). The ruling elite, who came into power, 
violated and exploited the existing colonial system for their own material, political, 
economic and social gain, instead of endeavouring to implement democratic 
transformation in most African states (Alonso et al., 2011). The use of force led to an 
increased gap between the elite and the subjects, intensifying further alienation from the 
ruling class (Alonso et al., 2011). Popular discontent was silenced and constrained, while 
a sense of political unity was falsely created, in the midst of social pluralism (Duignan & 
Gann, 2013).  
 
This is the main background to Africa’s single party form of rule that relied heavily upon 
military rule to suppress mass political expression (Vandewalle, 2012). These countries 
were operated in a constant mode of siege, where political repression festered beneath 
the surface of social order (Arendt, 1973). It is not surprising that economic and social 
development in these countries was arrested, as a result of this mode of rule, and the only 
active development was, in fact, underdevelopment (Arendt, 1973). Therefore, Africa’s 
civil wars and economic crises may all be attributed to its lack of political development 
and its stagnating political environment, giving way to a demand for democracy 
(Mamdani, 1996). 
 Reasons for the rise of democracy 
These conditions of suppression, oppression and repression, as well as continual 
underdevelopment led to the surge of democracy in the African states (Mamdani, 1996). 
The post-colonial state was considered almighty, whose control was complete and 
absolute. It operated without constitutional checks and constraints, as well as public 
accountability, controlled by the elite and imposed on the masses (Branch & Mampilly, 
2015).  Force was the mechanism of choice, to maintain this system of rule by the elite 
(Lynch, 2011). The state was administered as a private institute, where the dictator shared 
power with collaborators of similar interests, usually of the same faith, ethnicity and 
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community (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). This was the case in Liberia, under Samuel Doe, 
Ethiopia, under Mengistu, and Rwanda, under General Habyarimana, to name but a few, 
as there are too many to mention (Ake, 2000).  
 
Africa finds itself in a constant struggle between those who wish to stay in power by 
exclusion, and those who want to access power via incorporation. In order to maintain 
the status of exclusion of power, the ruling elite and the dictators use the military as a 
mechanism against the civilian population. This is achieved by granting the military 
exorbitant privileges, and depleting budgets to maintain this system (Lynch, 2011). In 
addition, the military is played up against civilians and granted lavish indulgences, 
securing its loyalty to the ruling party, and enforcing civilians to adhere to authority 
(Lijphart, 2012). Any opposition to the ruling party is silenced, and any affiliation to 
opposing parties is crushed by the military, as was witnessed in Niger (Lijphart, 2012). 
 The economic crisis in Africa and its connection to the process of 
democratisation 
Alonso et al. (2011) argue that the development of a democracy movement in Africa is 
linked to the demand of the masses for economic incorporation, which is based on the 
ideal that the dignity and human rights of the colonised have to be preserved, and the 
provision of equal opportunity, as well as equal access to political expression and 
representation, is assured. These expectations mobilised masses to express their public 
discontent around the lack of these rights. However, in most cases, they were not realised, 
and new rulers merely continued with the already operational colonial era mode of 
despotic rule (Duignan & Gann, 2013).  
 
After the first decade of independence, Africa’s attempt at economic and political 
development still appeared frail, and only worsened two decades later. The state of Africa 
appeared to be worse off in the 1980s, when compared to that of the 1960s (Joab-
Peterside, Porter & Watts, 2012). Collapsing infrastructures, coupled with escalating 
social conflicts and ethnic tensions, intensified poverty and malnutrition, and made the 
case of getting legitimate and proper leadership, a matter of survival for most Africans 
(Joab-Peterside et al., 2012). The failure of rulers to ensure the rights of its subjects, 
caused masses to insist on economic incorporation, and subjects found themselves forced, 
out of necessity, to become self-reliant. This lack of confidence in the ruling party caused 
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masses to treat the ruling elite with hostility, leading to the formation of political parties 
(Bayat, 2017). 
 
Pro-democracy groups started to take shape, which included farmers, who called for 
economic and political incorporation (Alonso et al., 2011). In the past, political parties 
operated covertly underground, such as Laurent Gbagbo’s Popular Ivorian Front (Joab-
Peterside et al., 2012). Therefore, it is evident that popular discontent contributed to the 
transition from a single party rule, and a multi-party rule system became inevitable. In 
countries, such as Togo, President Eyadema hoped to be spared of such democratic 
insurrections that started in Africa since 1979, and, in spite of popular discontent, he 
advocated that his subjects preferred one-party rule (Ake, 2000). However, the deepening 
recession in Togo, and the rest of the African states, led to the dire need of political reform 
for the people, and the initiation of a democracy movement (Lynch, 2011, p: 46).  
 Major waves of protest in Africa 
The popular uprising of many countries in Africa, and more specifically, in the MENA, 
was short-lived, and have, to some extent, become stifled. More recent protests in Libya 
are of a different nature to the original ones, with a narrowed focus. Citizens have 
criticised both sides of the regime, al-Sarraj and Haftar, but lack popular mobilisation. 
Protest might still very much be alive in Libya, but a on a quiet, reshaped and retooled 
stage (Blanchard, 2016).  
 
Africa has witnessed countless demonstrations, challenging the status quo of the state, 
but it has only been fairly recently, that the mass political action of the East has made 
western headlines (Berti & Guzansky, 2015). Popular revolutions that ousted Tunisia’s 
and Egypt’s autocrats, the narrowed ones about Marikana in South Africa, the Red 
Wednesday protests in Benin in West Africa, and the anti-corruption demonstrations in 
Kenya in the east, all signal that Africans are taking to the streets to bring about change 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015). 
 
Branch and Mampilly (2015) seek to outline a uniquely African course of protests, 
highlighting the almost blind optimism of an Africa uprising, and its patriotic belief that 
it is, in fact, ready to take its own political reigns. A new political society, therefore, has 
emerged and comprises young people in the streets, an urban underclass, marked by its 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
173 
“political identity as it is shaped by the form of state power to which it is subject.” (Branch 
& Mampilly, 2015: p. 15). History has revealed that popular protests under the 
organisation of students, organised labour, as well as the political elite, can claim a win. 
This was observed in Ghana, which dealt heavy-handedly with the very movements that 
disbanded and ousted the British powers. Political society and the masses, most defiantly 
have a voice, and it is a voice that is demanding change (Branch & Mampilly, 2015: p. 
67). 
 First wave of protests 
Branch and Mampilly (2015) outlines two major phases of political waves of protests in 
Africa. The first is set as the movements against colonisation, and towards a process of 
decolonisation. Two major approaches have been highlighted: a) non-violent and guided 
anti-colonial protests into a nationalist project, as was instructed by Ghanaian 
independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah; and b) the resistance by any means necessary, 
as was advocated by the revolutionary philosopher, Frantz Fanon, in Algeria (Branch & 
Mampilly, 2015). Besides protests against colonisation, Africa faces crucial obstacles to 
democratisation that have persisted over time. One of these challenges is the stark divide 
and contrast between the rural and urban populations (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). 
 Focus of protests in Africa 
Political society is not a standardised society, and therefore, the structure, possibilities, 
as well as limitations, are differently structured in different countries. Africa has a 
particular quality to its protests, which occur within, and amid, the political divisions and 
exclusions of the colonial and post-colonial powers. This form of colonial power has 
permeated all aspects of the citizens’ lives, more so in the urban citizens, which has been 
systematically entrenched in the economy, industry, and geography of the land, as well 
as the identity of its people (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). 
 Urban and rural divide 
In Africa, the stark contrast of the urban-rural divide is painfully poignant. Protests in 
Africa need to consider this divide, and ensure that they are not merely perpetuating it, 
thereby generating similar political structures. This was the case of the protests in Latin 
America, which have instated developmental policies, much to the advantage of the urban 
populations, and often to the disadvantage and negligence of the marginalised rural 
populations, and indigenous peoples (Ober, 2009). Protests that focus on the class divide, 
or formal citizenship, may also disbar the manner in which power interacts with different 
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races and ethnicities. In Brazil, for example, further questions were raised concerning the 
absence of the larger black populations, and their lack of participation in the protests, as 
well as how protests may, in fact, represent the inequality of race representation (Branch 
& Mampilly, 2015). 
 
Africa’s population has been largely divided into the urban and the rural, as a result of 
the historical colonial rule (Alonso et al., 2011). In addition, regions and rural positions 
were further divided, based on ethnicity, and subjected to indirect rule. Therefore, urban 
populations settled into variant economic and social classes, due to marginalisation and 
patronage. This divide is what has faced many of the anti-colonial movements in the past, 
and were necessary, in order to overcome the colonial powers. However, the protests of 
modern Africa face a similar challenge, and are not always successful, due to an economic 
and social divide (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).  
 
Politics in Africa has taken on numerous forms, and has been seen to be both violent and 
non-violent in nature. Frantz Fanon has articulated his logic, supporting violent uprisings, 
and by all means necessary kind of thinking (Bond, 2002). However, Africa, during the 
last few years, has witnessed far less violent protests. It has long been the stage of on-
going civil wars, coups, and more recently, non-violent political mobilisation (Branch & 
Mampilly, 2015). More recently, and more so during the Arab Spring, political 
mobilisation was activated and proliferated without the use of arms, and the usual familiar 
guerrillas’ armies. Instead, masses were mobilised with technology and social media, by 
techno savvy youth, centred completely on mass protest (Branch & Mampilly, 2015).  
 The second wave of protest 
The second wave of protests emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, and was focused on 
challenging the new structural adjustment, and the single party rule (Bond, 2002). These 
mass protests were mostly non-violent, but faced an array of challenges. States that had 
emerged from independence, had eventually fallen prey to the same vices, which they 
sought freedom from, and were held hostage by corruption and neoliberalism (Bond, 
2002). In this case, popular protests were an initiated political reaction against the ruling 
party, because of the violation of a theoretical pact that was concluded between them and 
the population. This phase of political protest was organised by students, organised 
labour, political elites, and NGOs, in order to gain access to state resources, by requesting 
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multi-party elections. However, they maintain that the promotion of multi-partyism only 
benefited those, who were resolutely established within civil society (Bond, 2002).  
 
Even though these movements were based on ushering in a new era of change, they did 
exclude rural and political society, as was the case with the national conferences that 
swept francophone Africa. Multi-partyism, according to Branch and Mampilly (2015: p. 
77), was “a way of disciplining long-standing demands for radical change from political 
society” and “the democratisation process also represented a tool for promoting urban 
interests at the expense of the rural, and urban elite interests at the expense of the poor.” 
These authors also maintain that the scope and aim of politics is extended well beyond 
mere elections and democracy, and that the process of democratisation obscured more 
than it illuminated. This implies that heads of states attempt and try to maintain their 
positions of power, through the development of new constitutions, and the suppression 
of protests, not so much to introduce democratic benefits to the people, but as a 
mechanism of political manoeuvring and manipulation (Bond, 2002).  
 
Branch and Mampilly (2015) further elucidate that the rest of the world has, in fact, 
become disenchanted with the process of elections, but that political opposition are 
merely exciting moments, when a convergence of social, economic and political factors, 
spur masses of people to protest for various underlying reasons. In African politics 
especially, economic and political protest are underpinned by the same motives, and are 
the same. In countries such as Libya, the state has, in the past, employed aggressive and 
strict economic mechanisms, to keep the masses abated. This still appears to be the case, 
despite a move towards so called democratisation (Ober, 2009). 
 
It appears that African masses are not so much protesting against the absence of 
multiparty elections, but rather against economic deprivation and violent state power. 
African protests might not necessarily be successful in the long run, but may prove that 
possibilities do exist, beyond the current status quo. In Uganda, all that remains of the 
popular protest is the closed off public square in Kampala (Ober, 2009). Currently, the 
Ugandan government stays in a state of counter-protest, whereas Ethiopia is still a 
counter-protest state. 
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The tribe in Libya is a formidable, yet silent, force that may significantly impact on the 
course of the current political state of the country (St. John, 2014). For this reason, tribal 
dynamics, and how they could impact the current civil war, is of particular interest to 
this current study. Tribes, in the Libyan context, may be defined as a social organisation, 
consisting of smaller branches, characterised by traditions of common descent, 
language, culture and ideology (St. John, 2014, p: 278). The actions, allegiances and 
ideologies of the tribes are always varying, often influenced and based on the changing 
landscape of the state and society (St. John, 2014. P: 280).  
The structure of a tribe in the Arab world is relatively similar, and is constructed 
hierarchically (Wright, 2012). The original tribe is referred to as a qabila (tribe), and 
comprises sub-tribes, named buyut, which are further divided into family groups, 
termed lahma (Kymlicka & Pföstl, 2014). The structure is not exclusively systematic, 
and appears to be a general form of social organisation (Varvelli, 2013). The heads of 
the tribes are called Sheikhs, who wield powerful influence, by providing guidance 
(Roumani, 2014, p: 167). The opinion of the Sheikh is held in high regard, and has been 
used in the past, to influence state policies at various levels of government. This was 
evident, particularly, during the rule of King Idrīs (Varvelli, 2013). 
Even though the entire tribe is socially constructed and affiliated to the main qabila, 
loyalty is affiliated to the lahma (Vandewalle, 2012). This means that loyalty is a bottom 
up approach. For some, the sense of tribalism is not only linked to bloodlines and social 
organisation, but is a means of identifying with a particular ideology. The tribe is, 
therefore, a form of social organisation that allows the grouping of nomadic peoples, 
scattered across the country’s vast spaces, which was the foundation of social order, for 
the better part of Libya’s history (Ashour, 2015). 
Libya is “one of the most tribal nations in the Arab world” (Capasso, 2013, p. 120). 
Tribalism in Libya, as well as the current civil war, plays a powerful and dynamic role 
in shaping the political future of Libya. At present, there are one hundred and forty 
tribes in Libya, of which an estimated forty appear to carry significant political 
influence (Chorin, 2012). Even though tribes were traditionally and historically 
concentrated in certain areas, they still have a series of transnational networks extending 
well beyond visible boundaries (Chorin, 2012). 
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Consequently, the allegiance of tribes to a particular group may ultimately impact on 
the outcome of a war, if the influence was considerable. This is because tribal identity 
and the notion of affinity and favouritism is so deeply entrenched in Libyan society that 
it will have a profound impact on its political condition (Ashour, 201, p: 5). Because 
tribes are naturally branched off into smaller sub-tribes, the sense of allegiance and 
favouritism will prevail in situations that directly impact on the tribe (Anderson, 2014). 
Colonisation has also impacted on the very fabric of the society and people it aimed to 
subjugate, and Libya was no different (Chorin, 2012). Numerous colonisation efforts 
by the Greeks, Romans, as well as the Italians and French, followed by the Sanūsī 
period, have all played their part in the composition and grievances of Libyan tribes. As 
far back as 1050, history has recorded the migration of the Hilalian Arab tribes to 
northern Africa, who either integrated into the native Amazigh tribes, or displaced them 
(Anderson, 2014, p: 4). The Amazigh are reported to have lived in the region since 1000 
BCE (St. John, 2014). The Amazigh have been grossly marginalised and oppressed 
through the eras of colonisation, and especially during the rule of Gaddafi. In addition, 
Arabs settling in the region introduced the culture of nomadism, and more importantly 
the religion of Islam, as well as the Arabic language. Therefore, a cultural invasion was 
initiated, resulting in the arabisation of the Amazigh, who accepted the new religion, 
and adapted to the Arab culture (Anderson, 2014, p: 6). 
 
Although many views reflected that there was a lack of democratic culture in Libyan 
society, it should be noted that tribal structures still carry considerable influence in the 
minds and politics of the Libyan people. The question that needs to be addressed is 
whether the tribal nature of Libyan society is able to enhance, or hinder the process of 
democracy, or whether the lack of democratic culture is not a result of its tribal nature, 
but attributed to Libya’s colonial past.  
 
Tribalism in Libya cannot be removed from the equation, and still infuses and pervades 
every part of Libyan society. It is regarded as an important factor in Libya’s civil war, 
and will play a critical role, invariably, in shaping the political landscape of the country. 
As is reflected in the literature review, tribalism is well established in Libyan society, 
constituting over 140 different tribes where loyalties are often iron-clad. However, only 
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30-40 of these tribes carry significant influence. It should be noted that the notion of tribe 
in Libya is a broad form of social organisation, and should not be confused with an 
ancient static social structure (Varvelli, 2013). Tribal identities are linked, and share a 
strong sense of acting and thinking, comprising ethics, practices and norms, such as 
solidarity of kin, and practicing values, such as honour and shame. These are not merely 
measures of moral judgment, but form the moral basis for tribal institutions and 
procedures, which may be harnessed for the development of new form of democratic 
system. Therefore, it is submitted that, although Libya does suffer from a lack of 
democratic culture, its tribal identity cannot be held responsible for it.  
 
Finding 34 indicates that Libya suffers from a lack of democratic culture, which may be 
attributed to a number of factors. In order to examine why this lack of democratic culture 
can be cited as an obstacle to achieve democracy, it is important to discuss the underlying 
reasons for this finding. Firstly, Libya has a tumultuous history, riddled with inadequacies 
of colonial and post-colonial legacies. These legacies, coupled with autocratic policies, 
defy democracy as a concept, and a form of governance. The remnants of these 
authoritarian legacies in Libyan society, and its operation within regional and political 
frameworks, have also greatly influenced Libyan political life. In addition, the people of 
Libya have been accustomed to a culture of violence, political exclusion, as well physical 
and intellectual oppression. Therefore, the use of violence had also become a means of 
resolving the differences and conflicts on the political landscape, which, consequently, 
led to further instability. Additionally, because Libyans were subjected to intellectual and 
cultural oppression by previous regimes, for decades, a culture of surrender to the state 
or perish had developed. Libya was subjected to regional and international isolation, as 
well, making the country economically weak, and culturally vulnerable to external forces, 
which systematically weakened the society. Based on the findings, it is submitted that 
these factors may have influenced the sample’s view of democracy, in a negative light. 
As reflected in the findings, this was most probably the reason that the concept of 
democracy was coined with negativity for the people, as well as why the respondents 
regarded conditions in Libya as being better, prior to the revolution.  
6.3 Tribal dynamics in Libya 
Finding 35 indicates that the study sample viewed tribal allegiances as a barrier to the 
process of democracy, which might be attributed to a number of factors. The problem 
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that Libya faces is that tribal allegiances may act as both a cause of insecurity, as well as 
an element of peace for the country. To illustrate this point, the clashes between the 
southern tribes in Kufra and Sabha have resulted in the further breakdown of central 
authority, and a revival of a tribal political economy, to some degree (Abu Zayd, 2012). 
Additionally, tensions between the Berber and self-identified Arab tribes exacerbated 
efforts to centralise the administration and unify the country. The Berbers of Nafusa 
mountain tribes have historically been marginalised by the previous regimes, and have 
recently asserted their cultural rights, calling for a return to the federalisation of Libyan 
political system (Maddy-Weitzman, 2015). Obeidi and Obeidi (2013) concurs that tribal 
identification is a major structural instrument in Libyan society, and as a result, a key 
source of political and social and mobilisation. This may present itself as a real problem, 
and may be the reason that the study sample viewed tribalism as a major obstacle to the 
process of democratisation. As democratic mobilisation is founded on the idea of 
citizenship and a civil society, in light of ethnic tribalism, these mechanisms become 
seriously weakened due to tribal and regional allegiances. 
Regionalism may also be considered another structural hurdle that hinders the process of 
democratisation. Representatives of different regions want to assert their own influence 
on the process of state-building. This was best illustrated during Libya’s first elections, 
where the representatives of Cyrenaica demanded equal representation in the parliament, 
as the east. The distribution of 200 parliamentary seats have been allocated as 120 for the 
(south-) western provinces of Tripolitania and Fezzan, and 80 for Cyrenaica, which has 
been interpreted as a power grabbing policy by the political elites in the west (Kjaerum 
et al., 2013, cited in Della Porta, Hidde Donker, Hall, Poljarevic & Ritter, 2018). Regional 
tensions further emerged with the construction of the majoritarian system of voting, after 
the first parliamentary elections. These debates between representatives from the regions 
of Tripolitania (with 67% of Libya’s population), Fezzan (8%) and Cyrenaica (28%) 
resulted in a compromise. Besides the majoritarian distribution of parliamentary seats, an 
amendment to constitution was added, for a parallel system of proportional representation 
to be incorporated (Kjaerum et al., 2013, cited in Della Porta, Hidde Donker, Hall, 
Poljarevic & Ritter, 2018).   
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The respondents’ views reflected a lack of democratic culture in Libyan society, as well as 
tribal structures that still carry considerable influence in the minds and politics of the Libyan 
people. Many tribes expressed their dissatisfaction with the previous Gaddafi regime, as they 
felt marginalised, and denied their fair share of wealth and power (Sawani, 2012). These 
sentiments will have to be addressed by the current government/s, granting equal and fair 
opportunities to all Libyans, despite their tribal affiliations and loyalties. 
Additionally, the marginalisation of some groups and regions, added to a weak central 
authority, prompted many Libyans to demand a return to a federal political system of 
government. A general lack of confidence in the current government to achieve democracy, 
was also expressed in the findings, with many Libyans presupposing that a democratic 
government was not the solution, because of the sluggish progression to demonstrate the 
benefits of an active democracy in Libya. Libya faces an array of challenges on an economic, 
political and social level, which may be traced to the previous regime, and consequently, the 
respondents had no confidence in the current leadership. 
A lack of safety and security was a major consequence of the revolution, and a source of 
significant concern; therefore, a general lack of confidence in the government was evident, 
which may be attributed to its inability to deal with this threat, effectively. For this reason, 
many Libyans have taken up arms to defend themselves, and advised authorities to remove 
firearms and weapons from militia groups. Clashes have infiltrated familial and tribal levels, 
developing into armed confrontations; thereby, creating an internal security threat.  
The challenges faced by the government/s are inter-linked with the political, economic and 
social implications of the Arab Spring in Libya, which the study sample consider barriers to the 
process of democratisation. Although the interim government/s have made attempts at political 
reform, through the establishment of multi-party elections, and free voting, they have neglected 
to meet the current economic challenges that Libyans were confronted with after the revolution. 
These political and economic challenges present barriers to the democratisation process, and 
have to be remedied, if the Libyan government/s hope/s to regain the confidence of its people. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: TOWARDS A LIBYAN DEMOCRACY 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Every democratic transition has challenges and obstacles that should be overcome, to achieve 
its mission. Therefore, the parties that constitute the political landscape of Libyan politics have 
a daunting task ahead of them, in terms of easing the tensions of the political climate. Besides 
these indicators that hinder the process of democratisation in Libya, some necessary 
requirements are still lacking for a successful transition and transformation. After the 
revolutions of the Arab Spring, Libya was transformed from a one-party dictatorship to a multi-
party system, from an enforced closure to an excessive opening, unchecked and unrestricted. 
The parties that came into power lacked vision, experience and maturity, in terms of the 
democratisation process, resulting in a country, steeped in chaos and political confusion. Based 
on the findings derived from this current study, it is submitted that the Arab Spring revolution 
was necessary to start the process of democracy in Libya. The barriers to the process of 
democracy are linked to the imbalance of the political and economic structures of the country, 
as well as the cultural-tribal base of the Libyan society.  
 
In order to address these barriers, related to the cultural base of the Libyan society, the 
researcher argues in favour of the development of a hybrid democracy that takes into 
consideration the broader political, historical and cultural sensitivities of the Libyan people and 
the MENA region.  The problem is that Libya may be in danger of falling into this very trap of 
merely replacing one dictator with another, and ambitions to achieve an electoral democracy 
may develop into an electoral authoritarianism. The Libyan government has a daunting task 
ahead, in terms of seeking an alternative, as well as unique model of democracy, in order to 
initiate a successful democratisation process. However, the concept of democracy has to be 
understood and accepted by a people, who wish to be ruled by a democratic system, or a system 
underpinned by democratic mechanisms. Democracy, in its true sense, is not limited to basic 
practices, such as, once-off free and fair elections, but is a complete system that ensures, and 
grants, rights to all human beings, and wherein all people, regardless of religion or ethnicity, 
are entitled to justice, fairness, equal opportunity and equality before the law.  
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Libya has real challenges, in terms of the tribal loyalties, which many have argued, act as 
barriers to the process of democracy. However, it is submitted, that the tribal nature of Libyan 
society cannot be removed, and should be incorporated into a new hybrid democracy. For many 
Libyans, loyalty belongs to the tribe foremost, and then to the state. In order to actively remedy 
the current democratic crisis of Libya, it may be necessary to, not only to explore how a 
democracy can be achieved through the use of democratic processes, but also how the rich 
tribal and religious bases of the Libyan society could be harnessed to achieve this aim. 
Therefore, the following questions should be considered by government/s and policy-makers 
to address current challenges.  
• What kind of democracy does Libya need, if any? 
• How will the new democracy consider the tribal base of the Libyan society? 
• Will this new hybrid form of democracy be based on a majority rule, on minority rule, 
or on the proportional representation of different tribes? 
• How will minorities, such as the Berbers, be incorporated into the political landscape, 
after years of oppression and marginalisation? 
• Is the tribal nature of Libyan society the barring factor to the democratisation process?  
• Should Libya and other MENA countries consider the development of a democratic-
tribal state that is not predicated on the ideals of a democracy, but founded on the 
amalgamation of tribal concepts, and an Islamic interpretation of democracy? 
 
The following discussion seeks to provide some guidelines to address these questions. 
7.2 African democracy and tribalism 
The ethos of the tribe is based on a sense of social equality and inclusion (Hermann & Seeberg, 
2013). This implies that ties within a tribe, and the matriarchal bond that holds the members 
together, will not break in the face of oppression or marginalisation. Instead, it draws its 
strength from oppression and statelessness, and, as a result, becomes a unified force. This has 
been demonstrated in the era of colonisation, to the Idrīs era and finally the Gaddafi regime 
(Varvelli, 2013). Tribalism, therefore, is growing stronger in Libya, and more so, in the absence 
of a formal state, which has witnessed the emergence of old affiliations and allegiances 
(Wehrey, 2013). These may present problems, or solutions, in addition to the current political 
challenges, already being faced by Libya. Cherstich (2014: p 12) writes, “Libya, therefore, is 
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not failing to become a nation because of tribalism. Rather tribalism is growing stronger 
because in post-Gaddafi Libya, the state is traumatically absent”.  
 
In order to address these challenges, it is important to note that the notion of democracy is well-
known in Africa, and not the product of the western civilisation solely, as it is perceived to be. 
Perhaps, it is noteworthy to mention the views of scholars like Achebe, Chega and Ake, in 
support of the view that Libya is not in need of a western democracy, but a uniquely African 
one, which considers its tribal and religious base. In this regard, Achebe (1990: p. 4) asserts 
that the Africanism and tribalism of Africa has always been viewed by the world as being 
devoid of democratic practices, before exposure to the western world. This notion that Africa 
and its people were in need western political systems, claimed that “bad leadership and deep-
seated ethnic rivalries and economic inequalities” were the challenges, to achieve a democracy 
(Chege, 1996: p. 350). Achebe highlights that, although the western well-wishers provided a 
range of solutions, regarding how Africans should govern their administrative systems, it is 
apparent that the advice rested on two misconceptions. The first is premised on the notion that 
Africans are not familiar with the concept of democracy, and secondly, democracy is a concept 
that can be given to those not familiar with it. However, for scholars like Ake (1996: p. 69), 
“democratisation is not something that one people does for another. People must do it for 
themselves or it does not happen”.   
 
Therefore, democracy has to be grown in Africa, and in this current study, Libya. Isakhan and 
Stockwell (2011) provide some useful discourse, by noting that democratic practices were alive 
on the African continent, long before the arrival of Europeans. While it is true that Africa had 
its fair share of civil wars, as well as several ethnic groups that seemed lawless, these problems 
are, in no way, uniquely African, and a large number of African ethnic groups observed 
democratic practices that governed their daily lives, before the arrival of the colonialists. For 
example, Teffo (2012) states that, contrary to popular belief, Africans were not ruled against 
their will in the past, and followed traditional systems that ensured their people a voice and 
representation in their governance.  
 
Therefore, Africa, and specifically Libya, is not in need of western democracy, but a uniquely 
Libyan one, that considers traditional principles and customary law (Urf), Islamic Law 
(Shari’ah), and wider principles of democracy, such as public participation, free and fair 
representation, as well as freedom of expression. The combination of these factors should be 
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considered in the development of a new hybrid form of democracy, and will depend on the 
degree of democratisation, the country can reach. This process will not only be limited to the 
implementation of typical democratic procedures, such as, competitive elections and separation 
of powers, but also inclusive of wider concepts, namely, principles that ensure the guarantee of 
civil liberties and shared values. In addition to these internal factors for the development of a 
democracy, the role of tribes and religion, as well as their effects on the relationship that exists 
between state and society, should be examined as part of the process.  
 
According to Deng and Wu (2004: p. 40), “It is not be difficult for an unprejudiced mind to see 
signs of democracy in traditional African political life”. Similarly, Ake (1996) also supports 
the view that African democracies existed well before their European counterparts, and these 
democracies were established on democratic values. Even though these tribal societies were 
patrimonial, and their consciousness, communal, there was strong emphasis on participation 
and accountability, and much stricter standards than their western counterparts. Therefore, 
democratic principles are not foreign to the tribal societies of Africa. 
 
In light of this view, examples of some decentralised and centralised entities in Africa could be 
scrutinised. Decentralised entities, such as the Chiga, Iteso, Karamojong and Basoga also have 
democratic practices, as do the hierarchically arranged, centralised entities, such as the Ankole, 
Batoro, Buganda and Banyoro people (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). Even though they shared 
different administrative systems, a strong socio-political administrative feature prevailed, 
which enabled them to govern themselves democratically.  
 
The notion of the ‘tribe’ is controversial across the African continent, both in its historical 
conceptualisation and its practice. Ntsebeza (2005) questions the relevance of ‘Tribal 
Authorities’ within a modern democratic state. His South African case study of the Xhalanga 
community’s vehement opposition to Tribal Authorities captures the sentiments regarding these 
colonial structures, where the primary role of the traditional authorities and headmen was the 
“policing (of) Africans in the rural areas of the Bantustans” (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.173). Although 
this case study focuses on one specific South African rural community’s “long history of 
rejection of chieftainship” (2005, p.173), Ntsebeza maintains that Tribal Authorities are an 
anachronism within modern-day democracies on the African continent.  
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Renowned African scholar and historian Mafeje (1971, p. 261) contemplates if ‘tribalism’ still 
mattered. In his critique of the ideology of tribalism, he asserts that, firstly, the ideology of 
tribalism “over-simplifies, mystifies and obscures the real nature of economic and power 
relations between Africans themselves and between Africa and the capitalist world”. Secondly, 
it draws suspect distinctions between the African continent and the rest of the world. Thirdly, 
it is out of place and in contradiction of the current times, which makes cross-cultural analysis 
nearly impossible. Mafeje therefore concludes that ‘tribalism’ does not have the same 
significance as other universal generalisable concepts with high explanatory power, which 
allows for social scientists to analyse human societies globally. 
The question at this juncture is; how does this apply to Libya?  
 
Although, the notion of the tribe is a controversial one, it should be noted that the Libyan tribal 
dynamics share similarities with their African counterparts such as the Buganda kingdom in 
Uganda. The tribal structures are similar, and more than often, tribal tendencies and loyalties 
of the native people were used by colonialist powers. These methods included direct and 
indirect rule, the latter referring to the system of integrating pre-established native elites into 
the colonial administration system according to Mamdani (1996). Whereas the former, direct 
rule, vested absolute authority with the colonial powers assigning menial tasks to local tribal 
chiefs. In the Libyan case, indirect rule was employed by the colonialists who utilised the tribal 
loyalties of the Libyan people to further their colonial plans. 
 
Tribes are arranged hierarchically, and Libyan tribes are no different. This may be best 
demonstrated by observing the democratic practices, values and norms of the Buganda people’s 
clan. The Buganda people had judicial systems that enabled them to practice a form of 
democracy, based on consensual decision-making, and broad participation in governance at all 
levels, mostly through representation (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011). The Buganda clan system 
had intricate administrative organisations that were responsible for various activities, 
specifically aligned to protect the cultural values and traditions of the clan (Karlström, 1996). 
Overall, each member of the clan was treated as an equal entity, and had a voice in their 
governance. This is, perhaps, the most striking democratic principle practiced: that each 
member had an equal right to vote in their governance (Green, 2010). 
 
It is submitted that Libyan tribes share similar traits with the Buganda clan, in that governance 
of the clan adopted the bottom-up approach. This implies that decisions were consensual, and 
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made at each level. In the Bunganda clan, if the individual felt dissatisfied with the decision, 
resolution or suggestion that was reached at a particular level, he was granted an equal and fair 
opportunity to the take the case to the higher level. In this manner, the Buganda governed 
themselves democratically (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2011) (Karlström, 1996). 
 
However, tribalism is so deeply-seated in the minds of the Libyan people that it cannot, and 
(the researcher argues) should not be removed, as it forms the basis of their unique Arab 
identity. Instead of being viewed as a barrier to the process of achieving a democracy, it should 
be seen as a means to enhance it. The very nature of democracy advocates that people have a 
right to their identity. Besides, being a tribal society, Libyans identify with being adherents of 
the Islamic faith first; therefore, it is the researcher’s view that both the natures of Islam and 
the tribal base of the Libyan society, should not be seen as barriers to the process of democracy 
necessarily, as they share underlying principles with democracy.  
 
To further understand this, it is important to reflect on how democracy was perceived and 
defined, and how its Eurocentric basis has for decades been regarded as the only form of 
democracy. The principles of equality, public participation, protection of human rights and the 
freedom of expression are universal, and can be found in almost any society, as well as most 
religions. These ideals are not foreign to humanity and are found in Islam, as well as many 
cultures, such as African tribes.  
 
Libyans have been subjugated by tyranny for so many years that the idea of a democracy seems 
strange and odd. At best, Libyans should be educated in a democratic culture, so that they will 
be able to receive democracy. Therefore, Libya has to be groomed for democracy, and Libyans 
should view them themselves as citizens with “equal rights, enshrined in constitution and law 
that they should demand, attain and protect and not merely be clients of a patron authoritarian 
ruler.” Under the totalitarian rule of Sanūsī and Gaddafi, Libyans had, and still have, no 
experience, or knowledge of the workings of a democracy. This is evident in the current deficit 
of democratic culture, which may be what impedes Libya from transitioning into a successful 
democratic state. 
7.3 Islam and democracy 
Islam provided the foundations for good governance and statesmanship over 1 400 years ago, 
and many ancient cultures, such as the Assyrians and the great empires of the Middle East and 
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India, in fact, had practiced forms of democracy and flourished, while Europe remained in the 
dark ages. Therefore, it is submitted that a new form of democracy, a hybrid form of democracy, 
may be the solution to Libya’s current democratic crisis. Democracies, as are seen in the world 
presently, are not truly democratic, but are rather hybrid forms of democracy, which sometimes 
emerge as an electoral democracy, or an electoral authoritarianism. An electoral democracy 
and an electoral authoritarianism, although both are based on the principles of elections, tend 
to revolve, crucially, on the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness and meaningfulness of elections 
(Diamond, 1999). The degree of freedom, fairness, inclusiveness and meaningfulness of 
elections have to be closely monitored, if Libya is to transition, successfully, from an 
authoritarian state to a newly democratic one.  
 
In the case of Libya, it is pertinent to address the issue of fair representation for all the different 
tribes of Libya, ensuring that minorities, such as the Berbers, are also fairly represented. 
Kymlicka (2007) argues that modern society is multicultural and that their unique rights and 
cultural sensitivities have to be considered in a truly inclusive democractic system. Although 
these rights conform to what is generally accepted as human rights, such as the right to freedom 
and social justice, the aspirations of such minorities remain unique. Similarly, Libya has some 
minority groups whose cultural aspirations have been muted by previous regimes, and have yet 
to be raised to interim governments and/or appropriate authorities. The researcher shares the 
sentiments of Kymlicka (2007) in this respect, and opines that these minority groups have been 
neglected in contemporary liberal theory. Furthermore, Tully (1995) questions whether a 
modern constitution can recognise and accommodate cultural diversity. He suggests that 
instead of arguing for or against cultural diversity, one should rather consider “the critical 
attitude or spirit in which justice can be rendered to the demands for cultural recognition” 
(Tully, 1995, p.1). This raises the question of whether Libya could learn from global best 
practices in how the various manifestations of the repression of group rights were handled. See 
more detailed global examples in 7.3.1 below. 
 
 Regarding elections, one of the founding principles of a democracy, are free, when the 
candidates and supporters of the political parties have a substantial degree of freedom to, firstly, 
campaign and, secondly, solicit votes (Diamond, 1999). Freedom, in this sense, entails 
considerable freedom of speech, assembly, movement and association in political life, as well 
as in civil society, as a whole (Diamond, 1999). However, when the basic standard of what 
constitutes a free and fair election cannot be met, an electoral authoritarianism ensues, and it is 
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argued that Libya may be at risk of falling into this type of regime. Electoral authoritarianism 
emerges when there is an “uneven playing field between the government and the opposition.” 
Though elaborate criteria have been developed for the assurance of free and fair elections, 
countries, such as Libya, should make use of neutral authorities to administer the elections. 
These authorities should be sufficiently competent to take precautions and measures against 
electoral fraud (Diamond & Plattner, 1996). 
 
It is further submitted that a hybrid democracy would have to be developed, by using the already 
existing principles of Islam, as well as the tribal systems, already practiced by the Libyan 
people. In this regard, Islamic principles do not only provide guidelines for human conduct, but 
also assert social and political order, founded on social justice, equality and the rule of law, to 
name a few. These principles are founded and drawn from the text of the Holy Quran, as well 
as the prophetic model (Sunnah), and comprise consultation (Shura), consensus (Ijma), 
electoral endorsement (Bay’ah), and independent reasoning (Ijtihad) (Kamali, 2002). In 
addition, the social and political order, founded by Islam, includes underlying principles of 
democracy, such as equality, freedom of expression and political participation. All of these 
principles are highly compatible with the notions of democracy and tribalism. In the following 
sections, the main principles of democracy in Islam are discussed.  
 
 Equality 
One of the fundamental principles of democracy, found in the Islamic doctrine, is that of 
equality. According to Kamali (2002) equality has historically manifested itself in four main 
dimensions. These are: (a) legal equality that grants all human beings basic rights and 
protections – the legislation against the women in Saudi Arabia who are legally prohibited from 
engaging in certain social and economic activities, serve to illustrate this point. (b) Judicial 
equality that grants all humans access to courts for fair hearings and treatment - the persecution 
of the Native American Indians over ancestral land conflicts is an example of this violation. (c) 
Equality, in terms of opportunity - the former racist oppression in South Africa during the 
apartheid period, as well as casteism in India illustrate the gross violations of the human rights 
to fairness and access to social, economic and political opportunities in these countries. (d) 
Equality, in terms of religious rights and obligations - the repression of the religious rights of 
the Rohingya in Myanmar and the Uighurs in China are prime examples of the human rights 
violations of these religious minority groups. These dimensions of equality are deeply ingrained 
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in Islamic practices, and do not consider class, race or gender (Kamali, 2002). Additionally, the 
Islamic constitution guarantees civil and religious rights to all people, including minority 
communities, as well as equal rights to freely participate in the daily affairs of the state. The 
first Islamic state of Medina provided the basis for an important historical precedent of two 
theoretical premises that have influenced contemporary political theory (Isakhan & Stockwell, 
2012). These are the theories of a social contract, and a constitution. More importantly, the 
values of consent and cooperation for governance were established.  
 Freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression is one of the underlying principles of a democracy, and one of the most 
basic rights afforded to human beings in Islam. Freedom of expression, according to Kamali 
(2002: p. 163), refers to the “the absence of restraints upon the ability of individuals or groups 
to communicate their ideas to others, subject to the understanding that they do not in turn coerce 
others into paying attention or that they do not invade other rights essential to the dignity of the 
individual”. In Islam, the rights of humans, such as right to life and property, as well as the 
preservation of human dignity, precede the state. This contrasts with the western context that 
witnesses an on-going struggle between the power of the state, and individual rights and 
liberties. However, the relationship between the state and individual rights is fundamentally 
different in Islam, as rights precede state formation.  
 Consultation (Shura) 
Shura is potentially a central democratic principle in Islam, and is generally found in most tribal 
societies. Consultation is the hallmark of good governance, as well as the hallmark in matters 
pertaining to all aspects of life: civil, military, religious and administrative. 
 Popular political participation 
At the heart of elections, is the practical means for the people to assert their sovereignty; this 
does not fulfil the requirements of modern democracies. Elections must be free, fair, and 
sufficiently recurrent, if the people’s will is to be implemented and executed. Therefore, the 
central point is that the process of electing a leader, according to the Islamic perspective, relied 
upon the collective participation of the people, who were treated as equal citizens of the state. 
A system of electoral endorsement, known as bay’ah, ensured that members of the community 
were given the opportunity to convey their acceptance of a particular leader, through an oath 
of allegiance (Isakhan & Stockwell, 2012). This process assured that legitimacy was deliberated 
on a leader, and is completely in sync with popular sovereignty, which regards people as the 
ultimate authority, and the source of the authority of government -- a fundamental principle of 
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democracy. Therefore, consent of the governed will also be attained, and is, yet again, 
compatible with democracy, which maintains that the just powers of government are based 
upon the consent of the governed.  
 
Sandel (1982) views that liberal society is governed by the principles of justice, in order to 
provide citizens with a degree of freedom to govern their lives as they please. However, Sandel 
(1982) asserts that the achievement of such liberal society is limited by the concept of 
liberalism, and a deeper understanding of community is necessary for its achievement. In line 
with Sandel’s views, the Islamic system of rule is governed by a deep sense of individual as 
well as social accountability and responsibility. In Islam, freedom is granted to all individuals 
but is linked to social responsibility. In this manner, social justice and democracy is achieved.  
 
The discussion above highlights that Islam has inherent foundational principles, compatible 
with democracy. However, in practice there are global examples illustrating the blatant and 
deliberate distortion, perversion and violation of these foundational principles of Islam. At the 
political level, Kuwait’s support of the US-led invasion of Iraq, and the Saudi Arabian 
justification of the US war mongering against Iran illustrate the political opportunism that 
supersede the foundational principles of Islam. At the level of global terrorism, the violent and 
deadly practices of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram demonstrate the 
vulgar and perverted interpretation of Islamic principles for devious and destructive motives 
(Mamdani, 2004).   
 
Therefore, it could be argued that while Islam provides theories and principles consistent with 
democracy, the interpretation and potential distortion of these foundational principles resort 
with those who practice their chosen brand of Islam. This holds true for the situation in Libya, 
as well. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
It has been eight years since the revolts that led to the fall of Gaddafi’s regime (2011) yet 
political instability is rapidly escalating in Libya. Despite international efforts to encourage a 
process of reconciliation among the warring groups, fragmentation on a national level in the 
country continues. The Libyan Political Agreement (also known as the Skhirat agreement, 
signed on 17 December 2015) and the establishment of the Government of National Accord 
(GNA) were regarded as positive advances in this critical phase of Libya’s political atmosphere. 
Instead, they have lacked in easing the centrifugal pressures, and upturned the dynamic of the 
on-going conflict. This has been further exacerbated by rivalries between the various power 
centres in the country, from Haftar’s LNA, to al-Sarraj’s GNA, and the Misrata-based political 
brokers. The explosion of weapons in Libya and the diverse militias have, to some extent, 
refuted the presence of politically legitimate institutions that would be able to run the country 
efficiently. Libya is at risk of being overrun by groups, such as ISIS, if they remain disunited 
and fragmented, and is still in a very unstable transitional stage.  
 
Tripolitania would have to be re-incorporated into the greater part of Libya, and a new political 
praxis for Libya would have to be formed. The development of equitable, legitimate and 
reformative institutions that would monitor the current production of weapons in the hands of 
civilian and militant hands, would have to be established. Additionally, supervisory 
mechanisms should be put in place, to prevent the government from falling prey to the same 
avarice mechanisms, employed by the previous regime, to maintain power, that is, the use of 
the oil revenues for political manipulation and convenience. These changes seem almost 
foreign in a country where political dialogue has been muted practically for decades.  
 
Western powers have become increasingly concerned that, if infighting between the different 
political factions continue, and the GNA is not recognised soon by the GNC, further turmoil 
would evolve, allowing the Islamic State and other Islamist groups to gain additional territory 
in the country. The internationally backed Libyan Political Agreement has failed dismally to 
subdue the turbulence and turmoil in the region.  
 
Libya is at risk of descending into a free-fall, if the peace process is not initiated and truly 
applied. The idea of a caretaker government that would accommodate two parliaments and their 
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allies, does not appear to be a plausible solution to the on-going crisis. Libya and Libyans are 
in desperate need of political order, and the reintegration of militias into the political arena 
cannot be implemented, without major international and international repercussions for the 
Libyan people.  
 
Therefore, it appears that the MENA region might have to prepare itself for a new innovative 
democracy that, although it is compatible and recognisable to the west as a democracy, is 
simultaneously merged with ideas of Islam, while maintaining its unique cultural Arab and 
Islamic identity. The western interpretation of a democracy cannot be exclusively applied to 
Arab society that is not governed by the same rules and ideals. Similarly, contesting parties for 
the rule of countries such as Libya and Tunisia, should lend themselves to these liberalising 
tendencies, in order to bring about the process of democratisation.  
 
However, in as much as these societies wish to achieve an Islamicised form of democracy, they 
still lack the institutional mechanisms to achieve these goals. Cultural and ideological 
differences present unnecessary difficulties in reaching agreement on goals, as well as the 
means of achieving them, placing further strain on an already delicate situation. Further ethnic 
and sectarian divisions complicate the development of democratisation processes, institutions 
and practices. 
 
Presently, seven years after the eruption of the Arab Spring in the MENA region and the fall of 
old regimes, these very forces that fought the regimes are competing with secular opponents 
for the control of power, to determine the future of their society. Despite the various divisions 
and disputes among these groups and forces, the demands and desires of all remain, 
fundamentally, similar. These are, the achievement of fair political representation, the provision 
and protection of basic human rights, the preservation of human dignity, and the development 
of an equitable socio-economic structure.  
 
Currently, the Libyan government is still strongly backed by tribal loyalties that wield influence 
in some regions, and many confrontations between opposing groups have been of a tribal 
nature. This sense of deep loyalty to the tribe, before anything else, makes democracy, or rather, 
a western democracy, an un-practicable solution for the formation of the democratic Libyan 
state. Libya may need a shift from a tribally-loyal culture, to a nationalistic culture, where 
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loyalty is to the state and its institutions, before the tribe. Libya needs to start laying the 
foundations and erecting the pillars for the structures of a state, recognise and remedy the 
impacts and remnants of its colonialist past, develop a democratic culture, and address the many 
challenges on the road to democratisation, in order to prevent a new era of tyranny and 
dictatorship. The inclusion of tribal figures is integral to social and political reform, which 
implies including tribal figures into the political landscape, who will work with the state, to 
establish the rule of law and institutions. In addition, Libya may need intellectuals, who are 
experts in the field of democratic transformation.  
 
It appears highly unlikely that the Arab Spring would yield stable, fair, and democratic societies 
any time soon, and the possibility of a need for order by the masses, may lead to the arrival of 
innovative authoritarian systems of government, of either secular, or Islamist variety. This, 
invariably, would lead to a perpetual cycle of dictatorship, and consequently another rebellion 
in the Arab World. 
 
8.1 Recommendations for policy-makers  
The researcher presents these recommendations, drawn from the lessons learnt, during the 
study, as well as the literature reviewed, concerning the causes and implications of the Arab 
Spring, for consideration by policy-makers in the political, economic and social landscapes in 
Libya. The collapse of any authoritarian regime will often introduce insecure periods of civil 
violence, compromised security, and civil war, which could obstruct a relatively easy transition 
from a dictatorship to democracy. This was certainly evident in Libya, which seven years after 
the 17th February 2011 revolution, finds itself quite far from the initial stages of the 
democratisation process, and faces both short- and long-term challenges. Even though most of 
these challenges are shared by other states in the MENA region, there are specific factors 
exclusive to Libya, namely, the political, economic and social challenges that may also act as 
barriers to the democratisation process. Below are some recommendations and conclusions 
derived from this current study. 
 Recommendations for political reform 
Presently, Libya is essentially a country deprived of state institutions, and riddled with 
civil war by opposing parties, fighting for power and wealth. Therefore, it is imperative 
for the policy-makers in Libya to address the challenges that currently hinder the 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
  
194 
democratisation process. This would require a complete reform of the current political 
state of Libya. The following recommendations are offered:  
• The government should establish genuine and operative democratic systems, and 
create more participatory and representative political systems, as well as 
independent judiciaries. 
• Political parties in Libya must be given the necessary resources and time, to 
organise and develop political platforms, so that the Libyan public could become 
familiarised with the various issues affecting economic development, as well as 
the future security of the country. 
• Elections should be halted until political platforms have been developed properly, 
in order to prevent isolated tribal factions, and Islamists, for example, the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), from garnering loyalty in the undeveloped 
Libyan political landscape. 
• The most pertinent and urgent priority is to stop the violence and stabilise the 
country. Establishing and maintaining stability is crucial for the initiation of the 
democratisation process, and should be addressed with clear strategic guidelines, 
for Libya to lay the foundations, and re-build the basic structures of a state.  
• Democratic principles should be implemented within institutions. 
• A constitution, founded on democratic principles that address the political, social, 
religious and cultural structure of Libyan society, should be drafted. 
• The government should encourage and establish comprehensive reconciliation, as 
well as national reconciliation. This could be achieved through the political 
reconciliation of political parties, and the resolving of political crises between 
various political forces. 
• The western state of Tripoli should merge with the eastern one in Benghazi. 
Therefore, it is incumbent that Haftar and al-Sarraj reach a compromise, in order 
to prevent national disunity. 
• The rule of law should be established, and stricter regulatory mechanisms should 
be established, and enforced. 
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• Since Libya is a country in transition from dictatorship to democracy, and still 
facing challenges with enforcing the rule of law, it should improve its legal 
system, so that it could enforce the law, for example, the activation of the amnesty 
law for prisoners who have not committed crimes against the Libyan people. 
• Political reform should be activated, and errors in the political process have to be 
acknowledged. 
• Decentralisation should be considered as a method of advancing democracy and 
development from the bottom-up. This method allows for more participation, and 
transfers managerial authority, capacities, and skills to sub-national levels. 
• Terrorism, violence and armed confrontations have to be eliminated. The 
government should urge militants to engage in political action, by offering legal 
and moral guarantees to those who exercise their political and intellectual right, 
away from the language of arms, or militia. 
• Libya should adopt the liberalising tendencies of a democracy. The western 
interpretation of a democracy should not be exclusively applied to Arab society, 
because it is not governed by the same rules and ideals. A solution may lie in 
increasing the powers of parliament, and decreasing those of the ruling elites. 
Similarly, contesting parties in Libya, should adopt liberalising tendencies, to 
bring about the process of democratisation. 
• The Government should practice accountability, transparency, good governance, 
and strong regulatory mechanisms. 
• Libya suffers from a lack of formal institutions and political structures, where 
neither the power-holders, nor the decision-making processes are clearly defined, 
and accountability for their deeds enforced.  
• Equality before law should be established and tribal domination in the monopoly 
of administrative and political decisions, should be removed, because the state is 
being administered through a combination of coercion, manipulation of informal 
power networks, and close tribal associations. 
• Participatory principles in government should be adhered to in the allocation of 
resources since people should have a say in the running of their own affairs. 
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• Free and fair political participation in decision-making within a framework of 
democracy should be implemented. Government should promote more effective 
forms of participation, especially at the local level. Participation should serve to 
promote more genuine and effective forms of sustainable development. 
• Administrative and financial corruption should be combated through the 
implementation of preventative measures, such as transparency and 
accountability. Government should take legal steps against those parties, 
allegedly committing acts of corruption, and restore, as well as protect the rights 
of persons who have suffered from acts of corruption.  
• Nepotism and favouritism should be removed. The government should appoint 
officials on the basis of their expertise, knowledge, skills and experience, rather 
than tribal affiliations and political connections. 
• The government should reduce the external interference of neighbouring 
countries through the impact on certain political components. 
• In order to avoid and prevent further coups, it is imperative, therefore, for the 
African Union (AU) to disallow unconstitutional change of power, by 
encouraging a political atmosphere of inclusiveness among its members. 
• Finally, formulae have to be devised that would allow for peaceful gun-free 
separation among opposition groups, as a solution to the escalating militia and 
rebel activities that have caused unprecedented human and material suffering and 
loss. 
 Recommendations for economic reform 
Political and economic reforms are intertwined, and in an under-developed country, such 
as Libya, it is ever more so. In order for the democratisation process to succeed, it is 
essential to move forward, simultaneously, on both tracks. Political reforms in the MENA 
region are necessary, but comprehensive democratic reforms cannot be achieved without 
first prioritising economic development programmes. These are necessary to prevent the 
continued instability in Libya, which, potentially, could initiate the re-emergence of 
totalitarian regimes, under the guise of maintaining order and stability. The researcher 
offers the following recommendations to achieve economic reform: 
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• Current governments will have to take a closer look at economic inclusion, which, 
invariably, would require inclusive government arrangements, without 
threatening political leaders. 
• The government’s attention should be focused, equally, on the imbalances of 
Libya’s economic structure, which is currently focused on security issues, in order 
to avoid yet another uprising of the Libyan people. 
• Disparate interest groups and tribal powers should be united, in order to establish 
a cohesive government, and the drafting of a new constitution. 
• Sustainable development should be adopted through democratic exchanges and 
consensus-building. 
• The decentralised, or participatory method should be implemented in the 
development programmes. This organisational arrangement is a democratic 
approach, applied by local communities to assess their development challenges 
and opportunities. Subsequently, these communities could create and implement 
action plans that reflect their shared priorities, such as job creation, education, 
health, and the environment.  
• A decentralised national system should be established. Local communities form 
part of the decentralised national system, whose leaders are elected, based on their 
ability to respond to the consensus decisions of their constituents. Libya urgently 
needs developmental projects, and should enrol the aid of NGOs that have better 
capabilities to enlist resources for developmental interventions. 
• The Libyan economy should be expanded and steered away from absolute 
reliance on its limited natural resources. Subsequently, a diversified and expanded 
economy would harness effective institutional development, leading to the growth 
of the private sector. Consequently, this will give rise to the economic and 
political empowerment, necessary to insist on their right to freedom and 
democracy, which will enhance the success of democratisation.  
• The government should facilitate wealth creation by the people from other 
productive and infinite sustainable sources.  
• State patronage should be reduced, as it is overly-dependent on the primary source 
of people’s income. 
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• MENA countries in the region should work to obtain higher rates of sustainable 
growth, and integrate more wholly into the global economy. This is a necessary 
obligation, in order to generate and sustain significant employment for a swiftly 
rising labour force, ultimately, reducing poverty and developing better living 
conditions for its people. 
• New economic development programmes should be drafted that are founded on 
participatory planning approaches, in order to address the critical human needs in 
Libya. 
• Economic benefits from privatisation should be equitably redistributed to meet 
social objectives, as well as ensure that basic services are improved for low 
income households. 
• Decision-makers should focus on the upgrading of infrastructure and its 
maintenance, to ensure future production capacity, according to population 
growth.   
• Good governance should be applied in all institutions, and spheres of government, 
in order to manage the country’s economic resources effectively, to deliver 
services efficiently and equitably.   
• In order to improve the quality of, and access to basic services, such as health care 
services, electricity and water, regional government should ensure high quality 
services, for taxpayers to receive value for their money. 
 Recommendations for social reform 
One of the main impediments faced by Libya is the pervasive sense of tribalism, general 
lack of democratic culture shared by the local people and a weak civil society. Libya was 
under the rule of its tribes long before Europeans set foot on their lands. The complex 
tribal system in Libya is poignant, perhaps more so than in any other Arab state. 
Europeans came and divided Africa through the delineation of political borders, known 
today as the MENA region. As a result, borders and countries were made with little and 
no regard for the ethnic integrity of local tribes and their legitimacy to rule. Thereafter, 
the concept of an “Arab World” was introduced, branded by the installation of dictators, 
only to be removed at a later stage during the Arab Spring, and yet again in total 
disregard for the local and indigenous peoples.  
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Is the tribal nature of Libyan society the barring factor to the democratisation process? 
Or should Libya and other MENA countries consider the development of a democratic-
tribal state that is not predicated upon the western ideals of a democracy but founded on 
the amalgamation of tribal concepts and an Islamic interpretation of democracy? 
 
Libyans have been subjugated to tyranny for so many years that the idea of a democracy 
seems strange and odd. At best, Libyans should be educated in a democratic culture, so 
that they are able to receive democracy. Thus, Libya has to be groomed for democracy 
and Libyans should view them themselves as citizens with “equal rights, enshrined in 
constitution and law that they should demand, attain and protect and not merely be clients 
of a patron authoritarian ruler.” Under the totalitarian rule of Sanūsī and Gaddafi, Libyans 
had and still have no experience or knowledge of the workings of a democracy. This is 
evident in the current deficit of democratic culture, which may be what impedes Libya 
from transitioning into a successful democratic state. 
 
Tribalism has a two-fold and juxtaposed effect on the process of democratisation. On the 
one hand, it may be harnessed to develop a new form of democracy and on the other hand, 
it might be one of the greatest obstacles faced by Libya in the process of democratisation. 
Tribalism and tribal loyalty is so deeply entrenched in Libyan society that it cannot be 
separated from its very foundation. 
 
Today, the Libyan government is still strongly backed by tribal loyalties who wield 
influence in some regions, and many confrontations between opposing groups have been 
of a tribal nature. This sense of deep loyalty to the tribe before anything else makes 
democracy or at least a western democracy an un-practicable solution for the formation 
of the democratic Libyan state. The following recommendations are suggested to achieve 
social reform in Libya. 
 
• Libya may be in need of a shift from a tribally-loyal culture to a nationalistic culture, 
where loyalty is to the state and its institutions, before the tribe. Libya needs to begin 
by laying the foundations and erecting the pillars for the structures of a state, recognise 
and remedy the impacts and remnants of its colonialist past, develop a democratic 
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culture and address the many challenges on the road to democratisation, in order to 
prevent a new era of tyranny and dictatorship. 
• The inclusion of tribal figures is integral to social and political reform. These include 
the inclusion of tribal figures into the political landscape who will work with the state 
to establish the rule of law and institutions. In addition, Libya may be in need of 
intellectuals who are experts in the fields of democratic transformation.  
• A complete social reform in Libya may be necessary which may comprise a re-
education of democracy and what it entails. 
• A complete shift in tribal loyalism will have to be instated and replaced with loyalty 
to the state and its institutions.  
• Additional democratic principles such as equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, 
independent of ethnic or tribal loyalties, is a necessary requisite for a successful 
transition to democracy. 
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APPENDIX I: In-depth interview guide (English) 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
 Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa 
Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865 
E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Good day. My name is Abdsalam Alahwal and I am a Libyan national. I am PhD student at the 
University of the Western Cape, in Cape Town, South Africa. I do not represent the government 
or any political party. I am studying the views of lecturers at three universities in Libya 
concerning the impact of the Arab Spring and the processes of democratisation in Libya. The 
universities are; The University of Tripoli, The University of Sabha and The University of 
Benghazi. 
Please be assured that your responses will remain confidential. The responses will be collected 
by the researcher in order to gain an overall perspective of the issue. I would also like to assure 
you that it will be virtually impossible to assign a particular answer to any particular respondent, 
so please feel free to share your thoughts with me. This interview will last approximately 60 
minutes. Your participation is offered voluntarily and will be highly appreciated. If you do not 
wish to participate, please know that you are free to do so.  
Do you wish to proceed? 
 
1. What is your occupation? 
2. Did you participate in the uprisings in your city: If [YES] Why? If [NO] [Why not] 
3. What are your reasons for supporting/not supporting the revolution?  
4. What do you think is the main reason people participated in the revolution for? 
5. How do you feel about the removal of the old regime? 
6. Describe the political state of your city before and after the revolution? 
7. Describe the social and economic state of your city before and after the revolution? 
8. Did you feel satisfied/dissatisfied with the country before and after the revolution? 
9. Why do you think the Arab Spring erupted in your country? 
10. Do you think the Arab Spring was necessary/unnecessary? Explain. 
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11. What were the outcomes of the revolution? 
12. How has the current government addressed the challenges after the revolution? 
13. What does democracy mean to you? 
14. Do you think the development of a democracy is possible in Libya? If [YES] Why? 
If [NO] [Why not] 
15. What do you think is the relationship between the revolution and democracy? 
16. Is revolution necessary to achieve democracy? 
17. What are the challenges Libya will encounter in order to achieve democracy? 
18. What are some of the difficulties your city is faced with after the revolution? 
19. How has the revolution impacted on the economic state of your city? 
20. How has the revolution impacted on the political state of your city? 
21. How do you think the revolution has impacted on the process of democratisation? 
22. How do you think people feel about the revolution? 
23. What do you understand by social dissatisfaction? 
24. How do you think the current government is able to achieve social satisfaction? 
25. How do you feel about the use of media during the revolution? 
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 جامعة الويسترن كيب
 جنوب أفريقيا - 5357بيلفل  -71صندوق بريد إكس 
 5683 959 12 72+,فاكس :  3583 959 12 72+هاتف : 
 az.ca.cwu@meirrakaالبريد الإلكتروني : 
   
 
 مقابلة
 
اسمي عبدالسلام الاحول ليبي الجنسية. وأنا طالب دكتوراة في جامعة الكيب الغربية، في كيب تاون، جنوب طاب يومك. 
أفريقيا. أنا لا أمثل الحكومة أو أي حزب سياسي. أنا أدرس آراء أعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب في ثلاث جامعات ليبية 
في ليبيا. الجامعات هي؛ جامعة طرابلس، جامعة سبها، وجامعة  بشأن تأثير الربيع العربي على عملية التحول الديمقراطي
 بنغازي.
 
يرجى التأكد من أن ردودكم ستبقى سرية. سيتم جمع أرائكم من قبل الباحث من أجل تكوين فكرة شاملة لهذه القضية. كما أود 
كة أفكارك معي. وهذه المقابلة تدوم أن أؤكد لكم أنه سيكون عدم اجباركم علي تعيين إجابة معينة، لذلك لا تتردد في مشار
 دقيقة. يتم تقديم مشاركتكم طوعا. إذا كنت لا ترغب في المشاركة فلك الحرية في ذلك. 06حوالي 
 
 هل ترغب في المتابعة؟
 . ما هي وظيفتك؟1
 . هل شاركت في الانتفاضات في مدينتك: إذا [نعم] لماذا؟ إذا [لا] [لماذا لا]2
 دفعتك لدعم / عدم دعم الثورة؟ . ما هي الأسباب التي3
 . ما هو السبب الرئيسي لمشارك الناس في الثورة؟4
 . كيف تشعر حيال إزالة النظام القديم؟5
 . صف الحالة السياسية لمدينتك قبل وبعد الثورة؟6
 . صف حالة الاجتماعية والاقتصادية للمدينة قبل وبعد الثورة؟7
 البلاد قبل وبعد الثورة؟. هل تشعر بالرضي أو عدم الرضي عن 8
 . ما هي أسباب إنتقال الربيع العربي لبلدك؟9
 . هل تعتقد أن الربيع العربي ضروري او غير ضروري؟ مع الشرح.01
 . ما هي نتائج الثورة؟11
 . كيف تعالج الحكومة الحالية التحديات بعد الثورة؟21
 . ماذا تعني الديمقراطية بالنسبة لك؟31
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 تطوير الديمقراطية ممكنة في ليبيا؟  إذا [نعم] لماذا؟ إذا لا، لماذا؟. هل تعتقد أن 41
 . ماهي العلاقة بين الثورة والديمقراطية؟51
 . هل الثورة ضرورية لتحقيق الديمقراطية؟61
 . ما هي التحديات التي تواجه ليبيا من أجل تحقيق الديمقراطية؟71
 الثورة؟. ما هي الصعوبات التي واجهت مدينتك بعد 81
 . كيف أثرت الثورة على الحالة الاقتصادية لمدينتك؟91
 . كيف أثرت الثورة على الحالة السياسية في مدينتك؟02
 . كيف تعتقد أن الثورة أثرت على العملية الديمقراطية؟12
 . كيف تعتقد أن الناس يشعرون حول الثورة؟22
 . ماذا تفهم من عدم الرضا الاجتماعي؟32
 د أن الحكومة الحالية قادرة على تحقيق الرضي الاجتماعي؟. كيف تعتق42
 . ما هو شعورك حول استخدام وسائل الإعلام خلال الثورة؟52
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APPENDIX K: Questionnaire (English) 
 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
1.1  
1.2    Private Bag X 17, Bellville 7535, South Africa 
Tel: +27 21 959 3853, Fax: +27 21 959 3865 
E-mail: akarriem@uwc.ac.za 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB SPRING WITH THE CASE OF LIBYA 
 
Respondent No.    
Data entry No.    
    
 
Site 
 
Tripoli  
Cyrenaica  
Sabha  
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Tick in the appropriate age group. 
1. Gender:    Male   Female 
 
 
 
2. How old are you? 
Below 20 year      21-30 years  31-40  
  
 
 
3. Which language do you speak? 
English  Arabic  
Italian  Other (specify)  
 
 
 
Good day. My name is Abdsalam Alahwal and I am a Libyan national. I am PhD student at the 
University of the Western Cape, in Cape Town, South Africa. I do not represent the government 
or any political party. I am studying the views of students at three universities in Libya 
concerning the impact of the Arab Spring on the process of democratisation in Libya. The 
universities are; The University of Tripoli, The University of Sabha and The University of 
Benghazi. 
Please be assured that your responses will remain confidential. The responses will be collected 
by the researcher in order to gain an overall perspective of the issue. I would also like to assure 
you that it will be virtually impossible to assign a particular answer to any particular respondent, 
so please feel free to share your thoughts with me. This interview will last approximately 15-30 
minutes. Your participation is offered voluntarily and will be highly appreciated. If you do not 
wish to participate, please know that you are free to do so.  
Do you wish to proceed?  
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4. How would you describe: 
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D
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k
n
o
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The economic conditions of your city before the revolution?       
Your own living conditions before the revolution?       
The economic conditions of your city before the revolution?       
The social conditions of your country after the revolution?       
The political conditions of your country before the revolution       
 
5. How do you feel: 
 
A
g
re
e 
   
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e 
N
eu
tr
al
 
D
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e 
S
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o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
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e 
Satisfied with the previous Regime.      
It was necessary to participate in the demonstrations and the 
revolution. 
     
Many people were satisfied with the previous regime.      
Many people did not participate in the demonstrations      
The previous government provided us with safety and social security      
I do feel the need for regime change.      
I think that the Arab Spring was necessary in Libya      
Democracy is achieved through revolution      
Protests and demonstrations are not necessary for democracy.      
The process of democracy has caused more problems or my country.      
I do not think that a democracy is possible in Libya      
I think that foreign intervention in Libya had a negative/positive 
impact on Libya 
     
Foreign Intervention was not useful in Libya      
I think that the Arab spring affected my city negatively.      
I feel that economic conditions of Libya have improved since the 
Libyan Arab Spring 
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I do not feel that unemployment has escalated since the Libyan Arab 
Spring. 
     
I do not feel that the country has improved since the revolution.      
I do not think that a democratic government is the solution to our 
problems. 
     
I feel that the revolution was necessary to start the process of 
democracy. 
     
I think that my living conditions have not improved since the 
revolution. 
     
I feel that the Arab Spring brought about positive changes      
 
 
6. How do you feel foreign intervention has impacted on the process of democracy in Libya? 
 
 
 
7. Do you think the previous government was undemocratic?  
 
 
[YES]           
 
 
___
 
 
NO 
 
 
___ 
 
 
 
8. What do you think was wrong with the previous government? 
 
 
 
9. How do you think the Libyan government is able to achieve democracy?  
 
 
 
10. And what for you would be signs that democracy is being achieved in Libya? 
 
 
 
11. What do you think are the challenges to democratisation as seen by lecturers or students? 
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12. What do you consider to be the most important problems or challenges facing your city 
after the revolution? 
 
 
 
 
13. What do you think are the challenges the current government is facing in developing a 
democracy? 
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14. How do you think the current government is dealing with 
the challenges after the revolution? 
     
 
 
 
y
es
 
N
o
 
I 
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k
n
o
w
 
15. Do you think the Arab Spring has brought about democracy in 
Libya? 
   
 
    
 
 
 
 
END THANK YOU 
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 EPAC NRETSEW EHT FO YTISREVINU
 acirfA htuoS ,5357 ellivlleB ,71 X gaB etavirP  
 5683 959 12 72+ :xaF ,3583 959 12 72+ :leT
 az.ca.cwu@meirraka :liam-E
 
 
 إستبيــــــــــــــــان
 
 ي في الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا بعد "الربيع العربي" حالة ليبيا.فهم عملية التحول الديمقراط عنوان البحث:
 
 رقم المشارك 
 تاريخ المشاركة 
 
 الموقع
 طرابلس 
 بنغازي 
 سبها  
 
 
 
 
طاب يومك. اسمي عبدالسلام الاحول ليبي الجنسية. وأنا طالب دكتوراة في جامعة الكيب الغربية، في كيب تاون، جنوب 
أمثل الحكومة أو أي حزب سياسي. أنا أدرس آراء أعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب في ثلاث جامعات في أفريقيا. أنا لا 
ليبيا بشأن تأثير الربيع العربي على عملية التحول الديمقراطي في ليبيا. الجامعات هي؛ جامعة طرابلس، جامعة سبها، 
 وجامعة بنغازي.
 
جمع أرائكم من قبل الباحث من أجل تكوين فكرة شاملة لهذه القضية. كما يرجى التأكد من أن ردودكم ستبقى سرية. سيتم 
أود أن أؤكد لكم أنه سيكون لكم الحرية في إختيار إجاباتكم، لذلك لا تتردد في مشاركة أفكارك معي. وهذه المقابلة تدوم 
 في ذلك. دقيقة. يتم تقديم مشاركتك طوعا. إذا كنت لا ترغب في المشاركة فلك الحرية 03-51من 
 
 هل ترغب في المتابعة؟
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 ضع علامة في الفئة العمرية المناسبة 
  . الجنس:                            ذكر                               أنثى1
 
 
    
  . كم عمرك؟2
 
  سنة 04 -13   سنة                                    03-12سنة                               02أقل من 
 
 
 
 . أي لغة تتكلم؟3
 الإنجليزية  العربية 
 الإيطالية  لغات اخري 
 
 
 . كيف تصف الاتي :4
 سيئ جدا لا أعلم
 سيئة إلى
 حد ما 
  جيد جدأ مقبول محايد
 الأوضاع الاقتصادية لمدينتك قبل الثورة؟      
 ظروف المعيشة الخاصة بك قبل الثورة؟      
 الأوضاع الاقتصادية لمدينتك قبل الثورة؟      
 الظروف الاجتماعية للبلد بعد الثورة؟      
 الظروف السياسية للبلد قبل الثورة      
 
 
 . ما هو شعورك:5
  أوافق أوافق بشدة محايد أعارض أعارض بشده
 راض عن النظام السابق     
 من الضروري المشاركة في المظاهرات والثورة     
 الكثير من الناس كانوا راضين عن النظام السابق      
 كثير من الناس لم تشارك في المظاهرات     
 الحكومة السابقة قدمت لنا السلامة والأمن الاجتماعي     
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 الحاجة لتغيير النظام     
 الربيع العربي كان من الضروري في ليبيا     
 الثورةتحقيق الديمقراطية من خلال      
 الاحتجاجات والمظاهرات ليست ضرورية للديمقراطية     
 عملية الديمقراطية تسببت في المزيد من المشاكل بالدولة     
 لا أعتقد أن الديمقراطية ممكنة في ليبيا     
     
أعتقد أن التدخل الأجنبي في ليبيا كان له تأثير سلبي و 
 إيجابي على ليبيا
 الأجنبي لم يكن مفيدا في ليبياالتدخل      
 أعتقد أن الربيع العربي أثر سلبا ًو إيجابًا علي مدينتي     
     
الأوضاع الاقتصادية في ليبيا تحسنت منذ الربيع العربي 
 الليبي
 البطالة لم تتصاعد منذ الربيع العربي الليبي     
 هذا البلد لم يتحسن منذ الثورة     
 أن الحكومة الديمقراطية هي الحل لمشاكلنالا أعتقد      
 الثورة كانت ضرورية لبدء عملية الديمقراطية     
 أعتقد أن ظروفي المعيشية  لم تتحسن منذ الثورة     
 أشعر أن الربيع العربي أحدثت تغييرات إيجابية     
 
 
  . ما هو شعورك حول التدخل الأجنبي في عملية الديمقراطية في ليبيا؟6
 
 
 
  . هل تعتقد ان الحكومة السابقة غير ديمقراطية؟   نعم (    )  لا   (    )7
 
 
 
  . اين كان الخطاء في الحكومة السابقة؟8
 
 
 
  . كيف تعتقد الحكومة الليبية قادرة على تحقيق الديمقراطية؟9
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  . ماهي الدلائل علي تحقق الديمقراطيه؟01
 
 
 
  التي تواجه الديمقراطية كما يراها أعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب؟ . ما هي التحديات11
 
 
 
  ماهي التحديات او المشاكل التي تواجه مدينتك بعد الثورة؟. 21
 
 
 
 
  ما هي التحديات التي تواجه الحكومة الحالية في تطوير الديمقراطية؟. 31
 
 
 
 
 سيئ جدا لا أعلم
 سيئة إلى
 حد ما 
  جيد جدأ جيدة الي حد ما
     
. كيف تعتقد ان الحكومة الحالية تتعامل مع التحديات 41
 بعد الثورة؟
 
  نعم لا لا أعلم
   
. هل تعتقد أن الربيع العربي قد أسفر عن 51
 الديمقراطية في ليبيا؟
 
 
 شاكرين لكم حسن تعاونكم على المشاركة فى هذه الدراسة
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APPENDIX M: Editorial Certificate 
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